The Criminal Axis of Chávez-FARC-ELN, established in 1999, represents an alliance that turned Venezuela into a narcotraffic platform, using cocaine as a tool for asymmetric warfare.
This strong statement was made by retired Major Milton Revilla Soto, who exposed to Venezuela Política and Sin Filtros the historical ties between Hugo Chávez and the terrorist organizations FARC and ELN. The late president provided logistical support, fake identities, and weapons to Colombian irregular groups.
Revilla Soto recounted how Hugo Carvajal and Diosdado Cabello acted as key operatives in the establishment of this criminal network. He warned that the involved military personnel face individual criminal responsabilities that are non-prescriptible under international law.
The Origin of the Chávez-FARC-ELN Criminal Axis
In an interview with Venezuela Política and Sin Filtros, retired major Milton Revilla Soto explained the origin and evolution of the strategic alliance between the Venezuelan regime, led by Hugo Chávez, and the Colombian terrorist guerrilla groups FARC and ELN. He noted that this relationship was formed even before Chávez came to power in 1999, transitioning from a political-ideological link to a transnational criminal corporation centered on drug trafficking.
The initial contacts were established while Chávez was in prison, through key figures like Ramón Rodríguez Chacín. Once he became president, Chávez leveraged high-impact events, such as kidnappings, to formalize ties and appointed high-ranking military officials, like Hugo Carvajal, as direct links.
Revilla Soto emphasized that Cuba played a catalyzing role by facilitating meetings and promoting the alliance as part of a broader geopolitical strategy to destabilize the region and counteract U.S. influence. He asserted that the Venezuelan state provided financial, logistical, and legal cover to irregular groups, including the swift granting of nationalities to combatants.
Moreover, he stated that cocaine was explicitly conceptualized as an “asymmetric weapon” to “flood” and weaken American society. Collaboration extended to other international terrorist groups like ETA and IRA, who provided explosive training to the FARC in Colombian territory with Venezuela’s endorsement.
Milton Revilla Soto was emphatic in stating that the claims of “following orders” by those military involved in these criminal activities do not exempt them from criminal responsibility, according to the principles of international law and the Venezuelan Constitution itself.
Foundations of the Criminal Alliance Between Chávez, FARC, and ELN
The retired Venezuelan military reiterated that the alliance between chavismo and Colombian guerrilla terrorist groups was established before Chávez’s electoral victory in 1998. Evidence of this comes from Colombian intelligence services and from computers seized from FARC leaders, such as alias “Rubén Zamora,” demonstrating that links were forged after the attempted coup in 1992.
Ties with the ELN
Revilla Soto indicated that the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) developed a close relationship with Navy Captain Ramón Rodríguez Chacín while he was at the Center for Penal Institutions of the Andes in Táchira state. Rodríguez Chacín became a key liaison.
Approaches to the FARC
The Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC) began their approaches through Venezuelan leftist parties. These military officers grouped in the Movimiento Bolivariano Revolucionario 200 (MBR-200), which later transformed into the Movimiento Quinta República (MVR) in 1995.
Political Interest (1997-1998)
By late 1997 and early 1998, these relationships took on a strategic political character as the certainty grew that Hugo Chávez would win the presidential elections.
Consolidation of the Chávez-FARC-ELN Criminal Axis (1999-2002)
Retired Major Milton Revilla Soto stated that, with Chávez’s rise to power, the FARC and ELN actively carried out deliberate actions to formalize and strengthen their relations with the new Venezuelan government.
Key Events for Establishing Contact
He noted that two specific events were utilized to force a direct communication channel with Chávez’s government:
Kidnapping of Richard Boulton: this kidnapping, carried out in Carabobo state, was a “commission” from the FARC to establish a direct relationship with the new government.
Kidnapping of an Avior airplane: an Avior Airlines aircraft was hijacked in Maiquetía by the ELN and diverted towards the border. The goal was to capture the new government’s attention. A lieutenant colonel, Francisco Briceño Araujo, was a passenger on this plane and later became one of the main ELN liaisons with Chávez’s administration, establishing himself as the Chief of Staff of CUFAN under Henry Rangel Silva.
Chávez’s “Ambassadors”
Hugo Chávez structured relationships with guerrilla terrorist groups through two main channels, assigning trusted high-ranking officials as direct liaisons:
Hugo Carvajal Barrios (with the FARC): under Chávez’s direct orders, Carvajal, then head of the Military Intelligence Directorate (DIM), made contact with the FARC, initially with Colombian President Álvaro Uribe’s authorization, under the pretext of negotiating Richard Boulton’s release. This marked the starting point for a permanent link between DIM and the FARC.
Ramón Rodríguez Chacín (with the ELN): he was the main contact with the ELN, consolidating a relationship that began in prison.
Cuba’s Catalytic Role
Revilla Soto asserted that Cuba was a fundamental player in consolidating this alliance, acting as a facilitator and promoter within the framework of the São Paulo Forum and its agenda to expand leftist influence in Latin America.
First Chávez-Granda Meeting: during Hugo Chávez’s first trip to Havana after his release from prison, a direct relationship was established with the FARC’s “chancellor,” Rodrigo Granda.
DISIP Operation: in 1998, shortly after winning the elections, a Venezuelan army officer was ordered to pick up Rodrigo Granda and his family in Zulia state and transport them on a DISIP plane to Cuba. This operation, along with Chávez’s intention to connect the National Armed Forces with the FARC, created the first disagreements with the DISIP director at that time, Jesús Urdaneta Hernández. Officers who participated in this and other missions to transfer guerrilla leaders were threatened with death in 2003 and had to flee to the United States.
Transformation into a Criminal Corporation
The Chávez-FARC-ELN axis, initially formed as a political alliance, quickly evolved into a criminal enterprise, with drug trafficking as the central focus and the Venezuelan state as a key facilitator.
From Political Support to Drug Trafficking
From the year 2000 onward, the FARC and ELN, with the approval of the Venezuelan regime, began to escalate their drug trafficking operations. They shifted from being protectors of camps and laboratories to direct producers and marketers, utilizing Venezuela as a logistical platform and sanctuary.
Cocaine as an Asymmetric Weapon
Revilla Soto clarified that the collaboration in drug trafficking was not merely economic but was driven by an ideological and strategic goal: to use cocaine as a weapon to attack the United States.
Direct testimony: Milton Revilla Soto recounted witnessing a conversation in 2000 at the border base of Catatumbo between DIM Commissioner Luis Castillo Morales and a FARC member, Aldemar Pinilla, where it was stated: “We’re going to flood the gringos with drugs, we’re going to kill the gringos with drugs.”
Cuban Planning: Revilla asserted that this strategy was part of a Cuban plan to destroy the social fabric of the United States, using the FARC as a tool and Venezuela as a logistical base.
Logistical and Operational Support from the Venezuelan State
Milton Revilla Soto informed that the Chávez regime provided multifaceted and systematic support— funding and weaponry—to the guerrilla terrorist groups, which was vital for their expansion and operation from Venezuelan territory.
Fundación Renacer: the FARC, through Rafael Pinilla, cloned a Colombian foundation and registered it in Venezuela. The Venezuelan National Assembly, with Rodrigo Cabezas and Calixto Ortega on the finance committee, granted this foundation 150 million bolívares— about USD 50 million at the time— money used to establish the FARC’s main base in Catatumbo under the command of alias “Rubén Zamora.”
Weapon Supply: it was documented that the Venezuelan National Armed Forces (FAN) supplied weapons to the FARC. A notable case was the downing of a Bronco OV-10 plane from the Venezuelan Military Aviation in 2001-2002. Investigations found that the plane was shot down with an anti-aircraft .50 caliber machine gun supplied by FAN to the FARC. After the downing, it was the FARC who controlled the crash zone and returned the pilots’ bodies.
Legal Coverage and Swift Nationalizations
The Venezuelan military intelligence orchestrated a plan to grant legal identities to thousands of Colombian guerrillas.
“Informative Note Number Five”: a report prepared in 2002 for the then-Minister of Interior Relations, Diosdado Cabello, detailed how DIM members coerced ONIDEX officials to grant swift nationalities to members of FARC’s Front 33.
Modification of LOPNA: in 2001, the Organic Law for the Protection of Children and Adolescents (LOPNA) was modified to allow the recognition of extrahospital births again. This enabled the fraudulent registration of thousands of combat-age guerrillas (18-32 years) as Venezuelans born on the border.
Key Actors and Responsibilities
A network of high-ranking military officials and Venezuelan authorities was instrumental in executing this plan.
Venezuelan ActorRelevant Position(s)Role in the Criminal SchemeHugo Carvajal BarriosDirector of Military Intelligence (DIM)Main liaison and “ambassador” with the FARC. Coordinated logistical and operational support.Ramón Rodríguez ChacínNaval CaptainMain liaison and “ambassador” with the ELN.Henry Rangel SilvaCommander of CUFAN, director of DISIP/SEBINParticipated in liaison and support operations, especially with the ELN through Francisco Briseño.Cliver Alcalá CordonesMilitary close to ChávezKey operator in the arms and logistics delivery to the FARC.Francisco Briceño AraujoBattalion CommanderELN liaison with the Venezuelan government, after being a passenger on the plane hijacked by this group.Francisco Arias CárdenasGovernor of ZuliaMaintained direct relationships with FARC members in his office, according to intelligence reports.Diosdado CabelloMinister of Interior Relations (2002)Received the report “Informative Note Number Five” regarding the swift nationalizations for guerrillas and, according to testimony, did not initiate any investigation.
On the guerrilla side, leaders from the FARC Central Command like Rubén Zamora, Rodrigo Granda, Iván Márquez, Jesús Santrich, and Rodrigo Londoño (Timochenko) had open and direct relations with Venezuelan soldiers between 2000 and 2002.
Involvement of International Actors
Milton Revilla Soto explained that the criminal network extended beyond the region, involving other international terrorist groups that used Venezuela as a base for operations and coordination.
IRA and ETA: between 2000 and 2002, the presence of members from the Irish Revolutionary Army (IRA) and Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) in Venezuela was documented, along with transit to FARC camps. Arturo Cubillas and Iñaki de Juana Chaos (ETA) were recorded passing through the Catatumbo checkpoint, escorted by DIM, towards a FARC camp. These groups provided training and education to the FARC in making improvised explosive devices, specifically “lapa bombs.”
Hezbollah: in 2011, an attempt to coerce by Jasén Alatef Necerdine (alias Abualí), identified as a Hezbollah member, against Major Revilla was recorded, to prevent him from testifying in the Spanish National Court in the ETA-FARC case.
The Fallacy of “Following Orders”
Major Milton Revilla Soto, firmly rejected the legal defense of following orders as unacceptable. He recalled that this is invoked by implicated military personnel, such as Cliver Alcalá Cordones, who claimed to have acted under “superior orders” from Hugo Chávez. This argument is challenged based on international criminal law principles and Venezuelan legislation.
Nuremberg Principles: it is established that obeying superior orders does not exempt one from criminal responsibility if the order is manifestly illegal. A soldier has the duty to disobey criminal orders.
Venezuelan Constitution (Article 25): states that any act of public power that violates constitutional rights is null, and officials who issue or execute such orders are criminally, civilly, and administratively responsible, “without superior orders serving as excuses.”
Venezuelan Constitution (Article 29): determines that crimes against human rights and crimes against humanity do not prescribe and are excluded from benefits like pardon and amnesty.
Revilla Soto concluded with a warning that this legal basis implies that the military personnel involved in forming this criminal corporation are individually responsible for their actions and cannot be protected by future amnesties.