The movements on the far-left spectrum of the Democratic Party, including the DSA, have seen significant growth during the recent primaries aimed at selecting candidates for the midterm elections this November. Photo: Conian Houston. Guacamaya, August 5, 2026. Every primary night during this preliminary midterm cycle, there’s a familiar scene: a crowd enthusiastically chanting “D-S-A” as a relatively unknown candidate defeats an incumbent supported by decades of political machinery. This momentum isn’t confined to the DSA— the Democratic Socialists of America— as other candidates are also embracing a leftist approach and achieving electoral success. A notable example is Abdul El-Sayed’s win in the Michigan Senate primary. Though he identifies as a “capitalist,” he backs progressive issues like universal health care and has a critical stance on Israel.
In Michigan, New York, and Washington D.C., the script remains constant, and the Democratic Party—fragmented, aged, and lacking a cohesive message following the 2024 election defeat—seems to have no viable response. What started as a niche interest a decade ago now appears to be the most dynamic faction within the U.S. opposition party, bringing forth a viewpoint on Venezuela that no Democratic presidential candidate can afford to overlook.
From “Outsider” to Machine: The Path of Victories
To grasp the significance of the current moment, we need to revisit June 2018 when Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, then just 28, defeated Congressman Joseph Crowley, a prominent figure in the Democratic hierarchy and a potential successor to Nancy Pelosi. Analysts within the movement considered this the DSA’s first significant federal win, establishing a precedent that the Democratic left would struggle to replicate.
The trend resurfaced vigorously in 2022 when Summer Lee triumphed in Pennsylvania’s 12th district and Greg Casar succeeded in Texas’s 35th district, both campaigning on openly socialist platforms with DSA support. During that election cycle, the DSA’s congressional caucus expanded to more than seven members, even as rival groups like Justice Democrats invested upwards of $11 million attempting to influence outcomes in their favor.
Yet, the most pivotal advancement occurred in 2025 when Zohran Mamdani, then a little-known state assemblyman from Queens, bested former Governor Andrew Cuomo in the Democratic primary for New York City mayor, achieving 56% of the ranked-choice vote. This victory marked the DSA’s first capture of a significant U.S. city executive position, catapulting him into the national spotlight for democratic socialism.
This accomplishment also served as a model for the grassroots campaign strategy he employed—reliance on volunteers, small-dollar donations, and a robust digital presence—elements that, a year later, were utilized to aid the election of three congressmembers in New York while influencing a Senate race in Michigan.
While the wave has been impressive, it has not been without challenges. In 2024, two of the most recognizable members of the “Squad,” Jamaal Bowman (New York) and Cori Bush (Missouri), both DSA affiliates and vocal critics of the Israeli actions in Gaza, lost their primaries to candidates heavily funded by AIPAC, the prominent pro-Israel lobby in the U.S., during some of the most expensive campaigns ever waged against incumbents.
However, these losses have not hindered the movement; rather, they have been leveraged as part of the campaign narrative. The DSA cited these events to claim that foreign lobby money had purchased two congressional seats, a story its 2026 candidates have adeptly utilized.
The 2026 Cycle: Michigan and New York Act as Testing Grounds
This context is the backdrop for the current election season. In Michigan, Abdul El-Sayed, a doctor, won the Senate primary by a mere 1.8 points—48.9% to 47.1%—against Haley Stevens, who benefitted from $60 million in outside funding, with over $30 million stemming from AIPAC and related groups. This was the largest investment in a primary made by the organization to date.
On the same night in Michigan, Donavan McKinney, also endorsed by the DSA, ousted incumbent Congressman Shri Thanedar, who had distanced himself from the progressive movement following the October 7 attacks in Israel.
New York’s results were even cleaner. The three candidates endorsed by Mamdani—Darializa Ávila Chevalier, Claire Valdez, and Brad Lander—successfully won their congressional primaries, displacing two incumbents while securing an open seat. Ávila Chevalier, a pro-Palestinian activist from Columbia, triumphed over Adriano Espaillat, who was then the chair of the Congressional Hispanic Caucus, thanks to a campaign that heavily criticized AIPAC funding directed to her opponent.
Additionally, Janeese Lewis George, another DSA member, secured victory in the Democratic primary for mayor of Washington D.C., putting DSA members on the cusp of governing both the nation’s capital and its most populous city.
The latest illustration of this electoral cycle’s trajectory appeared in Colorado at the end of June: Melat Kiros, a 29-year-old socialist Democrat, won against Representative Diana DeGette, who had represented the state’s first district since 1997.
According to the DSA’s own records, Kiros’s victory marked the organization’s 35th win this cycle—out of 150 endorsed candidates nationwide, 35 either advanced or won unopposed, while 34 faced defeat, with several races still pending. This increase is significant as it elevates the DSA from having two congressional lawmakers just a year prior to at least five secured, with the November elections still ahead. This shift has prompted DSA leadership to openly consider a competitive presidential candidacy for 2028 for the first time.
Common Denominator: AIPAC as a Declared Adversary
The nearly universal element tying these achievements together, from the original Squad to the Mamdani generation, is a mobilization narrative against corporate money, with Israel positioned as a symbolic centerpiece. An establishment candidate reaps funding from AIPAC, while the DSA candidate turns this into a focal point of their campaign, casting themselves as the untainted alternative to foreign lobbying.
This understanding has shown remarkable resilience against unprecedented spending. In Michigan, the hefty $60 million investment by AIPAC did not save Stevens. Bernie Sanders, a key strategist of this approach, articulated it plainly during his campaign: the true opponent was not the rival candidate, but rather the financial backing behind her.
Furthermore, this narrative inevitably ties each candidate’s position on Gaza into the mix. Brad Lander, who previously diverged from DSA over the group’s views on the October 7 Hamas attacks, won his primary after shifting to explicit criticism of Israel, labeling Joe Biden’s strategy toward Netanyahu a “catastrophic failure” that turned Washington into an accomplice to genocide.
This detail is significant, given that even candidates who are less connected to the DSA still adopt its language regarding Israel to navigate districts where such sentiments among voters have become pivotal.
The Other Front: Confronting Technofeudalism
While nations like Israel and Venezuela define this sector’s foreign policy, a third axis is emerging in its domestic economic discourse, particularly a term that was once seen as mere academic jargon just five years ago: “technofeudalism.”
This phrase, championed by Greek economist Yanis Varoufakis and French sociologist Cédric Durand, describes a transformed capitalism in which a select few platforms—Amazon, Meta, X, Google, Palantir—no longer compete in an open marketplace but instead extract rents due to their monopoly control over data, digital tools, and artificial intelligence. Critics liken this to a feudal lord who collects tribute for mere access to resources.
The term gained real-world relevance during the “Fighting Oligarchy” tour that Sanders and Ocasio-Cortez embarked on across the country, drawing huge crowds—36,000 in Los Angeles alone, one of the most attended rallies of the cycle—with a message blending traditional anti-monopoly rhetoric with a focused critique of tech leaders who have become political players.
Sanders has been clear regarding his targets. When Elon Musk remarked on social media about Sanders’s longstanding discussions on oligarchs, the senator shot back that the distinction lies in the fact that he’s no longer foreseeing a future threat; he’s defining the current landscape. The imagery both lawmakers recreate at every event—that a small group of billionaires decides, without any electoral mandate, matters affecting millions—is essentially the same thesis espoused by Varoufakis and Durand, now articulated within the context of a campaign speech.
Migration: Another Point of Confrontation with Trump
Another significant area where this sector has transformed confrontation into actual policy is migration. Mamdani has made the defense of immigrant communities a focal point of his initial year as mayor, resulting in a direct conflict with the White House.
In February, he signed an executive order designed to prevent ICE agents from accessing municipal properties without a court-issued warrant. In July, following the expansion of a federal operation in Queens and Long Island, his administration reiterated its refusal to allow “terrorization” of the city’s Haitian and Syrian communities, offering free legal assistance through the Mayor’s Office of Immigrant Affairs.
Mamdani has staunchly supported Temporary Protected Status (TPS), which approximately 600,000 Venezuelans have utilized. This immigration status has faced attacks nearly since Trump’s return to the White House as part of his campaign to stigmatize the Venezuelan diaspora, associating it with criminal groups, especially the Tren de Aragua.
On July 3, he delivered a speech from George Washington’s desk ahead of the 250th anniversary of U.S. independence, accusing “too many” in leadership of neglecting the U.S. role as a refuge for the persecuted and criticized ICE agents for intruding into communities without consideration for the length of residence or documentation status.
The tension has escalated beyond mere words: a May incident at a Bushwick hospital, where ICE agents detained an undocumented Nigerian immigrant and transported him in handcuffs for medical care, incited protests involving nearly 200 individuals and prompted the mayor’s office to revisit its protocols regarding immigration operations within municipal facilities.
This stance resonates once again with the broader platform of the sector. Just as the DSA denounces what it terms U.S. imperialism abroad in contexts like Gaza and Venezuela, domestically it critiques a punitive system allegedly aimed at the same populations—Central American, Caribbean, and Middle Eastern—that it purports to defend through its foreign policy. For supporters, this represents an ideological consistency that differentiates this faction from the rest of the party; for detractors, it’s seen as an incoherency that selectively halts at the borders of Caracas.
What to Expect from This Leftward Shift Regarding Venezuela?
The approach to Venezuela faced a significant test on January 3, 2026, when “Operation Absolute Resolution” apprehended Nicolás Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores, on Venezuelan soil. The DSA quickly published a statement declaring the action an openly imperialist war designed to hand Venezuela’s oil resources to U.S. corporations, demanding the withdrawal of military assets from the Caribbean, lifting of sanctions, and the reopening of the embassy in Caracas.
As mayor, Mamdani labeled the operation as a breach of international law and an act of war. Ocasio-Cortez escalated the rhetoric, framing the capture not in terms of drug trafficking but as an effort centered on oil control and regime change, weaving in the narratives around the “Epstein case” and rising health care costs in a disciplined message that prioritized domestic economic issues even amid such a monumental geopolitical event.
As the leftist caucus expands in January 2027, it is anticipated that its members will issue direct challenges to oil companies and other Trump-affiliated entities profiting from the new Venezuelan business landscape. This could involve letters from the House Oversight Committee, audit requests directed at the Government Accountability Office (GAO), and invitations for executive appearances—methods this sector has employed against other industries—though specifics regarding these inquiries remain unclear at this point.
This blend of anti-imperialism towards Caracas and anti-oligarch sentiments towards Washington is likely how the DSA will seek to demonstrate that its critique of corporate power extends beyond borders, intertwining both battlefronts within a unified narrative of state capture by corporations. This could lead to predictable political pushback, as the White House and Congressional allies may characterize these inquiries as political tools rather than genuine oversight.
It’s essential to be precise and avoid painting the movement as a monolithic block of silence, as the realities are more complex than typical critical reflexes suggest. The three most visible figures in this cycle have indeed criticized Chavismo as an authoritarian regime at various points.
Mamdani has explicitly labeled both the Venezuelan and Cuban regimes as dictatorships while condemning U.S. sanctions as instruments of collective punishment. Ocasio-Cortez, while framing her response to Maduro’s capture around the oil context of the operation, hasn’t dismissed the repressive nature of Chavismo. Sanders clarified his stance a few years back when, in 2019, he termed Maduro a “tyrant,” and by 2020, was openly referring to him as a “dictator” in televised discussions, designating Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua as “authoritarian societies” that he certainly does not endorse.
Thus, the national leadership of the movement maintains a dual-position: it denounces what it considers Chavismo’s undemocratic nature while firmly opposing any military intervention or regime change orchestrated from Washington.
Yet, this nuanced stance is not universally reflected across the grassroots. Local DSA chapters—like those in Madison or Pinellas mentioned in their statements following Maduro’s capture—have largely maintained a discourse that aligns closely with defending Chavismo as a resistance movement against U.S. influence, referring to the “Bolivarian Revolution” and the “gains” from the Chávez era in ways that the DSA congressional leadership seldom mirrors in public.
The diverging language between the visible leadership and local grassroots is telling: while Mamdani, Sanders, and Ocasio-Cortez weigh their words with a national electorate in mind that largely opposes Chavismo, local chapters operate with the more romanticized—and less critical—language of Third World solidarity reminiscent of the 1970s and 1980s.
A plausible scenario in the coming years involves the DSA adopting a congressional stance akin to the one Lula da Silva practiced in Brazil, that is, neither outright condemnation nor blind endorsement, but a calculated ambiguity. This would enable the denouncement of authoritarianism while avoiding legitimizing military intervention.
Ultimately, the lasting impact of these developments may not be reflected in individual votes but rather in reshaping the debate’s center of gravity. For nearly 20 years, bipartisan foreign policy towards Venezuela has consistently maintained a critical stance towards Chavismo. That singularity is beginning to wane.
With Mamdani leading the nation’s most influential city as mayor, Ocasio-Cortez increasingly proposed as a presidential candidate for 2028, and a structurally growing DSA caucus, the calls for “non-intervention, cessation of sanctions, and reestablishing relations” have transitioned from being a niche perspective to a feasible option within the foreign policy options available to a prospective Democratic presidential aspirant. This shift, one might say, was unimaginable just one electoral cycle ago.
The Division of Venezuela in Focus
One specific area where the criticism of technofeudalism and the DSA’s long-standing position on Venezuela are likely to clash with the White House in the upcoming months is in the corporate dissection of Venezuelan oil following Maduro’s ousting.
The pattern is already visible: merely six days following Operation Absolute Resolution, Trump gathered executives from 17 oil firms at the White House, including Chevron, ExxonMobil, and ConocoPhillips—each embroiled in pending arbitration claims against the Venezuelan government due to the 2007 nationalization—as well as Shell, Repsol, Eni, and service providers like Halliburton and SLB, assuring them of “complete security” if they invested in Venezuela.
In May, Trump even met again with Chevron and ExxonMobil’s leaders to discuss the status of those investments, publicly acknowledging that the influx of oil revenue had citizens celebrating in the streets.
Adding to this corporate equation, though with a different focus yet equally pertinent for this sector, is Elon Musk’s involvement. Starlink provided free internet access in Venezuela in the month following Maduro’s arrest, a gesture framed by the corporation as “supporting the Venezuelan people,” mirroring the strategy SpaceX had deployed in Ukraine. Seven months later, in July, the telecommunications regulator of the Venezuelan Interim Government formalized regular operations with SpaceX executives to expand connectivity across the country, thus completing the synergy between initial humanitarian intent and the establishment of a sustainable digital business infrastructure.
There’s also speculation regarding Palantir and Peter Thiel eyeing Venezuela as their next venture in Latin America, following initiatives in Honduras and Argentina’s Patagonia. This sequence—where a magnate associated with Trump emerges, emergency aid is delivered cloaked in philanthropy, and a lucrative contract follows—aligns closely with the framework of “technofeudalism” articulated by Sanders and Ocasio-Cortez.