London, 3.5.12 | The following is a collection of stories I’ve encountered in recent days, along with some insights, that indicate Venezuela is truly in a twilight zone. How long it will remain there, and how it will escape, is still up for debate.
Eladio Aponte Aponte, the former chief of Venezuela’s Supreme Court Penal chamber, began negotiating for his freedom in 2010, shortly after Walid Makled was arrested in Colombia. His first meeting with U.S. law enforcement (FBI) took place in Spain. Recently, he fled to Costa Rica via Curacao, and from there, the DEA transported him to the U.S. through Puerto Rico. Concerns arose for his safety after U.S. authorities learned that chavistas and Cuban G2s were sent to Costa Rica to capture him before the Americans could. Two high-ranking officials from the Chavez regime have supported Aponte Aponte throughout: Jorge Luis Garcia Carneiro, the current Governor of Vargas State, a military man fiercely loyal to Chavez, and Isaias Rodriguez, Chavez’s current Ambassador to Italy.
Another deeply compromised former chavista is set to confirm Aponte Aponte’s allegations linking the Chavez regime to drug trafficking. Nelson Bocaranda noted in his article today that Luis Velásquez Alvaray, former chief of the Constitutional chamber of Venezuela’s Supreme Court, will soon appear on Eligio Cedeño’s SoiTV. Velásquez Alvaray’s statements could significantly strengthen the case against Chavez and his narcogenerals, which U.S. law enforcement is keen on pursuing. Another potential source mentioned is Hugo Carvajal, former chief of military intelligence (DIM). Plans are being considered to extract other possible informants close to Aponte Aponte from Venezuela.
There is a rather peculiar and puzzling disinformation campaign concerning Venezuela underway in Washington DC. A group led by Roger Noriega, a former Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs under Bush, alongside Venezuelans Martin Rodil, Esteban Gerbasi, Alberto Federico Ravel, and potentially the latter’s associates Guillermo Zuloaga and Nelson Mezerhane, are making claims about links between Venezuela and Iran regarding uranium mining and exports (from Venezuela to Iran), the joint construction of a missile base in Paraguana, and Aponte Aponte’s escape to Costa Rica and subsequently to the U.S. They also allege involvement in U.S. law enforcement’s interaction with Aponte Aponte, as well as accusations against Venezuelan political refugee Eligio Cedeño regarding drug trafficking. The problem for this group is credibility; to date, neither individually nor collectively, have they presented a single piece of verifiable evidence to support these assertions. Noriega, who held a significant position under Bush and previously ignored Venezuela, has been promoting this unverified information to various media outlets, supposedly sourced from Rodil, Gerbasi, and Ravel. Cedeño has become the focus of Noriega’s newfound interest in Venezuela, possibly because Cedeño has been assisting Aponte Aponte. This could stem from Aponte Aponte’s recent revelations in an interview published by SoiTV, a company owned by Cedeño. It is also plausible that Cedeño possesses better intel regarding the chavista side and has leveraged it more effectively. There may even be a conflict involving older Venezuelan money (Ravel, Zuloaga, and Mezerhane) in relation to Cedeño’s Boliburgeoise wealth. Moreover, Cedeño has historically supported politicians likely disliked by Noriega’s group. They might also be jockeying for position in a future administration and perceiving Cedeño’s actions as exposing them to ridicule. Adding to the complexity, Cedeño has retained the counsel of Otto Reich, whom Noriega reportedly despises. Or it could be that Noriega and his associates are simply inept, witnessing Cedeño outmaneuver their every effort. Regardless of the reasons, observers of Venezuela should approach any information from Roger Noriega and his sources with skepticism, unless, of course, he begins to substantiate his claims with credible evidence.
Junta. During his latest visit to Venezuela, the ailing dictator appointed a group of unwavering fanatics to form a Council of State, essentially a Junta, that will supposedly govern Venezuela following Chavez’s demise. This Junta is led by Elias Jaua and primarily composed of civilians. It remains to be seen how the equally radical military fanatics, led by Diosdado Cabello and other narcogenerals, will react. However, it’s clear that the Junta isn’t powerless. It likely has strong ties to Cuban intelligence operatives, G2, factions within the army, and urban militias. It hasn’t gone unnoticed that Jaua maintains close connections with Goizeder Odriozola and her ETA terrorist spouse, Arturo Cubillas, who has been accused of training both chavista militias and FARC terrorists.
The opposition. Amid all these unfolding events, the opposition seems absent. The only one making moves—Henrique Capriles Radonsky—has launched a presidential campaign as if everything is normal and presidential elections are still set for October 7. This confirms earlier analyses suggesting that in a power struggle among chavista factions, the opposition can do little but observe. Capriles Radonsky’s name barely surfaces in discussions regarding Venezuela’s immediate future post-Chavez. Neither he nor any key figures from the MUD possess the political, military, or financial influence needed to claim a role among the warring chavista factions, positioning them as mere passengers on a chaotic bus. Capriles Radonsky’s best chance—and only hope—lies in the possibility that Chavez chooses to run so he can proceed with the act of being the opposition’s presidential candidate to confront the dictator on October 7. However, if something occurs with Chavez before then, which seems increasingly plausible, Capriles Radonsky’s influence will likely be negligible until it’s clear who will represent Chavez’s interests. If Chavez passes away before October 7, it’s highly improbable that presidential “elections” will proceed as planned.