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Home » V Congreso del ELN Revela Desprecio Por la Legalidad y Reafirma Estrategias de Guerrilla en Venezuela

V Congreso del ELN Revela Desprecio Por la Legalidad y Reafirma Estrategias de Guerrilla en Venezuela

The V Congress of the National Liberation Army (ELN) made it clear that legality is not a concern for the Colombian terrorist group operating in Venezuelan territory. Any claim regarding their disarmament and adherence to democratic norms is nothing but a fantastical invention.

The ELN continues to employ a strategy that combines armed struggle as a fundamental tool with an openness to political solutions, always under the premise that legal avenues are closed for popular movements. Their participation in dialogues serves as a tactic to assess the “real willingness” of the State. In other words, the double standards of these terrorists are evident in the document produced from their gathering, titled “Revolutionary War, Popular Power, and New Nation.”

The ELN focuses on building “popular power” and consolidating a “social and political movement” with an insurgent mindset, which encompasses mass mobilization, public management, electoral competition, and leader training.

They reaffirmed commitments made in a previous congress concerning the defense of Venezuela’s Bolivarian Revolution in the event of violent aggression by imperialism.

Wearing Down the “Enemy”

For the left in general and for the terrorist guerrilla in particular, there are no adversaries, only enemies that must be eliminated. In this context, the document acknowledges the complexity of urban warfare and the need for a “high level of specialization and professionalism” to operate effectively, targeting “strategic enemy objectives.” They aim to apply the “New Vision of Operation (NVDO)” to wear down the enemy and counteract their technology.

Moreover, it promotes active participation from the people in the conflict through a “mass insurrectional force” that goes beyond militias, incorporating various popular guards, civil disobedience, and “soft coup” strategies.

The ELN is aware of the “integral military offensive from the enemy” and proposes rigorous security, intelligence measures, and technological adaptation to preserve strength and maintain operability.

Overall Strategy and Position on the Conflict

The V Congress of the ELN reaffirmed its identity as an armed organization “because we understood that legal channels were closed for the struggles of the people; we still believe this today.”

The terrorist organization sees participation in peace dialogues as a tactic rather than a shift in their fundamental perspective. Therefore, they engage in dialogues “to assess the real intentions of the Colombian government and State; if we conclude that weapons are no longer necessary, we would be open to discussing whether to stop using them.” They present a cautious stance regarding the possibility of disarmament.

They agreed that their efforts would focus on achieving “national leadership around the proposal of a new nation.” They aim to build national consensus and a political and social movement alongside popular insurgency, pushing toward a governance crisis that could lead to the new model they intend to establish. The consolidation of communism is viewed as the only way to lay down arms.

National Mass Leadership

The V Congress of the National Liberation Army (ELN) approved the establishment of the National Mass Leadership (CMN) as “an instrument for the ELN’s direction to foster social and political cohesion in relation to the country and the world.” This will seek to develop a national mass plan, guide the political and social action of mass forces, project and develop popular movements, and connect these efforts with the rest of the nation and international popular struggles.

They agreed on creating structures called “Joropo” and “Joropitos,” where the “national joropo” serves as a consultative and harmonizing space convened by the CMN, while “joropitos” operate at the regional and urban level for the development of “convento.”

They aim for urban-rural integration conceived as “part of a process to build the ELN, taking an integrated view of cities, regions, and urban, suburban, and rural spaces.” Key cities include Barranquilla, Cartagena, Cúcuta, Bucaramanga, Barrancabermeja, Medellín, Bogotá, Cali, Popayán, and Neiva.

The strategic goal is to establish “unique city directions” in a strategic horizon, starting with unified mass leadership within a year, harmonizing actions amongst both factions in instruments like “Teatro-Cepal” and “Convento.”

The remainder of the organization consists of various structures including an ideological department aimed at shaping public opinion, training militants, and guiding national work plans. It features a national direction (DN) comprised of 17 members, and a National General Staff (EMN) responsible for overseeing the national military plan, executing missions, training forces, monitoring regional plans, and promoting the creation of Regional General Staffs (EMR) and Urban General Staffs (EMU).

Revolutionary Armed Struggle and Popular Insurgency

For the V Congress of the National Liberation Army (ELN), it is crucial to confront, wear down, bog down, neutralize, and break the “enemy’s” design for annihilating the insurgent and popular movement; that is their goal.

They propose to recover lost areas and refocus confrontations, aiming to strike strategic “enemy” objectives through a regionally designed strategy, with an emphasis on urban zones. Their goal is to legitimize themselves in the eyes of the population.

Considering the “enemy’s” capacity, they stressed the importance of information security, avoiding locators, eliminating routines, and controlling command to prevent demobilization. Neutralizing enemy technology, including tactical aviation capabilities, is essential.

They advocate for a high level of specialization and professionalism in urban operations, progressing from simple to complex tasks. They express a commitment to maintaining a state of permanent war, secrecy, compartmentalization, internal networking, and development of specialties. They argue that urban areas serve as “enemy rear” and “economic epicenter,” providing a “broad array of operational opportunities: economic, political, and military.”

They call for the application of the “New Vision of Operation (NVDO)” to strike the enemy behind their lines and inflict damage on infrastructure and personnel. They advocate for both irregular and conventional warfare while stressing the importance of remaining connected to the populace; countering technological advances and employing guerrilla warfare tactics. They also propose sabotaging the Armed Forces.

They assert that “popular insurrection goes beyond mass military struggles; it’s the ability of the masses to develop their own power.” They agreed to study the Pentagon’s “soft coup” as an integral war strategy that combines “insurrectional preparation of social sectors, with specialized military commands and imperialist military intervention.”