ARE THEY IN TROUBLE? Among the members of Gian Carlo Di Martino’s crew, there’s fear about not passing the PSUV filter in Caracas. Their names are likely to show up in databases from SEBIN and DGCIM, linked to previous investigations. While it’s true that all allegations against the Italian were frozen after 2008 due to his plundering of the municipality, it doesn’t mean those files have vanished. Names involved in previous scandals like Marilene Huerta, Giovanny Marzocca [alias “Bombillo”], Joemel Robles, Pedro Barboza, and Alexander Roseti are still active in intelligence agency archives. Just as this column was wrapping up, I received information about a name I need to check: Hanner Pérez, newly appointed provisional president of the Municipal Institute of the Environment. What’s the catch with Hanner? He’s in business with Joemel Robles on lubricants. Previously a supplier for IMAU under Rafael Ramírez Colina, he also got caught up in the 2024 purge and was detained for several days. I doubt he’ll pass the filter either. What will GDM do if they scrape his gang? I assume he’ll request exceptions in Caracas, claiming they’re part of his trusted team. Let’s wait for the evaluation results.
FOSPUCA (III). The massive scheme developed by Gian Carlo Di Martino before the July 27 elections is now official. This week he announced the hiring of the notorious Fospuca company, a joint venture between José Simón Elarba Haddad and Carlos Erick Malpica Flores [Cilita’s nephew]. One of the things that caught my eye in the Italian’s announcement is that, according to him, there won’t be any fee increases, as the service will be sustained by municipal funds. This raises questions since it’s impossible for current municipal revenues to fully cover Fospuca’s services. We’ll analyze that next week. As I mentioned, this week I’ll share some numbers from the waste scheme since I explained the tax collection last week. First, Maracaibo needs at least 100 trucks for waste collection, as Di Martino stated. It’s currently impossible for Fospuca to deploy 100 compactors, as these are expensive units that cannot be added overnight, nor can they bring trucks from other municipalities. Due to this issue, many trucks servicing the area will belong to external contractors. After consulting several knowledgeable sources, I estimate that of the 100 trucks, about 40 will come directly from Fospuca, while 60 will be from external suppliers, including compactors, mini-matics, and dump trucks [these are not exact numbers]. As is customary, the direct Fospuca trucks will cover the main streets and avenues for visibility, while the remaining trucks handle the rest of the city. After this segmentation, it’s easy to see this scheme has two business verticals. They’ll profit from the Fospuca trucks and the contracting of external ones. The common factor is overbilling. I start with the external contracts. Note that all calculations are approximations, depending on how many external trucks are eventually hired. Assuming 60 units for the exercise, they estimate billing $230 per trip for each compactor, but will pay the supplier $150 [$80 overbilling per trip per truck]. For each mini-matic, they’re expected to bill $110, but the contractor will receive $80 [$30 overbilling per trip per truck]; while with the dump trucks, they plan to charge $70 and pay the owner $40 [$30 overbilling per trip per truck]. If there are 30 compactors and $80 overbilling per trip, that’s $240 extra daily per unit, resulting in a total of $6,240 extra per truck monthly; thus yielding total profits of $187,200 for those involved. For mini-matics, assuming they hire 10, with a $30 overprice per trip and three trips a day, this generates a $23,400 total monthly profit. Meanwhile, for 20 dump trucks with a $30 overprice per trip, we’re looking at a profit of $46,800. From these projections, this side of the waste business could leave Di Martino and his crew with an estimated $257,400 monthly profit. Again, these are not exact numbers but approximations. And what about the profits from trucks owned by Fospuca? Due to space constraints, I’ll delve into that next week.
SIGAT. When discussing potential ways Gian Carlo Di Martino could legally grant Fospuca tax collection rights in Maracaibo, the name SIGAT popped up. What is SIGAT? It’s the “Tax Management and Administration System,” a software that enables governments, local councils, and state institutes to charge and manage fees and taxes. This system appears to be created by a company owned by José David Cabello Rondón, the superintendent of SENIAT, and it’s uniquely connected to this agency, allowing users to validate and cross-check information. No other system in Venezuela has this integration, and we can guess why. The company behind this software is Sirumatek Soluciones, RIF: J-40335450-2, with its headquarters at Sumar office, corner of Glorieta, Caracas. The audacity surrounding this company is astounding, as its office is located in the General Collections Division of the Municipal Administration and Collection Superintendency (SUMAR) of the Libertador Municipality. While it’s fundamentally José David Cabello’s business, he has partnered with controversial figure Atahualpa Fernández Arbulu, a Peruvian-Spanish citizen who has profited significantly with chavismo. What’s the profit from using the software? Sirumatek gets a percentage of tax collection and fees from the municipality, state government, or agency. In the case of mayors, the collection rate hinges on whether they are government-affiliated or opposition. If a PSUV mayor, they charge 5%, curiously, this doesn’t go to the software company but directly into PSUV finances. Is the money going straight to the ruling party? Yes, that’s right. Conversely, if the mayor is from the opposition, the charge is 3%, and that money does funnel into the company that developed the system. This indicates that those operating the company supplying the software prefer to strike deals with municipalities led by opposition anyway since that means all profits go to them. I suspect the method granting PSUV a cut of municipal collections run by chavistas is not only illegal but also legitimizes the business dealings of its leaders, in this case José David Cabello Rondón. To put it simply, the PSUV collects a “toll” from Sirumatek for allowing them to conduct business with the Venezuelan state. Not being a lawyer, I can only suspect that multiple crimes are being committed with SIGAT. In chavismo, corruption and the misuse of public assets are institutionalized. What gall!
SAP MISSION. Do you remember how after the fraudulent elections on July 28, 2024, a witch hunt began against opponents for any comments on social media or WhatsApp? Do you recall when I mentioned the “Sapo Mission” functioning in Maracaibo’s “high society”? Well, it’s now being rehatched with multi-connector Omar Enrique leading the charge. What is this corrupt individual doing? He’s calling for the investigation and arrest of anyone making negative comments on his or his daughter’s social media. As a result of this persecution ordered by the failed singer, currently, over 15 people from Maracaibo are detained in Caracas. The unjustly arrested are being captured and imprisoned on Omar Enrique’s orders, whom he considers terrorists spreading hate. The magnitude of this harassment and repression is so severe that families of those detained are opting for silence, having received threats from the “sensitive” multi-connector. In summary, the “Sapo Mission” is being revived in Zulia, with Omar Enrique as the leading henchman. Is it possible that Omar Enrique is giving orders to Diosdado Cabello? In times of revolution and connections, anything is possible.
CONFLICT (I). The radical shift in U.S. strategy against the regime is advancing. New elements arise daily that must be included in the analysis. Caution and intelligence should prevail. There’s no point in overselling expectations and discussing an imminent invasion; just like it’s pointless to dismiss any solution beforehand. The truth is the U.S. government has never before advanced so far in such a short time. However, military actions are not announced, as it eliminates the element of surprise, and we can cite countless examples, but that’s not the point. Nonetheless, there is a reality: the U.S. government now has the legal power to act. Why? Because after declaring the Cartel de Los Soles a terrorist organization and accusing Maduro of being the leader, they are no longer opposing a legitimate president, but rather the head of a criminal group. This change in the rhetoric is significant for decision-making and action organization. It’s now easier to understand Donald Trump’s strategy that initially seemed ambiguous. By choosing to maintain Chevron’s operations, he shuts the door on China’s encroachment while keeping an American company present in Venezuela. The negotiations for the release of American prisoners held by the regime help rescue U.S. citizens and strip Maduro of human shields. In this context, we can also observe a shift in roles, as previously, the official stance played tricks on the U.S. government, but now it’s the other way around. A significant step in the maximum pressure strategy is the deployment of a robust military force under “Operation Caribbean South.” The formation of the involved operational group reinforces the battle against criminal organizations, in this case, both the Cartel de Los Soles and the Venezuelan regime managing it. How is the Iwo Jima Amphibious Group organized? Besides Arleigh Burke-class destroyers: USS Gravely [DDG-107], USS Jason Dunham [DDG-109], and USS Sampson [DDG-102], along with the nuclear attack submarine from the Virginia class – the focus of major news regarding the topic – there are other notable participants. What types? Three naval vessels warrant consideration: the USS Iwo Jima [LHD-7/Landing helicopter dock], USS Fort Lauderdale [LPD-28/Landing platform dock], and USS San Antonio [LPD-17/Landing platform dock]. What does this mean? The operational group has airborne capability [helicopters, planes, and drones] and troop disembarkation. Now, many will wonder: How far will the U.S. go with such deployment? I still don’t believe in an invasion like the one in Panama, but rather in targeted actions aiming to fracture and dismantle the regime. Otherwise, the enormous costs associated with deploying this task force for mere threats without resolving the issue make no sense. Hence, I believe this change in the maximum pressure strategy aims to address the Venezuelan issue. If nothing materializes and the U.S. remains in mere gestures, it will amount to an expensive show likely to have political consequences for Trump, having used taxpayer money without tangible results.
SCENARIOS. After the electoral results from May 25 and July 27 in Zulia, it’s worth analyzing how the opposition stands, which leaderships have disappeared, and who the emerging leaders are in a potential transition towards a Venezuelan democracy without chavista hijacking. There’s no doubt that Manuel Rosales is the biggest casualty in the last three years. Not only did he lose both elections, but he also piled up errors against the opposition’s cause since 2023. This direct punishment from Zulians hit him hard, leaving him in a vulnerable position. Moreover, the impact of Manuel’s mistakes has led Un Nuevo Tiempo to navigate its most critical moments since its inception, facing a clear division that’s eroding its political, electoral, and social mobilization capacity. Who emerges as leaders amid Rosales’s UNT debacle? While options within the little house party are limited, two names appear, although one has already resigned: Gustavo Fernández and José Luis Alcalá. Despite his loss on July 27, Gustavo remains a reference in Un Nuevo Tiempo, and should he want it and with Manuel out of the picture, he could take the leadership. José Luis Alcalá Rhode now stands as an internal reference after confronting Manuel’s errors and Nora’s erratic leadership. His forthcoming political maneuvers will be noteworthy. Could Carlos Manuel Rosales inherit his father’s mantle? Perhaps, but I doubt he has the capability, image, or cleverness to assume leadership roles not just in UNT but in the state as well. Outside of UNT, who could rise to prominence in Zulia? Without a doubt, Gustavo Ruiz and Juan Pablo Guanipa lead the race. Starting with Guanipa, his support for María Corina Machado during the presidential campaign in 2024 and his current status as a political prisoner has helped him rehabilitate his image after his decision in 2017 to not swear in as governor before the ANC. And Gustavo Ruiz? He emerged as the primary advocate for María Corina Machado and Edmundo González Urrutia in Zulia. Not only did he successfully lead the election campaign, but he also had to confront the conspiracy of figures like Manuel Rosales, who attempted to seize campaign leadership in the state, only to resort to sabotaging political and electoral organization after failing. It’s important to recognize that Gustavo didn’t just direct the campaign; he was already deeply involved in organizing Vente Venezuela’s structure across Zulia, establishing teams throughout the state, which showed results with Machado’s victories in the primaries and later in the presidential elections. Where is Ruiz now? I assume he’s in hiding due to a detention order from a chavista court, facing charges of treason, conspiracy, and terrorism. I have no doubt that should the democratic forces led by María Corina succeed in liberating Venezuela, with international support, Gustavo would be well-positioned to assume leadership in Zulia. However, this analysis only holds true in a political transition scenario in Venezuela; if chavismo remains in power, there’s nothing to ponder, let alone analyze.
RACKETEERING. Unfortunately, it’s become a norm that newly elected officials in Venezuela, before assuming their posts, already have their first schemes clearly laid out. In many cases, if not most, shady deals are pre-arranged with their main campaign donors. This is exemplified by the new mayor of the San Francisco municipality in Zulia state, Héctor Soto, who has already forged his first “strategic alliance” with Farma Venezuela, whose public face is CEO Ziad Abd-El Kader, but in reality, the other investor is Daniel Aguilar, manager of the Maracaibo-Bolipuertos Port, leading me to suspect there may also be capital from José David Cabello Rondón, the SENIAT superintendent and the minister’s brother. Apparently, Ziad Abd-El Kader primarily funded Soto’s campaign, and before July 27, it was agreed they would handle all procurement of supplies and medications for the health departments under the San Francisco Mayoral Office. However, as part of the “strategic alliance,” the new administration could also grant tax benefits for Farma Venezuela to open new branches in the municipality, where it already has one in La Coromoto, conveniently located across from the municipal headquarters. What does this “strategic alliance” entail? It’s a concept created by chavista leaders to disguise direct contracts without bids for service providers and construction companies. Through this legal maneuver, they hide direct contracts with their allied firms; however, it’s utterly illegal since the “strategic alliance” framework doesn’t exist in Venezuelan law. Unsurprisingly, “strategic alliances” are exclusively meant for chavista governors and mayors.
IS IT POSSIBLE? When an expert in such matters explained the specifics of “strategic alliances” within the new schemes of the mayor of San Francisco, it struck me that this could be the same model Gian Carlo Di Martino might use to award Fospuca the rights for waste collection and tax collection in the Zulian capital. In light of Maracaibo’s garbage crisis, the clever Italian might utilize the “strategic alliance” concept to give a legal façade to the lucrative deal struck with José Simón Elarba Haddad [president of Fospuca]. A direct contract could scream corruption loudly, while a bidding process would take too long and delay the start of the money-making scheme awaiting Di Martino. Furthermore, should they ultimately grant Fospuca the service in San Francisco municipality and manage the sanitary landfill, this “strategic alliance” could appear as a means to legitimize an otherwise illegal operation. I suspect “strategic alliances” will proliferate during Gian Carlo Di Martino’s administration.
CONFLICT (II). Now, regarding this matter, it’s also pertinent to analyze what the regime as a whole will do and the potential actions of the civil and military brotherhood. Never forget that they too are playing their game and must decide collectively or individually how to respond to the threat posed by the United States. Herein lies a reality: the Nacional Armed Forces cannot halt the attacking group sent by the U.S., although I insist that a massive and direct confrontation seems unlikely. Can the FAN manage to counter specific actions? I doubt it, as, for example, air defenses are quite diminished. The reality indicates that the regime has yet to recover from the surprise of the latest decisions and actions from Donald Trump’s administration. They never believed the Cartel de Los Soles would be declared a terrorist organization, let alone that the reward for Maduro would reach $50 million. They also didn’t foresee the dispatch of the amphibious operational group. This has thrown them so off balance that some of their most significant meetings are happening mid-air, as was the case this week with a Conviasa flight that flew over the country for 45 minutes before returning to its starting point, despite claims it was headed for Havana. What transpired during that airborne meeting? My intelligence sources indicate a key contact with Jorge Rodríguez and U.S. government envoys. As Maduro’s representative, he continues to offer to hand over the country in exchange for the removal of threats against Maduro. Conversely, I’ve learned that a group of high-ranking FAN officials, through Diosdado Cabello, sent a message to Maduro, essentially warning that they won’t sacrifice themselves or expose the people for defense. However, I find something peculiar about this supposed message, as the proper channel for such a warning shouldn’t be DC, but rather Padrino López. If Padrino is unavailable due to health issues, the next option would be General in Chief Domingo Hernández Larez. This smells like a personal maneuver by Cabello. In this context, of the brotherhood members, who has direct communication with the United States? Only Jorge Rodríguez, who relays Maduro’s messages and receives the U.S. response. At this juncture, it’s worth querying: who guarantees that JR is genuinely defending Maduro and simultaneously conveying truthful information regarding his conversations with the Americans? At this point, we can’t rule out the possibility that Jorge Rodríguez, seeing no progress, might decide to save himself and his sister by offering a transition led by Delcy Eloína post-Maduro’s handover or escape, creating a vacuum of leadership. This is just a hypothesis that requires evaluation. The most disconnected from the U.S. is Cabello, and thus he is likely scrambling to find a mediator. It’s also important to note that the “game of betrayals” is accelerating, hence the rumors regarding resignations, detentions, and investigations. Among international allies, both Petro and Lula seem to be distancing themselves from the problem. Colombian President Petro’s stance is notable, having initially claimed they would support Venezuela under aggression, but later shifted his position. After reviewing the internal dynamics of the regime, let’s consider their options for reacting: 1) Fortify and cling to power, hoping nothing drastic occurs; 2) Individual figures begin negotiating, leading to an internal fracturing; or 3) The military and other allies compel Maduro to cede power and seek asylum. If the first reaction prevails, the regime, upon seeing that the U.S. has backed off and not taken more decisive action, will try to seize the moment to crush the democratic forces, especially María Corina Machado. This could result in more forced disappearances, and we shouldn’t rule out a tightening around certain embassies, as we’ve seen with the Argentinian diplomatic mission. Undoubtedly, the regime is in serious trouble, yet it still has options.
FEAR. Following the apparent downfall of Major General Néstor Reverol in his business dealings, there are significant fears of a retaliatory crackdown reminiscent of what occurred with Tareck El Aissami’s crew. It seems the regime has identified all of Reverol and his maracucho associate’s businesses [JF], who are effectively using two police officers as cover in exchange for a commission for posing as the owners of firms and properties. What businesses have they flagged about Reverol and his partner? A well-known and massive hotel in Aruba and shrimp farms in San Francisco and Mene Grande, amongst other “investments.” I believe they are right to be scared, given how those who fall from grace in the revolution tend to fare.
FRACTURE. Beyond the futile arguments of Manuel Rosales’ bootlickers, a clear internal fracture is advancing in Un Nuevo Tiempo. It’s not about a giant split; however, the migration of leaders to other political projects advocating for democracy, rather than MR’s shady agreements, will intensify. In this respect, it was significant when Omar González Moreno, a national leader of Vente Venezuela, revealed that a faction within the national UNT leadership is planning to resign to form a movement backing María Corina Machado. He even stated emphatically: “The national leadership of that party is over.” This corroborates the information I’ve received about the severe internal crisis within the little house party that Rosales refuses to acknowledge or address. It’s no longer merely a Zulia issue; the limited national structure of UNT is in freefall. Manuel is reaping what he sowed.
CENTRALISM. The PSUV’s disdain for decentralization is at its peak. Why do I assert this? Because government leaders have amplified their interference in designating members of the local governments elected during the July 27 process. The first phase of this intervention was evident with governors elected on May 25, many of whom swore in only to formally announce their government members one to two weeks later, after the PSUV in Caracas reviewed their credentials. The same is happening with elected mayors, who must send documents of their proposed appointees for various positions so that the red elite can assess who gets to participate and who doesn’t. The problem arises as, if they took up to 15 days to decide with 23 governorships, handling 285 mayorships could take weeks. This is why mayors like Gian Carlo Di Martino are appointing a provisional cabinet while awaiting the final list from Caracas’s PSUV. In GDM’s case, several aspirants have “criminal records” instead of actual curricula, and one can only hope they get rejected in a rare moment of honesty among chavista leaders.
RUMOR. I’m receiving messages from the Zulia border with the Colombian Catatumbo region about a strong rumor. What is it? The ELN is reportedly facing serious internal issues due to ongoing casualties not only from their clashes with Colombian security forces but also with Segunda Marquetalia. They are believed to be negotiating with the Venezuelan government for the “forced” recruitment of 100 inmates from the reactivated Sabaneta Prison, intending to subject them to rapid training before adding them to their combat fronts. This is in contrast to Colombian President Gustavo Petro’s request for Maduro to expel the ELN from Venezuela.
Darwin Chávez|@Darwinch857|[email protected]