Attacking and dismantling the Cartel de los Soles, leading to the ousting of Nicolás Maduro’s regime, could trigger a more dangerous and prolonged conflict, transforming Venezuela into a failed state, similar to Iraq or Libya.
The possibility of such a chaotic scenario is based on the immediate fragmentation of the Bolivarian National Armed Forces (FANB), whose collapse in command would facilitate the violent expansion of armed groups such as the ELN, FARC dissidents, and large criminal bands.
The primary risks identified include a low-intensity war in urban and rural centers, an additional historic migratory exodus, along with the potential need for unplanned massive international intervention.
Despite the existence of a strategic window of opportunity due to legitimate civil leadership and broad international support, only a negotiated military transition plan and an international stabilization alliance can prevent catastrophic collapse.
Real Scenario After a Possible Exit of Maduro
Declassified documentation and U.S. government war game simulations unequivocally conclude that the fall of Nicolás Maduro does not guarantee a stable transition in Venezuela. On the contrary, this event would dramatically increase the likelihood of a prolonged and chaotic conflict, positioning the country as a potential failed state, similar to post-conflict scenarios in Libya or Iraq.
Among the main risk factors are, first and foremost, a fragmented Bolivarian National Armed Forces (FANB) prone to collapse within 24 to 72 hours, along with a robust criminal ecosystem—ELN, FARC dissidents, and large gangs—ready to expand their territorial control. This would unleash a low-intensity war lasting up to 36 months, a massive additional exodus of 2 to 4 million people, and the total collapse of state services.
Therefore, in light of such a landscape and to mitigate this catastrophic collapse, any successful transition must be based on three essential pillars:
- A detailed military transition plan that integrates or neutralizes FANB factions,
- An immediate governance strategy to control territory and critical infrastructure, and
- A coordinated international alliance to provide humanitarian, logistical, and security support.
The central conclusion here is clear: Maduro’s exit is not the end of the conflict but the beginning of a more dangerous period for Venezuela.
Maduro’s Exit Is Not Synonymous with Stability
As things stand, Nicolás Maduro’s departure from power does not equate to stability. Instead, this scenario increases the likelihood that Venezuela will descend into chaotic and extended conflict, with multiple armed actors competing for power and territorial control.
This creates a dynamic that would place Venezuela in the category of a failed state, following the pattern seen in countries like Libya or Iraq after 2003.
Four Forces Defining the Venezuelan Scenario
The future of post-Maduro Venezuela would be shaped by the interaction of four key forces, each with its own interests and capabilities.
These are:
1. The Fragmented Military Force
The Bolivarian National Armed Forces (FANB) is not a monolithic block, and its cohesion is extremely fragile. It is characterized by internal divisions among factions loyal to the regime, pragmatic individuals willing to negotiate, and a significant contingent of officers fearing reprisals under a new government.
War game simulations indicate that, without a centralized and unified command, the FANB’s chain of control would collapse within 24 to 72 hours following the fall of the regime. Such a collapse could trigger internal wars among military units for control of barracks and arsenals, along with mass desertions that would empower other armed groups.
2. The Criminal Ecosystem
Illegal armed groups have consolidated significant power that could aggressively expand in the event of a state power vacuum. The ELN and FARC dissidents have a notable presence in the country. In fact, the ELN controls strategic corridors from Apure to Bolívar, possesses advanced military capabilities—explosives, armed drones—and has vowed to defend Chavismo.
Additionally, there are large gangs represented by organizations like the Tren de Aragua, Wilexis’ gang, and the Gold Syndicate, which have the potential to extend their territorial control.
On top of this, urban collectives would act as paramilitary forces loyal to the remnants of the regime, especially in key urban centers.
3. Civil Resistance and the State Apparatus
A fundamental tension exists between the emerging political leadership and the bureaucratic structure inherited from Chavismo.
María Corina Machado possesses a clear popular mandate stemming from the primaries, but lacks control over state institutions. Meanwhile, for 25 years, Chavismo positioned its loyalists at all levels of power: governors, mayors, judges, and bureaucrats.
Thus, in a negotiated transition that offers guarantees of impunity or amnesty, it is highly likely that a large portion of this civil apparatus will resist actively or sabotage the new government.
4. External Actors
Various nations’ interests converge in Venezuela, and their actions will significantly influence the outcome of any transition.
- United States: Its main objectives are to stop drug trafficking, dismantle the Cartel de los Soles, and contain the influence of terrorist actors in the region.
- Cuba: Maduro’s fall would mean the loss of its primary oil supplier. It is expected to activate its intelligence networks to preserve its influence.
- Iran and Russia: Both countries would view a regime change as a strategic blow to their military and financial interests in Latin America.
- Colombia: Its greatest fear is a spillover of conflict, with a massive influx of the ELN into its territory and a new wave of uncontrollable migration.
Critical Strategic Risks
An uncoordinated collapse of the Cartel de los Soles and Nicolás Maduro’s regime presents four high-impact risks that could destabilize the entire region.
| Risk | Description |
|---|---|
| Low-Intensity War | Estimated duration of 12 to 36 months, with areas of the country controlled by military factions or insurgencies. Urban clashes are expected in key cities like Caracas, Maracay, Valencia, and Maracaibo, leading to territorial fragmentation. |
| Historic Proportions Exodus | In addition to the current 8 million displaced, a state collapse could generate between 2 and 4 million new refugees within weeks, surpassing neighboring countries’ response capabilities. |
| Total State Failure | The loss of military control and public order would lead to massive looting, takeovers of oil facilities, paralyzation of refineries, and the collapse of national electricity and water supply systems. |
| Unplanned International Intervention | A scenario of total chaos could force military intervention. A U.S. deployment to stabilize the country would require between 30,000 and 60,000 soldiers, a scale comparable to that of Iraq. No regional actor has the logistical capacity for such a mission. |
Strategic Opportunities
Despite the grave risks, a transition, if managed adeptly, also presents unique opportunities for the reconstruction of Venezuela.
- Civil leadership with popular legitimacy: María Corina Machado has a clear electoral mandate, a strong symbolic identity, and a transition plan ready to be executed from “Day 1”.
- Broad international support: There is consensus among the U.S., OAS, the European Union, and most countries in the region to support a democratic transition.
- Window to dismantle organized crime: The initial chaos could be used to carry out surgical operations against the Cartel de los Soles, military corruption networks, and illegal oil trade intermediaries.
- Opportunity for institutional reconstruction: A well-designed transition would allow for the restoration of key institutions like PDVSA, the judicial system, the Armed Forces, and the overall democratic framework of the country.
Strategic Scenarios
There are three possible scenarios for Nicolás Maduro’s exit, each with varying levels of risk and different outcomes.
| Scenario | Level of Risk | Probable Outcomes |
|---|---|---|
| 1. Sudden Collapse | High | Fall of Maduro due to military pressure or insurrection. Leads to fragmentation of the FANB, looting, urban warfare, and a high probability of foreign intervention. |
| 2. Negotiated Transition | Medium | Agreement with pragmatic sectors of the military forces and governors. Reduces chaos levels, but armed groups persist. Possibility of a dual government in early stages. Requires immediate international support. |
| 3. Gradual Exit with Guarantees | Unlikely | Maduro negotiates his exit in exchange for protection and judicial guarantees. Results in an orderly transition, less violence, disciplined integration of FANB sectors, and recovery of territorial control in months rather than years. |
Pillars to Avoid Collapse
Comparing the Venezuelan situation with cases like Iraq, Libya, and Panama, alongside war game results, offers a fundamental lesson.
The fall of Nicolás Maduro is not the end of the conflict but the beginning of the most dangerous period for Venezuela.
To prevent a catastrophic collapse and a historically large humanitarian crisis, any transition effort must rest on three coordinated strategic pillars:
- Military transition plan: It is crucial to have a plan to integrate, neutralize, or co-opt the various FANB factions. This involves negotiating guarantees and securing immediate control of arsenals to prevent their dispersion.
- Immediate governance of territory: Deploying mixed and disciplined forces to ensure control over critical infrastructure, including ports, airports, refineries, and borders, should be a priority, maintaining a minimum of public order.
- International stabilization alliance: A robust coalition including the U.S., Colombia, Brazil, and European countries is needed to coordinate a multifaceted response encompassing humanitarian, judicial, logistical, and security support.