After spending several months traveling across Venezuela with Manuel Rosales during the 2006 presidential campaign, I feel confident enough to share my opinion on what may come from the arrest order issued by the chavista judge.
Rosales is a man who has come from humble beginnings. He’s someone who has worked tirelessly to shape his own destiny. Born and raised in a run-down town, one of many in Venezuela, he quickly learned the ins and outs of life and decided to enter politics, perhaps the only field where unprepared individuals can achieve something. However, his journey wasn’t easy; lacking a political family background, he faced off against the established power of the region: the bachacos. They controlled the political machinery in Zulia and were the force of governance.
The first significant position Rosales was elected to was that of councilman. Gustavo Lopez used to tell me during the campaign that Rosales was rumored to wander around in a beaten-up blue vehicle, pasting up posters on poles, organizing and attending rallies attended by a handful of supporters who would fight tooth and nail against anyone trying to derail his campaign, traveling to the farthest corners of the electoral district, often facing tough conditions, sleeping in his car—indeed, a period filled with challenges.
Acción Democrática held power through the bachacos, and this aspiring politician was not welcome. Not only did he defeat the bachaco candidate in the election, but Rosales also ended up winning over and marrying the daughter of one of the most fierce leaders of the bachaco group, whose former leaders are now Rosales’s operational, financial, and political allies.
Not satisfied with reaching the highest point in public administration in Zulia, nor with repeatedly humiliating Hugo Chávez electorally despite his political, economic, and media power, Manuel Rosales accomplished the notable feat of being the sole challenger to Chávez in the 2006 presidential elections. Some may think, “big deal.” However, believe me, for a Zulia native, essentially an outsider like Rosales, to politically triumph over the Caracas political and economic elite is no small feat.
But that’s Rosales. He may not possess Chávez’s charisma or charm, yet politically, the Zulia native has nothing to envy him. Both are caudillos, without a doubt. However, one is a convinced democrat, while the other—well, why reiterate? Over 30 years ago, while Chávez was nurturing his early ideas of seizing power with military force, Rosales was on the streets, battling against established power in one of the most brutal political environments imaginable, gaining supporters who, by the way, still stand by him today. Can Chávez say the same? Rosales has, in Pablo Perez, one of his successful successors; where are Hugo’s?”
Now comes the important part: the management of government. Maracaibo is, and I say this as someone who many would consider a misguided Caraqueño, a livable, pleasant city, cleaner than Caracas, filled with new public works, green spaces, functioning hospitals, and decent roads. Rosales dedicated time and effort to Maracaibo. He has worked for those who chose him and does not discriminate against those who didn’t. Perhaps that’s why Chávez has not managed to impose his puppets in Zulia. Perhaps that’s why the lottery of smartmatics has not favored the coup leader either in Maracaibo or on the Eastern Coast. In Zulia, you don’t have to wear a red shirt to benefit from public services.
I need to pause here to explain one of my major frustrations during the campaign. People supporting Chávez within Venezuela are unaware of the improvement in the quality of life for Zulians overall. Those living in Ciudad Bolívar, inexplicably a Chávez stronghold despite the official campaign of systematic destruction of the CVG, don’t know that life in Maracaibo is better today than it was 10 years ago. The Margariteño, with all the good work done by Morel, doesn’t know this either; nor do the Gochos, even with their proximity; nor the Llaneros, and certainly not the misguided Caraqueños, with their belief that “Caracas is Caracas and everything else is just weeds.” The communication breakdown, along with the lack of witnesses at 40% of polling stations, were, in my opinion, decisive in Rosales’s defeat in 2006. Rosales has done exceptionally well as a governor, and the facts, along with his works, are there for anyone with eyes to see. That’s why people continue to elect him and those who represent him.
Rosales’s giveaways are not bags of food, missions, or a few thousand for doing nothing. No. His contributions are long-lasting: hospitals serving people, schools providing daily meals, sanitation projects in neighborhoods, admissions to existing higher education institutions, operational roads, public transport, etc. If you don’t believe me, go see for yourself.
And that’s precisely why Chávez wants him imprisoned. It’s not because he’s a thief; if that were the case, and Chávez was truly concerned about corruption, he would lock up his closest family members first—he knows whether their wealth is ill-gotten or earned honestly. What really terrifies Chávez is effective governance. That scares him more than a thousand student marches or ex-generals rebelling. That’s why he disqualified Leopoldo and wants to make all opposing mayors and governors sitting ducks by stripping their powers, knowing that if they manage well, the chance of re-election diminishes with the end of the oil bonanza.
But the lingering question remains: What will the opposition do as a whole when they arrest Rosales? Marches? Passionate statements to the press? Shouting louder that Chávez is a dictator?
The Zulians are already fed up; in fact, they’ve suggested that the people might rise up. I have no doubt about his word, concerning his person and his environment. But what happens when Chávez sends a regiment of army thugs or the National Guard to quash the situation? After they arrest Rosales, note that it occurs in the absence of a firm and definitive sentence for the charges against him, who will rise up? Yon Goicoechea and the students? Ramos Allup? Teodoro the warrior? Omar Barboza and the rest of the bachacos? Alberto Federico Ravell? Can any Venezuelan imagine Julio Borges publicly calling for defiance against the constant abuses of chavista authorities? Can any Venezuelan envision the TSJ ruling that Rosales’s lawyers’ case is valid, without a preceding uproar of national proportions?
Rosales will once again have to confront the bachacos, but this time, he may not come out victorious. Not because he lacks the desire or courage to do so, “on any terrain,” as he said yesterday. Rather, outside Zulia, he lacks the muscle, the opposition people ready to take a stand regarding their political representatives and say, “yesterday it was Simonovis, or Humberto Quintero, or Otto Gebauer, or Nixon; today it’s Rosales, tomorrow it could be me.” The issue isn’t simply Rosales; it’s not about whether he pocketed some money or not. The real problem is that the freedom of every Venezuelan lasts until Chávez, or any of his allies, decides to issue an arrest order and imprison someone whose guilt hasn’t been proven. That’s the real issue—the absence of due process, the administration of justice, and the presumption of innocence no longer exist in Venezuela, and that affects every Venezuelan, whether chavista or opposition. No one is safe; no one escapes chavista interpretations of justice. There’s no longer a need to prove someone guilty in court, as Chávez has decided that all who don’t bow to him are guilty.