London, 3.5.12 | The following is a collection of stories I’ve heard in recent days, along with some thoughts that suggest Venezuela is truly in a twilight zone. How long it will remain there and how it will emerge is still a mystery.
Eladio Aponte Aponte. The former head of the Criminal Chamber of Venezuela’s Supreme Court began negotiating his freedom in 2010, shortly after the arrest of Walid Makled in Colombia. His first meeting with U.S. law enforcement authorities (FBI) took place in Spain. He recently fled to Costa Rica via Curacao, and from there the DEA brought him to the U.S. through Puerto Rico. There were fears for his life and freedom after U.S. authorities learned that Chavistas and Cuban G2 agents were sent to Costa Rica to capture him before the Americans could. Aponte Aponte has been supported during this time by two high-ranking officials of the Chavista regime: Jorge Luis García Carneiro, current governor of Vargas state, a military man with undeniable loyalty to Chávez, and Isaías Rodríguez, current ambassador of Chávez in Italy.
Another ex-chavista deeply involved is about to confirm Aponte Aponte’s statements implicating the Chávez regime in drug trafficking. Nelson Bocaranda noted in today’s article that the next former high official to appear on SoiTV with Eligio Cedeño is Luis Velásquez Alvaray, former head of the Constitutional Chamber of Venezuela’s Supreme Court. Velásquez Alvaray’s statements could potentially strengthen the case against Chávez and his narcogenerals, which is what U.S. law enforcement authorities want. Another name mentioned is Hugo Carvajal, former head of military intelligence (DIM). There is exploration of the feasibility of extracting other potential sources from Venezuela – close to Aponte Aponte-.
There is a strange and rather inexplicable disinformation campaign related to Venezuela in Washington DC. A group, formed by Roger Noriega, a former Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs under Bush, and Venezuelan citizens Martín Rodil, Esteban Gerbasi, Alberto Federico Ravel, and likely the partners of the latter Guillermo Zuloaga and Nelson Mezerhane, who are financing the operation, have been talking to anyone willing to listen about information – which they claim to possess but have not shown – linking Venezuela and Iran in uranium prospecting and export (from Venezuela to Iran), the joint construction of a missile base in Paraguaná, involvement in Aponte Aponte’s escape to Costa Rica and then to the U.S., and efforts to get U.S. law enforcement agencies to deal with Aponte Aponte and accusations against Venezuelan political refugee Eligio Cedeño in drug trafficking activities. The problem for the mentioned group is credibility, as to date, collectively or individually, they have not presented a single verifiable piece of evidence to support their preceding claims. Noriega, who had a significant job under Bush and never thought twice about Venezuela, is throwing around unsubstantiated information to many media outlets, information that presumably he is receiving from Rodil, Gerbasi, and Ravel. Eligio Cedeño has found himself at the receiving end of Noriega’s sudden interest in Venezuela. Perhaps it’s because Cedeño has been the one helping Aponte Aponte all the time. Maybe it’s because Aponte Aponte came out from the Chavista judiciary in an interview published by SoiTV, a company owned by Cedeño. Or because Cedeño has much better information on the Chavista maneuvers and has used it more effectively. It could be that there is a snake in the older Venezuelan money (Ravel, Zuloaga, and Mezerhane) and the boliburguesista fortune of Cedeño. It might be that Cedeño has long been a benefactor of politicians that the group led by Noriega may not like. It could also be because Noriega’s group is competing for a spot in a future administration and Cedeño’s efforts are exposing them as ridiculous figures. Or it could be that Cedeño has hired the council of Otto Reich, whom, according to what I’ve been told, Noriega passionately despises. Or it might be that Noriega and others are just a group of unfortunate idiots who are watching with dismay as Cedeño mocks every one of their moves. In any case, whether one or a combination or even other unmentioned reasons are the true motives, observers of Venezuela should be well-informed to take anything from Roger Noriega and his informants with a grain of salt, unless, of course, he starts backing his claims with evidence.
Junta. During his latest visit to Venezuela, the ailing dictator appointed a group of unwavering loyalists to form a State Council, read a Junta that presumably will govern Venezuela upon Chávez’s death. The Junta is led by Elías Jaua and is mostly made up of civilians. It remains to be seen how the equally radical military fanatics, led by Diosdado Cabello and other narcogenerals, will take this. That’s not to say the Junta is toothless. It’s likely to be well-supplied with Cuban intelligence operatives, G2, factions within the army, and urban militias. Some of us don’t overlook that Jaua is still working closely with Goizeder Odriozola and her husband, the ETA terrorist, Arturo Cubillas, who has been accused of training both Chavista militias and FARC terrorists.
The Opposition. As all these events unfold quickly, the opposition is nowhere to be found. The only one doing anything – Henrique Capriles Radonsky – has launched a presidential campaign as if nothing is happening and the presidential elections will be held on October 7, as planned. This confirms previous analysis, in the sense that in a power struggle between Chavista factions, there is absolutely nothing the opposition can do. However, be warned, the name of Capriles Radonsky is not even mentioned in conversations about Venezuela and its immediate future after Chávez’s death. Neither Capriles Radonsky nor any of the main figures of the MUD have the political, military, or financial strength to claim a place among the belligerent Chavista factions, mere passengers on a runaway bus. Capriles Radonsky’s best bet, and only hope, is that Chávez decides to run for office, so he can continue pretending to be the opposition presidential candidate facing the dictator on October 7. If something happens to Chávez before that date, as seems increasingly likely, it’s doubtful that Capriles Radonsky will have a relevant role, or let’s say, afterward, until a clearer picture emerges of who will govern on Chávez’s behalf. If Chávez dies before October 7, it’s very unlikely that there will be “presidential elections,” as planned.