ON CLOSURE. I have been confirmed that a group of Venezuelans seeking justice against those who have plundered the country is preparing a detailed list of “closet chavistas” who have made big profits under chavismo. This doesn’t refer to the typical insiders who flaunt their wealth and connections to the regime; rather, it concerns a vast group of individuals who have engaged in various deals with the government while mostly trying to avoid politics. What are they doing with the list? They are drafting a comprehensive report intended for the State Department to enact punitive measures against those who have facilitated the looting of Venezuela. One involved party has committed to deliver at least the list of “closet chavistas” from Zulia. As soon as I receive it, I will publish it.
BRAIN. Just as I was wrapping up this column, an intelligence source advised me to investigate the current mayor of Vargas municipality in La Guaira state, Colonel (Ej) José Manuel Suárez Maldonado, who has been identified by the United States as the true mastermind behind the Cartel de Los Soles.
FOSPUCA [VI]. If everything I’ve explained about the enormous scam Gian Carlo Di Martino set up with Fospuca seems outrageous, let me clarify that this is just the tip of the iceberg. More is coming. The initial idea of the partnership with Fospuca, essentially an alliance with Maduro and Cilia Flores, is that this company, legally owned by José Simón Elarba Haddad, would not only be responsible for waste collection in Maracaibo but also provide services in San Francisco in a joint operation. Although this has not been officially announced yet, Fospuca has already rented a large space in Mall Paseo San Francisco for their administrative offices in this municipality. This implies that the service delivery in the southern municipality has already been discussed and should happen soon. I assume they are finalizing operations in Maracaibo before taking over the southern part of the city. But it doesn’t stop there; as part of the initial plan, Fospuca is also supposed to manage the landfill, which, in addition to waste and bad odors, is an extraordinary source of revenue. This business will also benefit Gian Carlo Di Martino. Thus, the deal with this company will yield profits for the Italian and his gang through various channels: tax collection, inflated service billing, and landfill management, not to mention the income from contracting trucks from external suppliers. It’s a perfect business! However, if you thought this was all, think again, because Fospuca is also mentioned as a potential manager of a recycling plant purchased by fallen businessman José Enrique Rincón, which, as part of the spectacle orchestrated by Diosdado Cabello, is about to be handed over to the assets of the Zulia Governor’s Office. Do you now understand the true dimensions of Di Martino’s scheme?
EAGLES. I’ve been a fan of the Águilas del Zulia since I was a kid, and even though I am not a sports journalist, I always keep an eye on everything related to the team. I must confess that I’ve noticed some strange behavior with their management throughout the last tournament, as it was evident they invested more money than usual in hiring imported players and signing Venezuelan players who aren’t cheap. Many will say it’s normal for teams in the Venezuelan Professional Baseball League [LVBP] to invest in entertainment, which ultimately is their revenue source, but the thing is, unfortunately, the Águilas del Zulia is not an ordinary team; it’s a family business that has always been the family Machado’s golden goose. How is it the “golden goose”? Because everyone in the family wants their share of the pie, as the rest of their family businesses have been declining for several years. And since the family has grown, the pie must be cut into more pieces, thus slicing the revenue of the team, which mainly comes from government support and to a lesser extent from the agreement with Empresas Polar. When the pie is divided, what’s left for the team’s operating expenses is just a small piece of the total, hence why every year they hired “cheap” players who often turned out to be flops. However, last tournament, that changed slightly, evidenced by the team’s performance. Even the hiring of Lipso Nava was a sign, as he is not a budget-friendly player. At that moment, I had the feeling that someone had joined as a shareholder, but I had no information about it. The topic seemed frozen until a few days ago, when a wide restructuring was announced, placing the team in the hands of César Suárez Jr. and his father César Sr. Why do these changes stand out? Because it’s clear that the structure has shifted from a small one to a much larger, professional one, which implies higher costs, and the financial situation of the team under the Machado family is dire due to the mentioned pie division. I conducted some preliminary inquiries and was confirmed that the Suárezes apparently purchased a share package and placed the condition that they would manage the team for at least three years, during which they aim to recover their investment, hence all the changes being implemented. Is this negative? Not yet, and the capital injection could be a way for Águilas del Zulia to become that competitive team from years ago again. However, in revolution times, there is always a “but,” and that’s what I’m checking into, as a share package that grants control over a company involves a hefty investment, and I’m unclear about just how much money the Suárezes have for such a decision. That’s why I’m investigating, and if I uncover anything strange, I will let you know. For now, the restructuring, intentions, and initial moves seem positive, but we need to wait for the season to see the results on the field.
TRIP. As we had previously mentioned in this column, Manuel Rosales has begun his journey to the United States. He crossed the Colombian border last Wednesday, August 27. With the amount of luggage, it’s not a short trip; he plans a long stay. He is not going solely to relax or visit family, but true to his ways and excessive ambition, he has another mission. One that is not exclusive to him, as it also entails a task from his regime friends. In fact, Maduro mentioned in one of his last addresses that Rosales and Stalin González had traveled to the U.S. to advocate for the “country,” when all signs point to them acting as emissaries for chavismo seeking a truce. It is even presumed that when Maduro claims the two communication channels with the U.S. are “malfunctioning,” one of them is the opposition serving as a link with the Trump administration. But that isn’t Manuel’s only mission. What’s the other one? It is said within Un Nuevo Tiempo that he went to offer himself to lead a civil transition. Rosales combines this task with his assigned role while pursuing his own, somewhat inflated personal ambition to salvage his tarnished image. Will he gain support from the White House? I doubt it, as he is part of a list of opposition figures aligned with the regime who are all fully identified. He wants to lead a political transition? That doesn’t not seem like much to my buddy Rosales.
FAILURE. If we consider what Maduro recently expressed alongside other events, it can be concluded that all the regime’s attempts to negotiate a truce with the United States have failed. What did Maduro say? He admitted that the “two communication channels with the U.S. are malfunctioning.” This clearly infers that nothing offered by Jorge Rodríguez, alias “Gaviota” in intelligence circles, has convinced the gringos to relent in their “maximum pressure” strategy. But if Jorge is one channel of communication, what’s the other? It’s presumed that this second channel is the opposition financed by the regime, which still has avenues to discuss with representatives of the U.S. government. Moreover, I infer that this failure is one reason behind “Gaviota’s” trip to China. What did JR go to seek? I presume protection against the U.S. offensive. I don’t believe it to be military protection since China is too distant from the Caribbean theater but rather diplomatic protection so the country could shift from a tepid stance to a more aggressive and active position that tries to dissuade the United States from increasing pressure on the regime. Although we mustn’t discard that he may have sought to explore the possibility of China providing refuge if they need to flee Venezuela. Returning to the initial topic, there’s no doubt that the regime has burned all their bridges in seeking to agree to “peace” with the White House, but has achieved nothing. Thus, Maduro expresses concern over this evident failure. By the way, why the code name “Gaviota” for Jorge Rodríguez?
ACTIONS. After the deployment of the Amphibious Group “Iwo Jima,” which was reinforced with a missile cruiser and a nuclear-powered submarine — though not armed with nuclear weapons — it’s natural to wonder: What are the next steps of the U.S. against the regime? The assault on the drug-laden boat is already one initial response, but many other actions are presumably planned within the “maximum pressure” strategy. Let’s take a look at what could be the next steps. The first is quite clear: a total maritime and aerial blockade of drug trafficking operations. With the destruction of the boat and the death of its 11 passengers, the United States sends a very clear signal that they are not playing around. Such responses are not normal, as military and security forces typically aim to apply non-lethal force to seize the vessel, confiscate drugs, and arrest those involved; but here they opted for total destruction. This will undoubtedly bring operations employed by Cartel de Los Soles and their buyers to a complete halt, as most transactions occur at sea. If the U.S. task force detected and neutralized this boat, it’s reasonable to assume there is total monitoring that includes everything entering and leaving Venezuela by air; therefore, it wouldn’t be surprising if they soon start intercepting planes used for smuggling narcotics. It’s likely some of you may wonder what will happen regarding the vast border with Colombia, and the answer is clear. Beyond Gustavo Petro’s positions, Colombia’s military institutions are allies of the U.S., and I presume they will play a role in establishing a blockade on that border. This is a crucial step to suffocate the business and put pressure on those involved. Additionally, among the forthcoming steps, should be targeting the regime’s operational centers, businesses, investments, and properties in various countries. In this case, Panama becomes an important target, as we must remember that this nation has been used by chavismo for several years as its primary hub of shady operations. Coincidentally, Panama was one of the first countries to follow the U.S. lead and label the Cartel de Los Soles as a “terrorist organization.” Another country where the U.S. can target regime interests is the Dominican Republic, where chavista elites and their insiders have made investments in luxury properties and assets. Interestingly, the Dominican Republic also deemed the Cartel de Los Soles a “terrorist organization.” It’s equally critical not to overlook the so-called “triple border” between Brazil, Paraguay, and Argentina, which is globally recognized as a zone housing not just international drug trafficking but also terrorist groups like Hezbollah. It’s worth noting that the “maximum pressure” strategy should include actions not only abroad but also on U.S. soil, where hundreds of chavistas and insiders involved in the Venezuelan tragedy reside. What is Donald Trump’s management seeking with these multi-front attacks? As previously analyzed in earlier columns, it must outline the following objectives: 1) pressure for a real political negotiation that leads to reliable elections, 2) fracture the ruling brotherhood so that its leaders pursue individual negotiations when a group negotiation is impossible, 3) decapitate the regime and lay the groundwork for a transition back to democracy. We must remain vigilant regarding the upcoming moves from both the U.S. and chavista leaders.
ENTREPRENEURSHIP. The multi-connected individual and president of the Maracaibo Mayor’s Fair Committee, Omar Enrique, has a new “entrepreneurship” underway. It’s called Centralia, a culinary center that brings together three specialized restaurants in one place: Tanoshii [Japanese cuisine], Polanco [Mexican gastronomy], and Volterra [meat dishes]. Located at 75th with 3H, where the El Delfín restaurant and other nearby businesses used to operate, it spans over 1,000 square meters of construction, designed by a prestigious architectural firm using materials of immense quality and high cost. Clearly, Omar Enrique’s new venture isn’t for the common people but aims at an elite social class that can foot the hefty bill for its menu. I have no doubt that this guy has thrived in his dealings with the revolution, which, by the way, aren’t limited to the musical events he organizes for the revolutionary circus; he also maintains businesses in the oil industry and other areas.
SIGAT. Remember when I explained the scam regarding the SIGAT a couple of weeks ago? Well, a few days ago, the Maracaibo Mayor’s Office formally announced the incorporation of the “Tax Management and Administration System” [SIGAT]. Recall that this software was created and managed by Sirumatek Soluciones, RIF: J-40335450-2, which is essentially a front for a business tied to José David Cabello Rondón, head of SENIAT, benefiting the PSUV. How are they favored? Sirumatek charges pro-government municipalities 5% of the total amount for all transactions made through the system, but this money doesn’t enter the company’s coffers; it goes directly to the finances of the ruling party, in a vulgar triangulation that legalizes corruption through the PSUV. And how does Sirumatek sustain itself? By taking a percentage from opposition municipalities, since that money does go to their accounts, which is why they prefer working with opposition mayors. As of now, Maracaibo municipality is a direct taxpayer contributing to PSUV finances. Now, curious readers may wonder whether the incorporation of SIGAT nullifies the possibility that Gian Carlo Di Martino will hand tax, rate, and service collection to Fospuca in the coming months, and the answer is no. Why not? Because SIGAT is software that automates tax collection and municipal procedures, but it does not handle a vital part of the collection process, which is direct billing, a strong suit of Fospuca. This company allocates teams that, together with the municipal tax authority, visit taxpayers not only to collect dues but also conduct audits and raise fiscal concerns. So sooner or later, Di Martino’s management, alongside Fospuca, will unleash a full operation aimed at finding money — even from unlikely sources. Perfectly crafted in revolution!
CAPRILES. Henrique Capriles Radonski is a clear example of a politician who could have been someone, but wasn’t. From being a real alternative to Hugo Chávez, he has sadly morphed into an ally and puppet of the regime. Once a mayor and governor who toppled chavista hegemony, today he defends Maduro and his ilk. Was Capriles a deception from the beginning? No, I believe he genuinely sought to be the leader of the Venezuelan opposition, but ultimately this goal faded due to his lack of leadership, temperament, and clarity to navigate a process that has always faced severe difficulties. The only time I saw HCR in person was in 1999 when he made his first campaign tour to Zulia, as at that moment he was put at the helm of Copei’s list of candidates for deputies from our state. I remember interviewing him for PANORAMA when he debuted before the zuliana political community. He was an absolute unknown. The people of Zulia didn’t know him, nor did he know them. At that time, he was a young man starting in politics and was utterly inexperienced. By fate’s circumstances, he was a two-time presidential candidate and closely resembled the profile of a politician who could defeat both Chávez and later Maduro. He always lacked character or “guáramo,” as we Venezuelans say. There is very little left of that Henrique who wished to lead those Venezuelans who cherish democracy, to say nothing due to his evident alliance with chavismo. What does he gain from this deal with the regime? Power, money, or what? I doubt it’s money; he was already wealthy by birth and must be even richer thanks to his term in government. Power is also scant because beyond receiving a party and some deputies in the National Assembly, he has come to be nearly politically indigent. If it’s not power nor money, what does he gain being part of the official’s scorpion court? I have no idea. What I am sure of is that he is a loyal ally of the regime, which he confirmed once again when he dismissed the existence of the Cartel de Los Soles and even requested proof from the United States. Now, he claims he is a victim of a hate campaign, and that’s true, but it’s a campaign he incited through his behavior and isn’t an orchestrated strategy. Simply, part of the Venezuelan population stopped being foolish a long time ago and now can identify those colluding with chavismo. Returning to the initial topic, Capriles is an excellent example of the politician who could have been, but wasn’t.
ESCAPE. If the escape of opposition figures sheltered in the Argentine embassy in Caracas, part of operation “Guacamaya,” was spectacular; the evasion of bolichico Francisco Convit is also quite stunning because he was not in a diplomatic venue but in SEBIN cells. He didn’t have outside support but orchestrated everything with the help of intelligence officials and some heavyweight regime figure interested in his release to collaborate with U.S. justice. Was he directly a prisoner of Diosdado Cabello? Not directly, as it was Nicolás Maduro who ordered his detention, although DC was the warden since he was held at SEBIN. Whom does the information Convit possesses harm? Clearly Maduro, Cilia, and their closest circle. Does he aim to collaborate with U.S. justice? That seems the most logical step after the escape, considering he and his family need protection; however, he’s also accused in that country of being part of a network that embezzled over 1.2 billion dollars from PDVSA. Moreover, if we think negatively, Convit might be an emissary of someone within the regime interested in indirectly collaborating with the United States as a means of escaping the “maximum pressure” strategy. That “someone” could have been the one who facilitated his escape. I have the feeling we’ll soon find out Francisco Convit’s next moves.
DETAINED. An intelligence source kindly clarified the real situation of Major General Néstor Reverol. He was indeed detained and subjected to intense interrogations. He is not in any SEBIN or DGCIM dungeon, but rather at his home in Caracas and under strict surveillance. He was granted an unofficial “house arrest,” raising many questions as to why. This is Reverol’s third arrest in less than a year. The first occurred due to his ties with the demonized businessman, José Enrique Rincón, in late 2024. Then, this year he was captured again as part of the operation that nabbed the five narco mayors from Zulia. And now he’s been “cooped” once more. What’s happening around Reverol? There are whispers that a powerful figure in chavismo wants to use him as a “bargaining chip” in a negotiation attempt with the United States. Why would Reverol interest the U.S.? He’s labeled one of the founders of the Sol Cartel in the 80s and 90s, which later evolved into the Cartel de Los Soles; but I’ll share those details in a future column.
CONFRONTATIONS? Through two different channels, I received the same information: the clashes between Luis Caldera and Gian Carlo Di Martino have escalated in intensity. What’s going on? The Governor of Zulia is very aware that the Italian seeks to overshadow his work in Maracaibo to emerge as the leading chavista in Zulia and is already opposing several of his alternatives. No one within the PSUV doubts that Di Martino is not content with just being the mayor; he aspires to be the gubernatorial candidate, and to achieve this he needs Luis Caldera to fail. GDM has the advantage that whatever he accomplishes in Maracaibo will be pivotal for his hopes. On the Palace of Los Cóndores side, there is complete clarity regarding Di Martino’s ambitions, and thus skirmishes are already underway. Conflicts will soon arise over various projects in the Zulia capital, and this situation will continue to escalate. I wouldn’t be surprised if the confrontation extends to the PSUV in Caracas.
Darwin Chávez|@Darwinch857|[email protected]