Recently, I managed to partially access the list of rejected names from those proposed by Gian Carlo Di Martino to join his government cabinet. These individuals failed to pass the PSUV filters in Caracas. Among the rejected are: Giovanni Marzocca, Joemel Robles, Marilene Huerta, Hanner Pérez, and José Primera, to name a few. Clearly, the PSUV made a significant cut against the “Italian gang.” Interestingly, I’ve been informed that “Bombillo” secured a contract for his brother to repair 10 police vehicles in Polimaracaibo. Arriving and cashing in…
LIST. As promised, the group of Venezuelans seeking justice provided me with the list of closet Chavistas from Zulia. Despite my insistence, they did not hand over the national list. There are 80 names on the list from the Zulia region alone. How did they identify them as closet Chavistas? They conducted extensive investigations to uncover their links to the Chavismo, mainly through shady business dealings while attempting to remain on the sidelines of the political conflict. Some have been part of a money-laundering team, and they’ve maintained a lifestyle inconsistent with the country’s crisis and their legitimate income. I clarify that I have no involvement in the creation of this list; I merely provide information about the work done by this group of Venezuelans. Without further ado, here are “the closet Chavistas of Zulia”: Juan Pavan, Julio César Reyes, Lionel Oliveros, Miguel Daher, Miguel Virla, José Guillermo Virla, Alexis Morales, Francisco Juaristi, Joan Fereira, Joisy Fereira, Javier Fereira, Iván Ocando, Umberto Banfi, Nicolás D’Alessandro, Aulo Ortigoza, Andrés Ortigoza, Gabrielle Ortigoza, Ezio Angelini, Marcos Marín Soré, Carmen Pavan, Giovanni Marzocca, Luciano Fontana, Michelle Giurdanella, Benito Montiel, Andrés Atencio Yepes, Renzo Basso, Gianpaolo Basso, Raizi Caberlín, Ernesto Pineda, Mario Chaars, Ricardo Morón, Ricardo Morón hijo, Santiago Morón, Leonel Salaverría, Antonio Moschella [padre], Antonio Moschella [hijo], José Muñoz, Ricardo Ramones, Henry Ramones, Roque Rodríguez, Biaggio Parisi, Leonel Bracho, José Luis Bohórquez, Alberto Parra, José Buitriago, Olaida Villalobos, Franco Sampieri, Alessandro Nanino De Cándido, Omar Hernández Mejías, Alexander Rossetti, Luciano Milli, Oscar Posada, Juan Barboza Rubio, Isabel Rangel Barón, Daniel Rangel Barón, Tony Salucci, Hugo Molina, Ángel Emiro Vera, Eliodoro Quintero, Alexander Montilla, Gastón Guisandes, Pedro Pablo Guisandes, Salvador González, Carlos Salazar, Wilmer Pérez, Giuseppe De Pinto, Renny Rojas, Cirenia Paola Gómez, Ángel Lombardi Moratinos, Carlos Rendón, Alex Balza, Giuseppe Sblano, Pbro. Nedward Andrade (Parroco de la Basílica), Pbro. Richard Colmenares (Director de Niños Cantores), Argenis Carruyo, Eudomario Carruyo, Mario Carruyo, Endri Méndez, Jaime Indriago, and Argenis Sánchez. I leave you with this nugget, which I repeat, I have no influence or responsibility over.
WAR. Contrary to popular belief, the purge in the judicial mafia of Nicolás Maduro and Jorge Rodríguez, led by Tarek William Saab, is not a mere “settling of scores” among high-ranking SEBIN and PNB officials. On the contrary, this issue should be seen in the context of the treachery that is escalating within Chavismo. Why? Because to strike at judges and prosecutors who were part of the terror machinery that tortured, invented crimes, and sentenced citizens and political leaders requires much more than just holding a high position in those agencies. After conducting several inquiries, sources confirm that the mastermind behind this operation is Diosdado Cabello, who aims to dismantle the judicial mafia of his internal enemies to create his own. To understand this initiative, one must go back several years when it became “legal”—for lack of a better term—for some prosecutors to engage in business tied to the cases they handled. Why were they allowed such dealings? Because their salaries were so meager that enabling additional income ensured compliance with any order, no matter how absurd, to maintain that cash flow. Among the fallen prosecutors are those specialized in torture to maintain their status. At that time, Diosdado Cabello backed this policy of “judicial human resources” [excuse the dark humor], knowing it would someday serve as his weapon, and that time has come. Now the behavior they were authorized to engage in is being turned against those implicated. Meanwhile, Diosdado is forming his own judicial mafia and even using it to recruit allies. Want an example? One of the beneficiaries of this new judicial underworld will be Bernabé Gutiérrez, who through his brother José Luis García Parra [a magistrate of the Civil Cassation Chamber of the TSJ] will be able to appoint new prosecutors and judges. It’s worth noting that in this manner, Cabello is seeking to ally with one of the bigger scorpions. If he’s doing this with Bernabé, it wouldn’t be surprising if he offers similar advantages to other alleged opponents who only elicit disgust. I understand Nicolás is quite unhappy with Tarek, and that’s why, despite having offered a handshake, he blatantly ignored him at a recent official event. In this current landscape, what use is a new judicial mafia to Diosdado? It’s clear that this way he is gaining greater power while his enemies within the brotherhood are more concerned about the Americans, neglecting their internal conflicts. Additionally, DC aims to become the go-to person for Americans to talk to in order to resolve the crisis.
EAGLES (III). All assumptions about Chavismo’s investment in the Águilas del Zulia have been confirmed. What remains unclear is how a group of insiders, including Omar Enrique, Fidel Madroñero, and Antonio “Potro” Álvarez, seized control of the team. César Suárez junior serves as the public face of this appropriation of the traditional baseball team. He is the one taking orders and making decisions. A knowledgeable source attempted to downplay the role of Chavismo’s funds, claiming it is merely financial support for the Machado family to resolve the club’s crisis, invest in quality players, and contend in the championship. They even suggested that participants are doing this to support fans expecting the Águilas to return to their winning ways. If I take this source at its word, we’re supposed to believe there’s a group of generous insiders investing money to bring joy to fans without expecting anything in return. If this were the case, why take control of the club and remove any trace of the Machado family from the new management structure? Additionally, how do they plan to recoup the money invested? Disregarding the arguments made while feeling exposed, it’s evident that a group of insiders seized control of the team unlawfully, exploiting the arrest they themselves requested last year of Juan Andrés Machado. Currently, the prevailing narrative is that in exchange for the young man’s freedom, they demanded the transfer of the majority shares held by the Machado family, leading to their control as they positioned the Suárez, particularly the junior, as the face of the new “washing” operation of professional Venezuelan sports. It’s clear that now, of the eight teams in the LVBP, at least five are clearly “washing” operations used to legitimize the capital of Chavista theft. As it stands, it seems only the Cardenales de Lara, Leones del Caracas, and Bravos de Margarita are safe, although I have my suspicions about the latter. As I’ve mentioned in this column, after the international community intensified its tightening around Chavista capital worldwide, they sought alternatives, and one that they found was to launder their money in Venezuela, with professional sports being one of the most profitable routes. How do they do it? By investing substantial sums of dirty money in baseball, soccer, or basketball clubs, only to receive sponsorships from banks and state-owned companies through their connections with the high government, thereby recouping their investments. This way, the money comes in dirty and comes out clean. How can we further prove that the Águilas are in the hands of insiders? We already saw the first evidence with the hiring of imports that are slightly more expensive and diverging from the cheap reinforcement profile the Machados used to sign. But let’s wait until the season starts and check the new sponsors of the team, and I’m sure we’ll see a transition from fast food businesses to public enterprises. Let’s wait until October 16 to confirm 100% that Chavista capital has indeed taken control of the Águilas del Zulia.
PLAY? The changes that occurred a few days ago in the Office of the Comptroller of the state and in the oversight agencies of Maracaibo and San Francisco seem to be a normal rotation of officials, especially with the governors and mayors being from the PSUV. Why? Because rulers, particularly if they are from Chavismo, love to place someone they trust in the institution responsible for overseeing their management, to help cover up ongoing business. This led to expectations that Luis Caldera would seek to remove Jeffry Ramón Leal from the state’s Comptroller Office, as his connection with Manuel Rosales aside, he is part of Omar Prieto’s team, and hence, the governor had ample reasons to distrust him. The same assumption was made for the Comptroller of Maracaibo, where it was anticipated that Gian Carlo Di Martino would try to install one of his own to ensure his protection. Unfortunately for the Italian, his plan fell through despite all his efforts to retain the position. The surprise came when it was announced that the Maracaibo Comptroller’s Office would be led by Yasmín Cristalino de Carruyo, who is not only the wife of the contralor in Mara, Homero Carruyo, but also worked as an auditor within the municipal administration. Following this appointment, it was speculated—and later confirmed—that this woman was strategically placed there by Luis Caldera and is not remotely close to Di Martino. An acquaintance familiar with both commented that they both have extensive experience in oversight roles, although there are serious doubts about the validity of their credentials since they mostly studied at the Bolivarian University and there’s considerable controversy surrounding them. Beyond that, it’s believed that Luis Caldera played a risky game by placing someone he trusts in the Maracaibo Comptroller’s Office to closely monitor Di Martino’s management as part of the ongoing war between them. I suppose LC will firmly support her because being a counterbalance to someone like Di Martino isn’t easy. Conflict seems imminent in the relationship between the comptroller and the Italian’s administration.
OBJECTIVES. Before I begin, I’d like to reiterate the question that titles this column: Did the U.S. start achieving its objectives? The clear and evident answer is yes. Many of you might argue that the regime, especially Maduro, remains in power, which is true. However, evidence suggests that Donald Trump’s government is beginning to reach its goals. One of the initial objectives was likely to suffocate the business of the Cartel de Los Soles and other criminal groups trafficking drugs from Venezuela. That has been achieved, as the destruction of the first boat halted everything, resulting in a significant overstock of goods. It’s estimated that the Cartel de Los Soles used to export over 100 tons each month, and right now not even a gram is leaving. Not only is nothing leaving, but nothing from Colombia is coming in either. The order given was that nothing enters or leaves until the situation changes. And what about the three destroyed boats? I perceive the first as a trial balloon to test the response capability of the U.S. navy attack group. Given the response was overwhelmingly clear, they were ordered to avoid further risks. As for the other two boats, they clearly belonged to lesser-ranked criminal groups operating in Venezuela, who took the risk to avoid further financial losses. However, the naval and aerial blockade not only disrupts drug trafficking but also affects oil operations, as none of the tankers in the regime’s ghost fleet should be entering or leaving either. The inspection of the tuna boat signals that any suspicious vessel engaged in illegal activities will be boarded and searched. It’s essential to remember that the sale of Venezuelan oil is an activity that violates international sanctions. Considering the risks, I believe that the sale of oil in violation of sanctions is also on hold, making it two of the regime’s business operations that the U.S. has managed to paralyze. Based on everything outlined, it’s possible to infer that this objective has been accomplished. A second objective, presumably, was to create internal fractures leading to betrayals within both the civil and military leadership. Clearly, the game of betrayals has not only accelerated but has also deepened, evidenced by Diosdado’s war against the judicial mafia led by Tarek William Saab, particularly with Cabello’s refusal to accept the proposal made by Maduro and Jorge during a recent meeting in La Orchila, which reportedly contained a negotiation offer not accepted by the U.S. The clear response from the U.S. demonstrates that the time for negotiations has ended, and only the regime’s exit is on the table. Regarding this second objective, it’s evident that they are also achieving positive results because the fracture and betrayals have intensified. Additionally, it’s clear— likely a third objective—that Chavismo is unable to decipher Trump’s enigmatic responses to questions about his future actions regarding Venezuela: “You’ll see” and “we’ll see what happens.” Remember that deception is also part of the art of war. Want to verify another objective? It’s evident that Trump’s administration sought to reaffirm that the negotiation avenues have been exhausted, generating widespread fear among the regime, thus confirming that their tricks to deceive the U.S. are running out. In my view—while respecting those who think otherwise—the U.S. has begun to achieve its objectives with the maximum pressure strategy. Of course, it’s not enough yet, but there are too many things happening behind the scenes that could signify Maduro’s and the regime’s final fall. Suddenly, for reasons unknown, I recalled the title of an old Venezuelan movie: “Amaneció de golpe.”
MAYOR. After my last week’s comment about the extensive power held by the co-owner of Farma Venezuela, Ziad Abd-El Kader, in the administration of San Francisco’s mayor, Héctor Soto, a close friend of this administration wrote to me, stating that I underestimated the situation: “The Arab is the real mayor. He decides the major issues. No business is entrusted to anyone without his decision. He is present at almost all meetings where he issues instructions and makes decisions, while the mayor just looks on and nods. When the Arab asks for his opinion, Soto simply says, ‘as you say.’ Thus, most of the time, the mayor operates from an office that has been set up for him at Farma Venezuela, situated opposite the City Hall.” Why does Ziad have so much power? I’m told that despite Héctor Soto leaving with money and even a farm after his tenure at Hidrolago, he was not willing to invest any of his wealth in the campaign, leading Ziad Abd-El Kader to emerge as the financier and even political support. Abd-El Kader paid for everything in the campaign, and now is in the process of collecting. He’s seeking to multiply his investment by 10x or more based on Soto’s victory, who naturally allows him to do as he pleases since he has essentially mortgaged his administration. Moreover, there’s a political aspect as Ziad’s partner in Farma Venezuela is José David Cabello Rondón, who injected capital through his business agent in Zulia, the current manager of the Port of Maracaibo-Bolipuertos, Daniel Aguilar. Hence, Ziad not only offered money but also political backing within the PSUV because he has direct access to the Cabello Rondón brothers. This is the source of his immense influence in Héctor Soto’s administration, who is merely the nominal mayor while the real acting mayor is Ziad Abd-El Kader, popularly known in the halls of San Francisco’s City Hall as “The Leader.” The scale of municipal business projection is such that “the leader” is on the verge of taking control of several existing Fiorella Supermarket locations to expedite the expansion of Farma Venezuela. I’m told he and Omar Barrios, another insider, are finalizing the sale agreement. I fear that the Chavista populace of San Francisco voted for one mayor, yet it’s someone else who truly wields the role of municipal authority.
EXPLOSION. There are many strange things surrounding the explosion of the fireworks depot that resulted in a tragedy in the municipality of San Francisco. Several points catch my attention. Firstly, how could that business operate in a residential area given the risk of storing such a quantity of explosives, and why did none of the authorities call for an investigation into the legality of the operation in their statements? All officials limited themselves to lamenting the tragedy, outlining the damages incurred, and announcing supposed reconstruction plans. Curious enough, there has been no indication or even the detention of any responsible parties from the company, which is rather unusual in a regime that loves to call out and accuse immediately. Regarding the ambiguity about who will take responsibility for the consequences, I wonder whether the owners of this company had any insurance for such incidents. However, considering the level of destruction to houses, vehicles, and businesses, I doubt any insurance policy would cover a tragedy of this magnitude. There are many rumors circulating about military capital’s involvement in the company, but so far, nothing has been confirmed. Nonetheless, the silence on this matter suggests something odd is at play. Want proof that authorities are avoiding responsibility regarding Gallo Verde? Check out these statements from Luis Caldera here, and you will perceive. I have no doubt they are protecting someone. This movie has too many plot holes. I keep digging.
FALL. The partying ex-comptroller of Maracaibo, Antonio Bermúdez, remained true to his tricks until the very last minute. When he had confirmed his departure from the position, he prepped himself to leave with his pockets full. What happened? Well, on Wednesday, September 10, the Maracaibo Comptroller’s Office received an additional credit that was nearly entirely used to pay out the generous severance packages that “Antonito” had prepared for himself and his closest team. As expected, by Thursday, September 11, there was not a single bolívar left from the additional credit. Who benefited from these “express” severances? I’ve heard that those in general direction, administration, human resources, legal consultancy, dispatch management, and his assistant were included. Coincidentally, these people collectively resigned on Monday, September 15. However, this is not the final chapter of “Antonito’s” dismal management. His fall is not the end, as he still doesn’t realize how deep his downfall will be. In a little over a year, he went from glory to tragedy. He dug his own grave. He was assigned to review even the paper baskets in the administration of Maracaibo’s mayor, Rafael Ramírez Colina, but ended up believing he was someone special. This isn’t just about his constant fondness for revelry and good whisky. It involves his vast greed for money and how he saw an opportunity to exploit his position during the regime’s interest in dismantling Ramírez Colina’s management for personal gain. Consequently, he would enter municipal offices bulldozing and making threats while secretly proposing deals for sizable sums. This practice became commonplace. He even began to think of himself as the anointed one to be mayor when Diosdado mentioned him a couple of times on his weekly show. He envisioned himself “maraqueando” a whisky in the office located on the 5th floor of Maracaibo City Hall. Now he faces the consequences, as “Antonito” is allegedly detained with accusations of corruption. This movie isn’t over for the bonchón.
CABIMAS. As expected, chaos reigns in the administration of the new mayor of Cabimas, Frank Carreño. Well, calling it an administration is almost an overstatement because Carreño’s work has yet to commence. Why hasn’t it started? Simply because he doesn’t know what to do. Beyond the wreckage he caused in every higher education institution he attended, the guy has no clue what governing a municipality like Cabimas entails. As a result, the city is littered with garbage and poorly maintained. He still lacks a decently assembled cabinet, having already encountered issues with the local PSUV leadership, and the few he has sent to Caracas for review have failed to pass the filters and therefore have yet to be appointed. At this stage, most directors are tied to the previous administration. One of the few appointments made has sparked controversy, namely the appointment of Ricardo Espejo to head the Municipal Urban Cleaning Institute, as he lacks the experience for such a crucial position. To make matters worse, the PSUV councilors in the Municipal Chamber contribute little, particularly the current president, Yilber Castañeda, who is entirely out of touch with the work he’s supposed to carry out. And as is customary, this mayor also commenced his tenure with scandal — the firing of 2,000 individuals, violating labor stability, to replace them with 4,000 Chavista leaders and collectives. Just as Nabil Maalouf kicked off with the illegal sale of municipal scrap, Carreño begins his work with illegal firings and an unwarranted increase in the payroll. I must acknowledge that the worst is yet to come with this character. Cabimas seems forever cursed to have bandit and inefficient mayors.
METAPHOR. A friend who is a loyal reader of this column sent me a metaphor to understand the current state of the regime: “They are like a tree infested with termites; on the outside, it appears strong and healthy, but internally it’s consuming itself until finally, it collapses.”
Darwin Chávez|@Darwinch857|[email protected]