“The crisis is precisely the fact that the old dies and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum, a great variety of morbous phenomena appear.” Antonio Gramsci
The capture of Nicolás Maduro on January 3, 2026, and his subsequent trial in the United States marked the end of a political cycle, yet it did not resolve the historical problem that this cycle represented. Chavism-Madurism was not merely a personalist regime; it was a specific form of power organization rooted in oil revenue, populist mobilization, and the state capture. Thus, Maduro’s absence does not imply the dissolution of this power structure. Instead, we enter a juncture reminiscent of a crisis of an era: a time when the old order has lost its ability to generate consensus, even as the new order has yet to be instantiated in institutions, practices, and a shared common sense.
The Venezuelan dilemma is not simply about transitioning from dictatorship to democracy; it’s about the much more demanding possibility of a post-populist rentier transition, which entails overcoming a political logic that has structured public life for a quarter of a century.
The rentier populism as a historical form of power
In its Venezuelan version, populism was a response to the representation crisis of the Punto Fijo democracy and the persistence of social inequalities. Its defining feature was the articulation of a polarized political identity — “people” versus “elite” — sustained by the redistribution of oil wealth and a charismatic leadership that reconfigured institutions as tools for a unified will. Materially speaking, Chavism represented a rentier historical bloc: an alliance among the state apparatus, military sectors, clientelistic networks, and a popular base reinforced by transfers and symbols.
Under Maduro, this bloc transformed. The sharp fall in oil revenues, international sanctions, and the production collapse undermined the material basis of consensus. Populism degenerated into a form of domination without hegemony, supported by coercion, illicit economies, and elite fragmentation. What emerges after his capture is an unprecedented phenomenon: a leaderless populism managed by a bureaucratic-military coalition that seeks to stabilize the order without dismantling its authoritarian foundations.
Reconfigured authoritarianism and technocracy without democracy
Comparative experiences show that the fall of a populist leader does not necessarily lead to democratization. In various contexts, populism metamorphoses into a reformed authoritarianism that adopts partial economic liberalization while preserving political control mechanisms. Venezuela seems headed for this scenario: selective oil sector openings through productive participation contracts, tactical releases of political prisoners, and negotiations with the United States aimed at easing sanctions, all without effectively dismantling the apparatus of domination.
This pattern is not accidental. Maduro’s elites perceive transition as a loss: they fear judicial persecution, loss of revenue, and political unprotection. From a decision-theory perspective, this creates incentives for high-risk behavior and minimal reforms designed to ensure survival. In contrast, the opposition views the transition as a potential gain and tends to take prudent positions, accepting gradual agreements that maintain enclaves of the old order. This structural imbalance explains why transitions are often negotiated and why they tend to be institutionally incomplete.
It is crucial to understand that a post-populist democracy would mean transitioning from populist authoritarianism to an institutional democracy with effective controls. It’s not just about “more elections” but also about strengthening the rule of law.
Organic crisis and dispute for hegemony
The Venezuelan crisis is a crisis of hegemony. For years, Chavism-Madurism successfully articulated a common sense built on sovereignty, social justice, and anti-imperialist antagonism. This narrative shaped expectations, legitimized sacrifices, and structured identities. Today, however, that story is exhausted. Economic failure, systemic corruption, and massive emigration have eroded its persuasive power. The regime maintains its dominion, but it has lost both intellectual and moral direction.
Nevertheless, the erosion of hegemony does not automatically imply the emergence of a democratic alternative. The democratic opposition faces the opposite problem: it has electoral legitimacy and international backing but lacks a hegemonic narrative that incorporates new social expectations into a coherent historical project. Venezuelan politics finds itself in the interregnum that Gramsci described: the old cannot continue, and the new doesn’t seem to be born yet.
This hegemonic vacuum explains the contemporary paradox: stabilization without consensus. Stabilization of this sort does not constitute a democratic transition; rather, it signifies the management of an exhausted order. Lacking hegemony, domination tends to rely increasingly on coercion, opaque pacts, and rent extraction.
Transition, elites, and material structure
Political transitions are processes structurally conditioned by political economy. In Venezuela, oil rent is not merely a fiscal resource; it is the material foundation of power coalitions. Any transition will hinge upon the struggle for control over oil resources. The opening of the energy sector, driven by the United States and international companies, may facilitate economic recovery but can also consolidate a tutored transition with internal legitimacy deficits.
Latin American history illustrates that democracies born under external tutelage tend to face subsequent populist vulnerabilities. Oil, therefore, is simultaneously an opportunity for reconstruction and a vector of political dependency.
Transitional justice and legitimacy
One of the most delicate dilemmas is transitional justice. The elites of the old regime demand guarantees of impunity, while civil society seeks truth and reparations. From a materialist perspective, justice is not only a moral imperative but also a condition for structural legitimacy in the new order. A transition that entirely sacrifices accountability may stabilize the short term but creates a symbolic debt that populism will exploit in the future.
The challenge is to design hybrid mechanisms: truth commissions, selective sanctions, and institutional reforms that prevent the repetition of abuses. Democratic legitimacy does not solely stem from elections; it also derives from the social perception of justice.
Post-Populist Democracy?
A post-populist democracy aims to construct a democratic-institutional hegemony following populism, creating a new “common sense” grounded in rules, rights, and pluralism, not in a charismatic leader. This does not mean an absence of conflict; rather, it calls for its institutionalization.
This entails programmatic parties, institutional autonomy, and a citizenship organized around rights and procedures rather than plebiscitary identities. Populism was partly a response to institutional weakness and social inequality. Without structural reforms in education, economy, and the rule of law, populism will reemerge in new ideological forms.
The figure of Edmundo González Urrutia symbolizes a depersonalized, constitutional leadership, a break from the plebiscitary logic. However, institutionalizing this rupture requires more than leadership; it necessitates a new democratic hegemony, capable of reorganizing common sense.
Structural Scenarios
Three structural scenarios emerge:
Reformed authoritarianism: economic liberalization with political control. Stability without democracy.
Pact transition: competitive elections and gradual reforms with persistent authoritarian enclaves.
Democratic rupture: dismantling of the authoritarian apparatus and profound institutional reconstruction.
The first scenario is the most likely given existing power structures; the third is the most desirable from a normative perspective; while the second appears the most plausible in historical terms.
Conclusion: from interregnum to democratic hegemony
Venezuela finds itself in a juncture of organic crisis. Chavism-Madurism has lost its hegemony as a historical project but maintains its capacity for domination. The opposition has gained electoral legitimacy, but it has not consolidated an alternative hegemony. The result is an interregnum characterized by stabilization without consent, domination without direction, and transition without rupture.
The crucial question is not whether Venezuela will move from dictatorship to democracy, but whether it can overcome the populist logic that has structured its politics since the late 20th century. A transition limited to economic liberalization and elite rotation would produce a formal democracy vulnerable to populist restorations. Only a profound institutional transformation, accompanied by a new cultural hegemony, can open the possibility for a post-populist democracy.
The Venezuelan challenge lies in creating a new historical articulation that integrates economic development, social justice, and the rule of law into a coherent project. Without this synthesis, the current epochal crisis will not lead to stable democracy but prolong the interregnum, along with its inevitable anomalous and authoritarian forms of power.
@antdelacruz_
Executive Director, Inter-American Trends