In declaring this week that he will assume special powers to govern by decree, President Chávez of Venezuela stated: “We are building a new democracy here that cannot be turned back.” By labeling these political changes as irreversible, he revealed the type of democracy he envisioned: one person, one vote, where he is the person and the vote is his.
A generation ago, Latin America was plagued by economic stagnation, debt, inequality, and autocracy. Then, countries like Chile and Uruguay moved away from military rule, transforming into stable, well-governed pluralistic democracies. Governing parties on the constitutional left, such as Brazil’s Workers’ Party, managed inflation and adhered to responsible public finances. These developments improved living standards and expanded freedom. The major exceptions to these trends are Cuba and Venezuela; under Chávez’s erratic and authoritarian rule, Venezuela is the only country in the region where political and economic development is aggressively lagging.
Chávez was elected president in 1998. His administration has been marked by a continuous accumulation of presidential powers, stifling judicial independence, sidestepping parliamentary governance, and undermining the political rights of his opponents. He describes the terrorist known as Carlos the Jackal as a freedom fighter and praises Zimbabwe’s President Mugabe and Iran’s President Ahmadinejad as “brothers.” He is part of an alarmingly long line of autocrats celebrated by the Western left.
These hopes generally reflect more the weakness of radical politics in advanced industrial democracies than any particular interest in foreign affairs. When Chávez visited London in 2006, he was the guest of honor at a luncheon hosted by Ken Livingstone, then mayor of London, who called him “a beacon of democracy and social progress in Latin America.”
The attempted military coup by Chávez in 1992 seems to have been forgotten by Livingstone, or perhaps not known at all. Had it succeeded, it would have ended 34 precious years of democratic governance in Venezuela. The narrative of ignorant radicalism paints Chávez as a rebel against the harsh austerity imposed by the IMF in the 1990s. In reality, his populist demagoguery shattered a fragile political consensus for economic reform, showcasing the power of violence and street politics. Nearly a hundred people lost their lives in his failed coup attempt, most of them civilians.
During his early years in office, Chávez faced significant discontent, including another coup attempt and a wave of general strikes. However, his government has since solidified due to two factors.
First, the strength of energy prices for much of the last decade has inflated Venezuela’s public finances, of which around 50 percent come from oil revenues. However, even this entirely fortuitous boost to the economy has been squandered. Economic mismanagement has led to a whopping 30 percent inflation rate in Venezuela.
Second, Chávez has intimidated his opponents and has progressively stripped the political system of checks and balances. This is the context in which he has assumed new powers. Under the pretext of responding to flooding, as stated by an opposition politician, he mounted a coup against the Constitution. Chávez fits a familiar model of Latin American strongmen whose time should have passed long ago.