AT CLOSING. I was contacted by a group of Venezuelans preparing a list of “closet chavistas” that they plan to submit to the State Department. They informed me that they will soon send me the list from Zulia, which already has 70 names. I am pushing for the national list and hoping to achieve my goal. Whatever the final list I receive, I will publish it next week.
MISSION. More than a breakout, the exit of bolichico Francisco Convit from his confinement in SEBIN was an arranged deal. What do I mean by an arrangement? Well, Convit shares a goal with another heavy chavista leader: to bring down Nicolás Maduro, Cilia Flores, and the Rodríguez brothers. For the escapee, removing those responsible for his detention is a pressing need, with a key target being Carlos Erick Malpica Flores to tarnish that group’s image. For the high-ranking chavista, Convit is a means to weaken their reputation, especially that of the Rodríguez brothers. Maduro is beyond saving, but the Rodríguez still have some leverage with the U.S. government, which this internal rival wants to attack. Hence, they utilized the old saying that the enemy of my enemy is my friend, coordinating their VIP escape from SEBIN, and even from the country, to establish contact with U.S. justice and provide information that implicates those involved, particularly the Rodríguez brothers. Why seek cooperation? By doing so, he submits to justice, faces charges, and ultimately gains release from judicial persecution. It’s a two-fold play: he avenges himself against Maduro’s circle, especially pointing the finger at Malpica Flores, whom he accuses of being the mastermind behind his arrest earlier in the year. What does the chavista leader who facilitated his escape gain? Clearly, he gets an intermediary to provide information on the Rodríguez’s crimes, having previously tried—and failed—to establish communication with the U.S. Moreover, freeing a Maduro prisoner directly undermines Maduro’s interests. Why try to further tarnish the Rodríguez’s reputation? Because he applies the maxim that if it’s not going to be me, then it shouldn’t be them either. This equation will become clearer later in this column. It’s crucial to note that Convit not only left SEBIN without issue; he successfully exited the country accompanied by five agency officials, who presumably have the mission to ensure the fugitive accomplishes his objective. Who is Convit’s godfather in this case? I think the answer is pretty obvious.
GENERAL. Just a few days ago, my colleague Sebastiana Barráez published an intriguing interview with an active Venezuelan general in Infobae, revealing important points worth mentioning. I firmly believe this interview is legitimate, owing to the seriousness with which this journalist conducts her work. Key takeaways from this high-ranking official include: 1) All military personnel who have collaborated—especially those supplying arms to criminal, terrorist, or drug trafficking groups—will face severe judgment in the future; 2) Venezuela lacks conventional response capability against U.S. power, as equipment is poorly maintained, cannibalized, or given to allied nations, resulting in minimal operational readiness; 3) The Armed Forces as a professional organization are effectively non-existent, even incapable of responding to a country like Colombia; 4) Militias serve as the regime’s facade to conceal infiltration by Quds forces [Iran], ELN, and criminal groups; 5) They aim for irregular warfare, adopting a “scorched earth” strategy, yet fail to realize that the U.S. is aware of their every move and knows how to neutralize them; 6) They support surgical extraction operations, neutralizing criminal groups to eliminate daily threats to Venezuelans; and 7) They back Edmundo González Urrutia’s “legitimate government.” This general’s statements don’t seem to reflect a personal position, rather they’re indicative of a broader consensus among institutional officers within the National Armed Forces.
EAGLES (II). Just as I suspected and explained in my previous column, there are suspicious elements within the ongoing changes in the Eagles of Zulia. Chavismo money is involved. I have two narratives regarding the situation, which I will elaborate on. Both have two common points. Firstly, the Machado family no longer controls the team, although Luis Rodolfo and others are still appearing to avoid raising suspicions. Secondly, despite their impressive roles in baseball, the Suárez family lacks the financial means to invest in a team, let alone buy, if that’s the case, a share package. Here’s what I’ve heard. The first version states that the Suárez family acquired a share package of the traditional Zulia team. If so, to gain control they must have purchased a significant percentage allowing them to make decisions. The Eagles’ ownership previously included, or rather involved, the Machado family, who held the majority of shares, as well as a minority group linked to Cervecería Regional, who distanced themselves from the Machados years ago, supposedly over conflicting income and expense reports. In any case, acquiring a share package of the Eagles would require substantial investment—a cost that supposedly the Suárez family is unable to shoulder, no matter their success in baseball post-retirement. Using the recent sale of an LVBP team, namely the Tiburones de La Guaira, which is estimated to have cost around $10 million as a benchmark, we can estimate. If the Eagles of Zulia are valued at approximately $9 million and the Suárez bought 40%, we’re looking at around $3.6 million that they likely cannot afford. Moreover, considering César Junior’s strong ties to some chavista figures, we might infer that if the purchase occurred, the funding likely comes from connected individuals who’ve wanted to control the team for some time. An example of “Cesita’s” connections to chavistas is his presidency of the Brillantes del Zulia basketball team, which is supposedly owned by ex-mayor of Maracaibo, Willy Casanova. However, this version has a puzzling aspect: in the case of a sale, LVBP approval remains crucial, and apparently, that topic hasn’t been discussed as far as I know. The second version diverges, suggesting the Machado family was forced out as part of the deal that enabled Juan Andrés Machado’s release, son of Luis Rodolfo, who was detained after the electoral fraud on July 28, becoming a victim of the “Misión Sapo,” led in Maracaibo by characters like Omar Enrique, Juan Paván, Gianluigi Di Martino, and Gianpaolo Basso, among others, who reported elite marabinos for social media posts or comments related to the electoral theft. Rumors circulated then that these individuals demanded the team be handed over in exchange for Juan Andrés’s freedom. Ultimately, he was released months later, with reports suggesting Antonio “Potro” Álvarez facilitated his release. The matter has gained relevance as management changes occur within the team, and a source indicates the Machado family ceded their shares to the Suárez family, who are the visible heads behind the investment that connects to the chavistas. In summary, all signs point to chavista capital being involved with our Eagles of Zulia. I continue my investigations.
TRIP. Manuel Rosales and a large part of his family returned to Venezuela last Sunday. Recall that MR traveled across the Colombian border to the U.S. just over two weeks ago. Given the number of suitcases, his aides thought it would be a long trip. However, they returned on Sunday and this Wednesday left Venezuela again, crossing the Colombian border to fly from Bogotá to Panama. Why such a short stay in the U.S.? I don’t have the exact details, but apparently, they are facing immigration issues. When I heard this, I remembered rumors of actions from the Trump administration against him, and in such cases, immigration remains a nagging concern. The fact is, he and much of his family are now in Panama. I assume they are, for now, at their luxurious apartment, and may eventually move to their oil palm estate in Chiriquí. The traveling group was so large that Rosales even brought along his heavy luggage handler, Henry Ramones, aka “El Morsa.” What’s Rosales up to? His initial intent was to propose his name to lead a hypothetical transition in Venezuela, although now I guess he’s trying to resolve his issues with the Americans. As I conclude this commentary while reanalyzing the facts, a question arises: why return to Venezuela via Colombia, only to reverse the trip three days later to head to Panama? Why not travel directly from the U.S. to Panama? What information did he receive upon arriving in Maracaibo that prompted such a hasty exit three days after returning? Why gather the entire crew in Panama when they all seem comfortable in the States? Just some reasonable doubts to ponder.
WEARINESS. I have no doubts that the betrayal game is intensifying within chavismo. It’s not just at the highest levels anymore; mid-level leaders are also getting in on it. Each appears to be out to save themselves and gain any advantage amidst such uncertainty. It’s almost a wear-and-tear war to see who can drain their enemy faster, aiming to assert themselves in negotiations with the U.S. Most aren’t trying for complete salvation, seeming to think that’s impossible; they merely want to reduce the load of accusations against them. Additionally, distrust has grown; nobody knows who speaks the truth or who lies. I start with the reconstruction of events and the outcome of conversations with the U.S. Apparently, all attempts to reach minimal agreements with Trump’s administration have faltered. The most common response received has been that time is up, and no agreements are possible as long as they continue to detain Venezuela. Amidst this regime desperation, they’ve proposed calling for new elections, only to be told they must be reliable, verifiable, and transparent; moreover, Maduro and Diosdado cannot be candidates. What’s with the Rodríguez brothers? Apparently, they weren’t immediately vetoed. This brings up an important question: is Jorge Rodríguez, in his role as mediator with the U.S., being truthful, or is he adjusting the facts to suit his needs? The reality is that this veto adds a new dimension to the betrayal game, and accordingly, one affected party escalated their strategy to tarnish the image of the Rodriguez siblings in front of the U.S. What’s happening? There is a palpable interest in handing over individuals allegedly linked to the Cartel de Los Soles to the gringos, with two names emerging as particularly relevant: Colonel (Ej) José Manuel Suárez Maldonado and Major General (GNB) Néstor Reverol. I’ll start with the latter, who is said to have belonged to the so-called criminal group since it was known as “the Sol Cartel” back in the late ’80s and early ’90s. He’s reportedly a founding member of that organization alongside others from military and civilian backgrounds, including generals Ramón Guillén Dávila and Orlando Hernández Villegas. Reverol remains house-arrested in Caracas under tight surveillance. Suárez Maldonado’s case is interesting because, while not originally linked to the criminal group and not an outstanding officer, he’s quite adept in business—allowing him to ascend within the organization. He’s currently seen as the mind behind organizing routes and money laundering operations. Hence, one individual identified by the U.S. has set their sights on him as a bargaining chip. Coincidentally, Suárez Maldonado has been close to Maduro for several months, suggesting he’s seeking protection. In this framework of weariness conflict, we should include Jorge Rodríguez’s trip to China and the judicial war unleashed against Tarek William Saab’s mafia. We shouldn’t view that issue as a mere vendetta by SEBIN and PNB against this mafia but rather as a deeper, more high-level action. Because beyond Tarek being the main target as head of this mafia, it directly threatens Maduro’s and the Rodríguez’s interests. Also, as part of this betrayal game, it’s necessary to take into account the VIP escape of Francisco Convit I previously explained. These are just some indications of the weariness war currently unfolding within chavismo. It’s literally every man for himself, do whatever it takes.
SAN FRANCISCO. The management of San Francisco Municipality’s mayor, Héctor Soto, is going poorly. Not only has he failed to address garbage collection issues diligently, but amidst a lack of operational teams and experience, he’s illegally established a new waste transfer zone. Where, you ask? Well, don’t be fooled into thinking it’s somewhere out of sight of piled-up garbage. No, contrary to logic, he’s creating it in a high-traffic area that will be visible to both San Francisco residents and those in Maracaibo. The inexperienced mayor decided to set up this makeshift and illegal waste transfer zone at C2 with Av. 15 of Sierra Maestra, between the La Portuaria and Richmond urbanizations. Yes, trucks are arriving at all hours, dumping their trash, which is later transported in larger trucks to the sanitary landfill. In fact, a National Bolivarian Police officer stationed at the REDI next to the dump mentioned that the scene was shocking and flies were already starting to appear. However, the garbage problems don’t stop there; he also has a three-week debt with private contractors providing their trucks, prompting them to protest outside Farma Venezuela. Why outside this company? Because Mr. Soto spends most of his time working from an office located in that pharmacy, owned by Ziad Abd-El Kader, who was the main financier for Soto’s campaign and is the masterminded behind the current administration. Soto rarely visits his office at the city hall, which coincidentally is across from Farma Venezuela. Ziad Abd-El Kader is referred to as “Leader” because he dictates which companies the municipal administration collaborates with and even makes executive decisions that aren’t his to make, leading many to comment that he is, in fact, the acting mayor. If this man isn’t part of the municipal cabinet, how is he making decisions, and why does he have a private office for the mayor? Additionally, true municipal office employees, who are required to work out of Farma Venezuela, have expressed frustration over Soto’s working hours; he shows up just as they’re preparing to finish their shifts, expecting them to stay with him until 1 or 2 a.m. Why work those atypical hours? No one knows the reasons, but it’s causing issues with his employees.
SPOILERS. Some “alacranada” opposition members are already making moves in anticipation of a political change in Venezuela. Clearly, they are motivated by the agreements they uphold with the regime. What are they up to? They are beginning to push the narrative that this transition should not be led by Edmundo González, let alone María Corina Machado. Their rationale is that neither, particularly MCM, would be accepted by the military and would raise suspicions among chavista figures, complicating any agreements. Hence, some are positioning themselves to lead the transition, claiming they are “acceptable” to chavismo. This initiative isn’t about fostering a genuine political transition but rather trying to assist the regime in achieving its objectives while also reviving their waning leaderships. These individuals lack any shame because after all their conspiracies to keep the regime in power, they now wish to be part of a potential transition. The reality is this: it’s impossible to exclude Edmundo and María Corina from any transition scenario. Moreover, reality dictates that EGU should spearhead that national reconstruction government to uphold the people’s will. However, that’s a topic to address later, because as a friend of mine often says, the urgent can overshadow the important, and in this case, the urgent is to finally escape chavista captivity.
WAR. I’ve been told that Gian Carlo Di Martino’s management is witnessing a currently low-intensity war, referred to as the “war of the Italians.” Who’s facing off? Two individuals who were among the biggest schemers during previous GDM administrations: Giovanny Marzocca [alias “Bombillo”] and Giuseppe Sblano [alias “Pinucho”]. The latter accuses the former of being disloyal. Why? Because Sblano claims that he was the one who introduced “Bombillo” to Di Martino’s circle and now he’s trying to exclude him from current business deals. Without a doubt, Marzocca has skillfully maneuvered to secure leadership positions within Gian Carlo’s entourage. How far will this conflict go? Well, with money at stake, we can expect anything.
INQUIRY. I would like to ask Zulia Governor Luis Caldera whether he bothered to directly review or verify the professional background of Neudo Enrique Ferrer González, whom he appointed as legal consultant for his administration. Why the concern? Rumor has it that this individual has been removed from judicial positions twice and was appointed in the regional executive because he is the son-in-law of Nohelí Pocaterra. I continue to probe.
ARRIVING. And scheming. That’s how the message I received from the Maracaibo Mayor’s office began. Who’s the message referring to? It’s about the Health Director within Gian Carlo Di Martino’s administration, Mayreth Acosta. What did she do? She successfully set up the medical insurance for municipal staff and pocketed a nice commission. I’ve been informed this isn’t her first shady deal; she’s done similar schemes during her time at Hospital Coromoto and other positions. Indeed, I mentioned her past dubious activities alongside then-Health Authority of Zulia, José Miguel Medina, in several of my columns from November 2023. Back then, there was considerable noise regarding her, as she was implicated as one of the leaders, paired with Medina, of the mafia controlling supplies and works in the health sector under central government authority. She’s always been considered a protégé of Fidel Madroñero, and she likely learned many tricks for siphoning off public funds from him. Who did she collude with for the HCM insurance contract for municipal staff? The individual renegotiated the existing contract with Mediplus and secured a juicy commission for herself. Just as I mentioned at the outset: arriving and scheming.
REJECTION. I’ve been informed that the first list of approved and rejected members of Gian Carlo Di Martino’s cabinet has arrived. It appears the list of rejects is longer than that of accepteds. GDM will need to hustle in Caracas to save some names that are part of his closest circle.
DISMISSAL. Finally, the prophecy was fulfilled with the dismissal of Maracaibo’s “bonchón” comptroller, Antonio Bermúdez. In fact, he was busy preparing handover documents for the new comptroller, Yasmín Cristalino de Carruyo, who appears to be the wife of the comptroller for Mara Municipality. Unofficially, it’s said he was ousted for committing acts of corruption and could even face prosecution. It’s clear that this matter doesn’t end with his departure, as other actions are expected against him. “Antonito” believed he was invincible and untouchable; now he faces the consequences.
CONTROL. Jessy Gascón, President of the Maracaibo Municipal Council, suffered a setback from Gian Carlo Di Martino. What happened? She was looking to appoint someone she completely trusts as the council’s administrator, but he said no. Ultimately, GDM appointed the administrator himself, which clearly disrupts the plans Gascón had intended. The new administrator’s mission is to control the organization’s budget. This isn’t the first blow to her; she failed to secure a significant position for her husband, Jhon Labarca, either.
MISSING. That describes José Javier Martínez, an Action Democrática councilman in San Francisco municipality, who refuses to attend the Municipal Council headquarters to sign handover documents, as he was the last president from the previous period. Why is he hesitant about the formal handover? Because a parallel payroll consisting of 200 workers was uncovered, who were getting paid without doing any work. The worst part is that the one who benefited most from this parallel payroll now refuses to assist him. Who is that? It’s his party mate, Otto Piñero, who had added more than 120 people to that parallel payroll. The adeco councilman is terrified and is therefore staying hidden.
DISAPPEARING? I’m told the crisis affecting the Nuevo Tiempo party continues deepening. The flight and deactivation of leaders are massive. It’s not only about rejecting Manuel Rosales’ erratic behavior; the losses in the Governorship and Municipalities are impacting them, leading them to seek protection to maintain their jobs.
Darwin Chávez|@Darwinch857|[email protected]