PCC, Comando Vermelho, CJNG, Sinaloa Cartel, Tren de Aragua, Gulf Clan and other major Latin American crime organizations can no longer be analyzed solely through the traditional lens of drug trafficking. Their expansion into illegal mining, extortion, human trafficking, money laundering, and legal economies aligns with a strategic shift from Washington: the United States has begun to treat some of the most powerful criminal organizations in the hemisphere using legal instruments previously reserved for terrorism.
The landscape of transnational organized crime in Latin America and the Caribbean is undergoing a historic transformation. For decades, cocaine was the primary element used to gauge the power of large cartels. Today, that explanation is no longer sufficient. Criminal organizations have evolved into networks capable of merging drug trafficking, illegal mining, extortion, smuggling, human trafficking, corruption, money laundering, territorial control, and infiltration of legitimate economic activities.
Among the most impactful organizations are the Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) and Comando Vermelho (CV) from Brazil; the Cártel de Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG) and Cártel de Sinaloa from Mexico; MS-13 and Barrio 18, with deep roots in Central America; Los Choneros and Los Lobos from Ecuador; the Gulf Clan, ELN, and dissident structures from the former FARC in Colombia; the Tren de Aragua from Venezuela; and Viv Ansanm, the Haitian criminal coalition. This map should also include international organizations such as the Italian ’Ndrangheta and Albanian criminal networks connected to the Latin American cocaine market.
Not all of these structures are the same. Some operate like cartels, others as gangs, armed insurgencies, criminal coalitions, prison structures, or international intermediary networks. There is also no universal official classification to assert that they constitute, in that order, “the 15 most powerful organizations.” What they do demonstrate is a common phenomenon: the evolution from relatively specialized criminal organizations to transnational ecosystems capable of linking illicit markets with the formal economy.
Trump changes the rules: from cartels to terrorist organizations
Donald Trump’s return to the White House brought about a significant change in how the United States confronts this threat. On January 20, 2025, Trump signed the Executive Order 14157, establishing a process to employ anti-terrorist tools against certain cartels and transnational criminal organizations.
Since then, the Department of State has gradually incorporated Latin American criminal organizations into the category of Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) under Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act.
The first major wave included the Cártel de Sinaloa, CJNG, Gulf Cartel, Northeast Cartel, United Cartels, La Nueva Familia Michoacana, Tren de Aragua, and MS-13. Subsequently, organizations from Haiti, Ecuador, Colombia, Venezuela, Brazil, and Mexico were added.
Among the new designations made during Trump’s second administration are the Tren de Aragua, MS-13, Cártel de Sinaloa, CJNG, United Cartels, Northeast Cartel, Gulf Cartel, La Nueva Familia Michoacana, Viv Ansanm, Gran Grif, Los Choneros, Los Lobos, Barrio 18, Cártel de los Soles, Clan del Golfo, Primeiro Comando da Capital, Comando Vermelho, Chone Killers, Cártel de Juárez, and Los Viagras.
The process continues to evolve. In July 2026, for example, Secretary of State Marco Rubio formalized the designation of the Cártel de Juárez and Los Viagras as FTO, after determining that there was sufficient basis under Section 219 of the INA.
This means that at least 20 criminal organizations in the hemisphere have received new FTO designations during Trump’s second administration, a figure that must be distinguished from the total number of terrorist organizations already operating in Latin America before his return to power.
ELN, FARC-EP and Segunda Marquetalia
Here a fundamental distinction appears. Trump did not start from scratch. Before January 2025, there were already Latin American organizations within the U.S. anti-terrorism architecture. The National Liberation Army (ELN) from Colombia has been designated as a terrorist organization by the United States for decades. In 2021, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People’s Army (FARC-EP) and Segunda Marquetalia were added to this list after Washington revoked the previous designation of the demobilized FARC and established new designations specifically aimed at dissident structures that continued to carry out armed activities.
The State Department’s own reports have identified the ELN, FARC-EP, and Segunda Marquetalia as active terrorist organizations in Colombia and Venezuela, linking them to attacks, kidnappings, extortion, and other illegal activities. In the case of FARC-EP, Washington has also pointed to international drug trafficking and illegal mining among its sources of funding.
This significantly expands the map. If one studies the universe of Latin American criminal and armed organizations under U.S. designations —and not only the new designations ordered during Trump’s second administration— the number exceeds 20 organizations.
Brazil: PCC and Comando Vermelho
Brazil represents one of the most important examples of this transformation. The Primeiro Comando da Capital emerged in the São Paulo prison system but has evolved into a transnational criminal organization capable of connecting producers, logistical corridors, ports, and international markets.
Alongside the PCC operates the Comando Vermelho, another of Brazil’s historical criminal structures. The inclusion of both organizations into the U.S. terror designations demonstrates how far Washington has expanded the conceptual boundary between drug trafficking, organized crime, and national security.
It’s no longer just about stopping shipments. It’s about attacking financial networks, intermediaries, suppliers, facilitators, and business structures that enable these organizations to operate.
Mexico remains a major power center
Mexico accounts for a significant portion of the organizations targeted by the new U.S. strategy. The Cártel de Sinaloa and CJNG continue to be among the Mexican criminal structures with the greatest international projection, but the map is considerably broader.
Gulf Cartel, Northeast Cartel, United Cartels, La Nueva Familia Michoacana, Cártel de Juárez, and Los Viagras are also part of the organizations that Washington has placed under its anti-terrorism architecture.
The significance of this decision transcends Mexico. Mexican organizations require suppliers, intermediaries, maritime routes, companies, ports, financial systems, and associated organizations in Central America, South America, the United States, Europe, and Asia. Modern organized crime increasingly operates not as an isolated structure but rather as a global chain of illicit supply.
Ecuador as a scene of a transnational war
Ecuador’s transformation is particularly revealing. For years it was primarily seen as a transit country. Its location between Colombia and Peru, two major cocaine-producing centers, and its port infrastructure ultimately turned it into a strategic node for exports to the United States and Europe.
Organizations such as Los Choneros and Los Lobos have evolved to become relevant actors within these international chains. Now, Chone Killers has joined the list of Ecuadorian organizations targeted by U.S. designations.
The risk is not limited to violence. Ports, agricultural exporters, shipping companies, transport firms, warehouses, customs operators, and logistics companies may become targets for infiltration or clandestine use. For the private sector, this means that a seemingly legitimate supply chain can become a criminal infrastructure without the end company initially knowing of the infiltration.
Colombia and Venezuela as models of crime, insurgency, and illicit economies
Colombia presents an even more complex scenario as purely criminal organizations converge with insurgent structures. The Gulf Clan represents a powerful structure linked to drug trafficking and territorial control. Meanwhile, ELN, FARC-EP, and Segunda Marquetalia operate, blending armed violence with illicit economies.
U.S. reports have documented the activities of ELN and FARC dissidents in both Colombia and Venezuela for years. The State Department noted that these organizations engaged in terrorist activities including attacks, kidnappings, and assaults against infrastructure and security forces.
In Venezuela, the State Department additionally documented a permissive environment for the presence of ELN, FARC-EP, and Segunda Marquetalia, indicating that armed and criminal groups could benefit from illicit activities and ties to elements of the Venezuelan state. Also in this scenario is the Tren de Aragua, an organization originating in Venezuela that has developed regional expansion and became one of the first criminal groups included in Trump’s new anti-terrorism strategy.
Criminal governance
Haiti represents perhaps the most extreme case of another phenomenon: criminal governance.
Organizations like Viv Ansanm and Gran Grif have shown that organized crime can surpass the traditional goal of seeking economic gain and dispute essential functions with the state itself.
When an organization controls territories, roads, communities, or strategic infrastructure, it imposes rules, determines who can move, collects extortion fees, and systematically uses violence, the problem ceases to be solely criminal.
The organization begins to exert de facto political power over the territory.
The Latin American criminal map does not end on the continent. Cocaine connects South American producers with intermediaries and European criminal organizations. The Italian ’Ndrangheta has an extensive history in international cocaine trafficking and maintains connections with Latin American suppliers and operators. Albanian criminal networks have also advanced within the logistical chain, establishing contacts with South American suppliers and developing mechanisms to introduce large shipments into Europe.
However, an important legal distinction must be made: having a transnational presence, being subjected to criminal investigations, or participating in international drug trafficking does not automatically equate to having an FTO designation from the State Department. Confusing those categories can lead to errors in intelligence analysis, compliance, and risk evaluation.
From drug trafficking to the criminal ecosystem
Cocaine remains one of the fundamental economic drivers of organized crime in Latin America, from the producing areas of Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia to the large international markets. But around this economy, complementary activities have emerged: illegal gold mining, extortion, human trafficking, smuggling, environmental crimes, counterfeiting, fuel theft, and corruption.
The truly strategic element is that these markets can share the same infrastructure. A route used to transport cocaine can also serve to move people, illegal gold, or smuggled goods. A company used to launder money can also provide services to various organizations. A corrupt official can simultaneously facilitate both legal and illegal operations. Thus, a kind of shared criminal infrastructure emerges.
The ultimate goal
Drug trafficking generates enormous amounts of cash, but the accumulation of illicit capital creates another problem for organizations: they need to inject that money into economic circuits where it can be used without revealing its true origin. That’s why money laundering represents a critical phase of the ecosystem.
Front companies, real estate, international trade, cryptocurrencies, mining, construction, imports, and exports can become mechanisms used to move, hide, or legitimize capital. Criminal organizations reach a higher level of sophistication when they no longer rely exclusively on clandestine markets and manage to penetrate sectors of the formal economy.
The new threat to businesses
This change has enormous consequences for companies operating in Latin America. The risk can no longer be measured solely by asking if a country is dangerous or if drug trafficking exists in a given territory. A company may not consciously maintain any ties with a cartel yet still be exposed through suppliers, contractors, intermediaries, transporters, hidden end beneficiaries, ports, security firms, mining operators, or financial institutions.
And the new U.S. designations significantly increase that exposure. When a counterparty is linked to an organization designated as terrorist, the issue can go beyond traditional controls against corruption and money laundering. Depending on the facts and applicable jurisdiction, sanctions, terrorism financing, and the severe U.S. provisions related to material support may come into play.
This forces multinationals, banks, energy companies, mining firms, shipping companies, insurers, and logistical operators to elevate their due diligence procedures. Knowing the client is no longer enough. Companies also need to know the supplier, the contractor, the end beneficiary, and, in certain operations, who really controls the territory and the logistics chain through which goods circulate.
The new criminal map of Latin America
The big change isn’t just that criminal organizations have become more violent. It’s that they have become more flexible, international, and economically sophisticated. PCC, Comando Vermelho, Sinaloa, CJNG, Tren de Aragua, Gulf Clan, Los Choneros, Los Lobos, MS-13, Barrio 18, Viv Ansanm, and Colombian insurgent organizations represent different models but are part of a regional ecosystem where drugs, territory, logistics, corruption, and money converge.
Washington has also altered how it interprets that threat. The expansion of FTO designations during Trump’s second administration has begun to blur a legal boundary that for decades clearly separated terrorism and transnational organized crime. For Latin America, the challenge now isn’t just to stop drug traffickers.
It’s to prevent criminal organizations from controlling territories, ports, routes, economies, businesses, institutions, and financial flows. And for the private sector, there’s an equally important warning: organized crime no longer needs to stay outside the legal economy to thrive. Its greatest victory may occur precisely when it manages to infiltrate it.