The criminal case against Nicolás Maduro Moros in the Southern District Court of New York witnessed a new procedural development on January 9, 2026. A day after his registered attorney requested to exclude him from the case, Bruce Fein filed a formal response with the court, without disputing the facts presented by the primary defense, but asking for direct intervention from the judge to determine, without intermediaries, the true will of the accused.
In his written submission, Fein identifies himself as “Counsel for Defendant Nicolás Maduro Moros” and emphasizes that his actions stem from a spirit of professional moderation and judicial economy. From the outset, he makes it clear that he does not challenge the truthfulness or good faith of the sworn statement made by Barry J. Pollack, nor does he accuse the principal attorney of misrepresentation, improper conduct, or hidden motives.
Fein acknowledges as undisputed procedural facts that Pollack filed his appearance on January 5, 2026, and represented Maduro during his initial hearing and arraignment. He also admits that he himself submitted, a day later, his request to appear pro hac vice, which was granted by the court on January 8, just hours before Pollack filed the motion to exclude him from the case.
The core of Fein’s response does not lie in a denial of Pollack’s statements, but rather in explaining the origin of his involvement. According to the document, Fein maintains that he sought admission in good faith, based on information received from individuals he describes as “credibly situated within Maduro’s inner circle or family”, who indicated that the accused wanted his legal assistance. Fein clarifies that he does not present this information as a factual contradiction to Pollack’s testimony, but rather as the subjective basis that justified his initial appearance.
One of the most relevant elements in the submission is Fein’s explicit admission that he has never had direct contact —neither by phone, video, nor any other means— with Maduro. Nevertheless, he introduces a contextual argument: he claims that the accused was detained under extraordinary circumstances, characterized by abrupt deprivation of liberty, communication restrictions, and immediate immersion in a foreign legal process, in a different language, which—according to Fein—could lead to misunderstandings or failures in indirect communication.
From a constitutional perspective, Fein centers his argument on the Sixth Amendment, reminding that the right to counsel includes the qualified right to choose a lawyer, provided it pertains to private defense. He explicitly cites key precedents such as United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez and Wheat v. United States, to assert that when there is uncertainty regarding authorization, it is up to the court—and not third parties—to determine the accused’s wish.
Instead of requesting that Pollack’s motion be denied, Fein takes a more cautious procedural stance. He requests that the court temporarily suspend the decision on the exclusion and conduct an in camera inquiry —that is, reserved and out of public scrutiny—to directly ask Maduro whom he wishes to represent him. The stated goal is to avoid collateral litigation, preserve confidentiality, and eliminate any doubts that may affect the legitimacy of the process.
Fein proposes that, after that reserved hearing, the court issue an order strictly aligned with Maduro’s expressed will, whether to confirm Pollack as the sole defender, allow for joint defense, or definitively exclude any undesired attorney. Significantly, he anticipates that if the judge concludes that his withdrawal truly reflects the accused’s will, he will withdraw without objections, complying with the ethical standards governing the termination of legal representation.
This exchange of written arguments reveals a clear contrast in strategies. While Pollack maintains that his client’s will has already been verified and is unequivocal, Fein contends that, given the exceptional circumstances of the detention and transfer of the accused, only a direct judicial confirmation can definitively resolve the matter.
Regardless of the court’s decision, this episode exposes an uncommon tension in cases of this magnitude: a defense that, before debating the core of the accusations, must publicly resolve who has the legitimate authority to speak on behalf of the accused. In a process that intertwines criminal law, international politics, and global scrutiny, even these preliminary disputes take on significance that far exceeds mere administrative concerns.
The court’s decision will organize the case and set the standard for how the wishes of the accused are managed in contexts of high political and procedural complexity. In the U.S. federal justice system, this point is not auxiliary: it is an essential part of due process.
