A resolution introduced by left-leaning Democrats in the House of Representatives aims to compel President Trump to withdraw U.S. troops from military operations in the Southern Caribbean aimed at combating drug trafficking. The text invokes the War Powers Resolution to establish boundaries on executive authority and reopen an old constitutional debate: who decides when the U.S. goes to war, Congress or the President?
Following recent military strikes ordered by the White House against vessels linked to drug trafficking in the Southern Caribbean, a group of radical Democratic congressmen introduced a concurrent resolution under the 1973 War Powers Resolution to demand the withdrawal of U.S. forces from “unauthorized hostilities.” The measure, spearheaded by Representative Ilhan Omar and other members of the progressive wing, emphasizes four legal limits that, according to its authors, the Executive branch has overlooked.
1. A “terrorist” label doesn’t authorize war.
The text clarifies that designations such as Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) or Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) do not inherently grant authority to use military force against new groups. The resolution applies this restriction to transnational organizations designated after February 20, 2025, thus closing the door on a “blank check” for armed operations.
2. The 2001 and 2002 authorizations have limits.
Since the 9/11 attacks and the Iraq war, successive administrations have utilized the AUMFs of 2001 and 2002 as justification for global operations. The new resolution states that these texts do not cover attacks against Venezuela or recently designated criminal organizations, criticizing the “elasticity” with which they have been invoked to justify new military campaigns.
3. Drug trafficking is not a legal excuse for hostilities.
While combating drug trafficking is considered a national security issue, the resolution points out that it does not meet the legal standard of “attack” that allows the President to act without prior Congressional authorization. “Drug trafficking does not, on its own, constitute an armed attack or imminent threat,” it states.
4. Open and indefinite operations.
The official White House report on operations in the Caribbean admitted that “it is not possible at this time to know the scope and duration of necessary operations” and that “forces remain positioned to carry out new military actions.” For lawmakers, this type of language creates “facts on the ground” and reduces Congress to a mere financier of already initiated conflicts.
The constitutional knot: mandatory or symbolic?
Although the War Powers Resolution authorizes in its section 5(c) that Congress order the withdrawal of troops via concurrent resolution, its constitutionality has been debated since the Supreme Court, in INS v. Chadha (1983), invalidated legislative vetoes without presentment to the President. Many legal scholars argue that, after Chadha, a concurrent resolution is not enough to compel the Executive; a joint resolution or law that the President can sign (or veto) would be necessary.
In practice, this means that even if both chambers pass the resolution, Trump could ignore it or veto a joint version, forcing lawmakers to seek a two-thirds vote to override—something politically challenging.
Political tool vs. real legal restraint.
In this context, the resolution functions more as a political instrument than a definitive legal mandate. It puts media pressure on the President, revives the debate on war authority, and necessitates hearings and testimonies, but lacks the legal certainty to halt the operation. For effective oversight, Congress would need to pass a stronger law or joint resolution, or litigate the issue in court, facing the “political question” doctrine that often hinders such claims.
An old debate with new urgency.
The measure serves as a reminder of Article I of the Constitution, which grants Congress the power to declare war. It reaffirms existing principles rather than innovating legally, but in a context of diffuse threats and non-state actors, it raises the question: is the deliberative process of the 18th century viable for 21st-century conflicts, or does it leave a gap that presidents inevitably fill?