On January 7, 2026, Marco Rubio, the Secretary of State, appeared before the U.S. Congress to outline the roadmap developed by the White House for the “day after in Venezuela,” based on Donald Trump’s statement: “We will manage the country until we can make a safe, appropriate, and prudent transition.”
Rubio informed lawmakers that three phases were set: first “stabilization,” followed by “recovery,” and finally, “transition,” noting that “some of this will overlap.”
The plan’s implementation would involve the regime’s vice president, Delcy Rodríguez, as the operational figure, while the democratic opposition seems to be sidelined until the third phase.
Democratic Legitimacy Takes a Back Seat
The first phase, Rubio stated, aims to prevent the country from “falling into chaos.” He justified the continuation of the “oil quarantine” and announced that Washington would take between 30 and 50 million barrels of previously sanctioned Venezuelan crude oil to sell “at market prices” and manage the distribution of funds to ensure they do not go to “corruption or the regime.”
The second phase is termed “recovery,” defined as “ensuring that U.S., Western, and other companies have fair access to the Venezuelan market.” Rubio also mentioned a “national reconciliation” process that would help rebuild civil society. Only at the end of this process sits the third tier: “the transition” to democracy.
This sequence relegates democratic legitimacy to the last place, opening up the possibility for structural decisions to be made that will condition the country’s future, without input from legitimately representative authorities of the Venezuelan people. This indicates a sequence that adheres to a “political criterion” that must be analyzed with great care.
Concerns of U.S. Investors
The economic aspect of the second phase in this roadmap—ensuring U.S. companies’ access to the Venezuelan market—quickly translated into concrete actions.
On January 9, Donald Trump called for a closed-door meeting in the White House’s East Room with executives from the largest energy companies in the U.S. to persuade them to invest the over $100 billion estimated necessary to rebuild and reactivate the Venezuelan oil industry.
The response from those present, according to press reports, was quite cautious and skeptical. Industry leaders expressed concerns and highlighted the multiple risks—legal, financial, and political—of investing under the current conditions in Venezuela.
Political instability, ongoing sanctions on the oil sector, existing debts, the need for financial guarantees, the rule of law, and the current legal framework in Venezuela were some of the main obstacles pointed out by business leaders.
Chavismo Announces Comprehensive Legal Reform
It is likely that Washington had already anticipated these demands. According to a Reuters report, two sources indicated that “U.S. officials—among them Secretary of State Marco Rubio—in discussions with Delcy Rodríguez, stated that American companies require favorable contracts to return to Venezuela due to concerns over the legal and financial risks of investing in the country.”
On January 8, a day before Trump announced his meeting with oil companies, Jorge Rodríguez, president of the chavista National Assembly and brother of the acting president, Delcy Rodríguez, informed that the legislature would embark on “a comprehensive reform of the Venezuelan legal framework.”
This ambitious project, undertaken by a regime that is “allegedly” advancing towards a transition process, aims to concentrate and systematize the country’s regulations through the creation of eight major codes covering civil, criminal, electoral, political, social, and economic areas.
Among the new instruments are the Code of Direct Democracy and Strengthening of People’s Power, the People’s Criminal Code, and the Economic and Productive Trade Code, which will consolidate all economic and commercial legislation, including modernizing the legal framework for commercial relations.
Notably, this last one is positioned as the vehicle for the chavista regime to introduce the reforms demanded by future investors. This compilation could include critical reforms such as modifications to the Organic Hydrocarbons Law, the Law of Gas Hydrocarbons, the Investment Protection Law, the Public Procurement Law, along with repealing the Anti-Blockade Law.
Who Can Commit the Country?
Although the government led by Delcy and Jorge Rodríguez is preparing to rewrite the legal framework for economic and energy matters—as suggested by the announced initiative for creating the Economic and Productive Trading Code—and for a future signing of agreements, the validity and convenience of these actions taken by a government lacking democratic legitimacy, and under foreign tutelage, raises deep doubts.
These doubts even emerge within the American business community. Amos Hochstein, managing partner of investment group TWG Global, sums them up clearly: “U.S. companies need to know who their counterparts are. Are they signing agreements with the Venezuelan government? Is the Venezuelan government legitimate?”
The response to this doubt from recognized Venezuelan jurists, such as Dr. Asdrúbal Aguiar, a former magistrate of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and former secretary general of the IDEA Group, is categorical: “Nicolás Maduro lacked original legitimacy to exercise a government, and obviously that same lack of legitimacy drags along the vice president and the rest of his ministers who exercise power from a purely factual perspective.”
The chavista National Assembly, elected in May 2025, is also in the same condition of illegitimacy. The process, conducted under the total control of the illegitimate regime of Nicolás Maduro, was marked by massive abstention, an opaque and biased management of the electoral arbiter, the persecution of opponents, and severe restrictions on fundamental freedoms. Various governments, including those of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the European Union, described this process as an act devoid of democratic validity.
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The Transition Cannot Wait for Recovery
In these 26 years of governance, chavismo has destroyed the Venezuelan oil industry, a sector that for much of the 20th century was one of the most efficient in the world.
Its technical and financial recovery requires capital and technology that the country currently lacks. As proposed by the democratic opposition’s programs, this recovery involves reopening to Western partners and foreign investment. The debate isn’t about the opening, but about who holds the legitimacy to commit the nation’s strategic resources.
In recent years, oil and gas have accounted for over 90 percent of Venezuelan exports and are the primary source of state income. But its significance extends beyond fiscal concerns: since the mid-20th century, the energy sector has structured the Venezuelan economy and served as a lever for development in the country. Therefore, committing these resources through legal reforms and long-term agreements is a sovereign decision that only a government with popular mandate can undertake.
Delegating this task to those who destroyed the industry, who also lack democratic legitimacy, represents a political contradiction and a legal risk. It implies imposing on Venezuela, without legitimate representation, structural decisions that will condition its economic future, forcing future democracy to validate completed facts.
If a stable and socially accepted recovery is sought, the transition to democracy should precede the reconstruction process. Alternatively, both stages should advance concurrently.
Ramón Cardozo Álvarez