After more than a quarter of a century in power, the Chavista autocracy is going through one of its most erosive moments. The electoral fraud following the loss in the 2024 presidential elections has left Nicolás Maduro lacking political legitimacy.
The majority rejection of the regime by the population is undeniable, while the persistent humanitarian crisis deepens amidst an economy marked by stagnation, triple-digit inflation, and the collapse of the bolívar.
In addition to the political illegitimacy that has isolated the regime internationally, growing pressure has emerged from international security, especially after U.S. authorities designated the Cartel of the Suns as a transnational terrorist organization, identifying Nicolás Maduro and prominent members of his regime as its primary leaders. At the same time, Washington has deployed a broad military operation in the Caribbean aimed at the region’s drug trafficking cartels. Recently, President Donald Trump also confirmed he authorized covert CIA operations in Venezuela, suggesting the possibility of ground actions against cartel activities.
Transition from Authoritarianism to Democracy
Numerous analysts and think tanks have argued that the current context of high pressure and erosion of the Chavista regime could lead, in the short or medium term, to Nicolás Maduro’s eventual exit from power. While it is true that the hope of the vast majority of Venezuelans—and the international democratic community—points to the fall of the Maduro dictatorship opening doors to a democratic transition, both historical experience (Libya post-Gaddafi, Haiti post-Duvalier, and Sudan post-Bashir) and specialized literature warn that these liberalization processes do not, by themselves, ensure the establishment of a stable democracy.
Notable researchers, such as the Spanish-German Juan Linz (1926-2013), have pointed out that the transition from authoritarianism to democracy is a complex, dynamic process filled with uncertainty, including risks of regression or deepening the dictatorship. Therefore, the transition phase (the intermediate period between the collapse of the autocratic regime and the establishment and stabilization of the democratic system) is extremely critical and requires political leadership to exhibit realism, anticipation, and prudence.
Chavista Legacy
Indeed, the way a potential exit from the regime occurs will condition the chances of establishing a stable democracy. Depending on whether it happens due to an internal fracture, a collapse of the regime induced by societal pressures, a negotiated agreement with guarantees, or even external intervention, various scenarios could arise that either multiply or reduce the complexities of the transition process. Not surprisingly, Maduro and Diosdado Cabello have threatened that if they were removed from power, Chavista forces would make the country ungovernable.
Closely linked to how a regime collapse occurs and the transition path taken—an issue that requires its own analysis and remains fraught with uncertainty—are structural obstacles and political challenges inherited from 25 years of authoritarianism that opposition forces will inevitably face on their path to democracy.
The Autocratic Institutional Framework
From a political-institutional perspective, restoring a democratic system would face an institutional framework designed and utilized by Chavismo to guarantee its permanence in power. The Supreme Court, the National Electoral Council, the National Assembly, the armed forces, and multiple intelligence agencies are entirely co-opted and controlled by agents loyal to the Chavista regime, necessitating a profound restructuring to restore the balance of powers in the country.
In this context, one of the most complex challenges any new government will face will be the reintegration of the military and security apparatus within a democratic framework. Over the past two decades, the Venezuelan armed forces have undergone intense ideological indoctrination and a radical change in their military doctrine, aligning it with the political project of the Bolivarian Revolution and with the interests of authoritarian powers such as Cuba, Russia, Iran, and China.
Simultaneously, its structure and command unity has been deliberately fragmented (notably with the creation of the Bolivarian militias), and a wide internal surveillance system has been established that impedes institutional cohesion. Likewise, to ensure loyalty, the regime has established a system of privileges that grants military members direct access to sources of economic power, which has corrupted some mid-level and senior commanders.
The Chavista institutional framework has also led to the loss of the state’s monopoly on force. To secure its power, the regime has negotiated with illegal paramilitary forces, particularly with the binational guerrilla that currently exerts territorial and political control especially in border areas. The recovery of territorial control and dismantling of these parallel structures will be a vital condition for restoring the authority of the democratic state.
Inflation, Devaluation, Debt, and Financial Isolation
From an economic-fiscal perspective, the country is in a deeply compromised situation, worsened by the regime’s secrecy and lack of statistical transparency, which makes it impossible to accurately determine the depth of the economic collapse.
Some economists, like José Guerra, estimate that the year-on-year inflation as of September 2025 is around 370 percent and warn of the risk of a new hyperinflation. At the same time, the bolívar is experiencing a brutal depreciation: in the first nine months of the year, it fell by 71.9 percent.
Moreover, the country faces an unpayable external debt. Economist Gustavo García estimates this amounts to approximately US$ 180 billion, equivalent to between 170 and 180 percent of GDP, a sum impossible to address with current revenues. The situation is exacerbated by the regime’s isolation, preventing access to financing sources like the IMF or international markets.
Destruction of the Productive Apparatus, Informality, and Loss of Labor Force
Another legacy of the Bolivarian Revolution has been the destruction of the productive apparatus. Reports from business organizations and consultancies estimate that, in the last 25 years, nearly three-quarters of the formal business sector has disappeared.
This is compounded by the debacle of state-owned enterprises, especially PDVSA, which, lacking financial or technical capacity, is unable to restore the production levels achieved during democracy by itself. Today, more than 50 percent of the Economically Active Population (EAP) is informal. To this tragedy adds the dramatic decline of the labor force due to the forced migration of more than seven million Venezuelans.
Collapse of Service Infrastructure, Poverty, and Food Insecurity
The economic landscape worsens due to the collapse of the country’s service infrastructure. Lack of investment, maintenance, corruption, and forced migration have led to a critical deterioration of electricity, water, transport, and road services, as well as public health and education systems, with dramatic consequences for productivity, employment, and the quality of life for Venezuelans.
According to ENCOVI 2024 data, more than half of Venezuelan households live in multidimensional poverty (56.5 percent). Meanwhile, the Global Humanitarian Overview (OCHA/GHO-2025) estimates between 7.6 and 7.9 million Venezuelans require humanitarian assistance. At the same time, the World Food Programme (WFP) estimates that 40 percent of the Venezuelan population suffers from moderate or severe food insecurity, and 15 percent needs urgent help.
Reasons for Hope
This dramatic social situation, along with the Chavista institutional framework and economic collapse, is just the tip of the iceberg, but reflects the magnitude of the challenge. However, there are also reasons for hope.
As Primero Justicia’s Paola Bautista de Alemán argues in her article “Why Venezuela is not Haiti?” the country possesses a set of conditions that favor the restoration of democracy. Forty years of republican life have left a strong imprint on the collective memory. Moreover, Venezuela has a relatively homogeneous society; political and civil organizations that, despite repression, maintain operational and coordination capacity; and a widely recognized opposition leadership both nationally and internationally.
On the other hand, the Venezuelan opposition is not improvising: various technical and political teams have developed thorough studies and proposals for the country’s recovery over the years. The most recent of these efforts is “Venezuela, Land of Grace,” the national reconstruction plan presented by María Corina Machado and Edmundo González.
It’s clear that a process of this nature will not be easy or quick, and will require sustained support from the international community, but the important thing is to recognize that Venezuela is not condemned to choose between Chavista dictatorship, internal confrontations, or anarchy.
Ramón Cardozo Álvarez