One of the sadly infamous presidential “expropriate” policies seems to have had an effect on ambassador Diego Arria. His La Carolina estate in Yaracuy state was targeted by the whimsical expropriation of strongman Hugo Chavez. Last October, Stephen Sackur from the well-known BBC program “Hard Talk” confronted ambassador Arria about this issue, asking if his recent political activism was due to being forced into the so-called club of wealthy landowners expropriated in Venezuela. At that time, I found the question valid and cannot deny I love the attitude of British interviewers when confronting their subjects with uncomfortable topics. Given Arria’s recent actions on the international stage and his determination to demonstrate the criminal and anti-democratic nature of Chavez, who he has said will die in prison, I have openly requested this public, virtual interview with Diego Arria, hoping he will respond someday.
Ambassador Arria: Stephen Sackur seems to have touched on a recurrent point in the debate on who makes up the opposition and who represents chavismo. Much has been said and written about the social strata identified with one side or the other. What can you tell us about this topic?
Question: You seemed to be uncomfortable when Sackur brought up your comfortable financial situation. Considering the corruption accusations made against you by chavista representatives regarding the Simon Bolivar Center, your time as Mayor of Caracas, Minister of Tourism, and the acquisition of Leyland buses, isn’t it reasonable to conclude that your wealth comes from the improper appropriation of public funds?
Question: The New York Times reported on November 3, 1974, that in your role as Governor of Caracas, you implemented a series of populist measures such as eradicating critical poverty and uninhabitable shanties in neighborhoods, supplying resources to poorly equipped schools and hospitals, and plans to counteract unemployment. The article also mentions you faced criticism from the establishment for prohibiting private beaches, protecting green spaces in Caracas, and requiring all public buildings to hire elevator operators and cleaning staff as a way to provide jobs for 15,000 street vendors your administration had displaced. Don’t these measures in Caracas resemble what Hugo Chavez has done on a national scale? How do they differ from current actions?
Question: You launched your presidential campaign in 1978, receiving less than 3% of the votes. Given that you had recently served as Governor of Caracas and Minister of Information and Tourism, do you believe you have real chances of competing in the piranha-filled waters of Venezuelan politics? How do you view the proposal for primaries in 2011 leading up to the 2012 presidential elections? Will this process be transparent, where all candidates discuss their country proposals, or will it be characterized by cabals and unconsulted appointments, as happened in 2006 among Julio Borges, Teodoro Petkoff, and Manuel Rosales?
Question: If you were to re-enter the political scene in Venezuela after more than 20 years abroad, whom would you represent, what is your proposal, and who would accompany you in this venture?
Question: I have heard that you personally negotiated with dictator Augusto Pinochet for the release of Orlando Letelier, Minister of Salvador Allende. What similarities do you find between Pinochet and Chavez, that is, between Pinochet’s Chile and Chavez’s Venezuela in 2010?
Question: Were you aware of Allende’s communist plans, supposedly devised by Fidel Castro? If so, how do you explain your support for Allende and Letelier at that time and your opposition to Hugo Chavez now?
Question: When and why did you decide to leave Venezuela for good?
Question: Once at the UN, you became the highest-ranking Venezuelan diplomat within the organization. How do you explain your successful rise in an institution that is often deemed useless and criticized by nearly all sectors of the political spectrum? Was it due to your pro-Allende stance in an organization traditionally dominated by the left? Were you one of those bureaucrats exempt from income tax in any country?
Question: In your diplomatic career, you were involved in resolving serious ethnic conflicts. How do you see the resolution of the profound polarization in Venezuela? Do you think the country needs to go through armed conflict for political actors to reconsider and seek consensus?
Question: You have stated that you will see Hugo Chavez in The Hague, as you did with Milosevic, of whom you were a witness in his trial. There are substantial differences between the two cases, both in the gravity and nature of the crimes committed and in the strategic relevance of the nations from which both leaders come. Do you think Milosevic was an exception to the rule? For instance, the dictator Ghadaffi is today a respected leader after being involved in international terrorist actions. The leftist government of Alex Salmond, in collusion with the labor government of Gordon Brown, even released a Libyan terrorist related to the Lockerbie case to obtain energy contracts for English companies. The international community has turned a blind eye to this, and multinationals are eager to go pay homage to the Libyan strongman, while the UN can do nothing and wants to do nothing. We have seen several examples of this hypothesis in Venezuela: Sarkozy and Uribe in the Ingrid Betancourt and Rodrigo Granda cases, the case of Arturo Cubillas and the Rodriguez Zapatero government, and how to ignore the farce of the FARC’s presence denounced by Uribe’s government and the convenient silence of his successor Santos. Don’t you think Chavez is playing the same card as Ghadaffi, knowing that as long as he can grant multimillion-dollar contracts, no one will bother to bring him to justice for his numerous crimes?
Question: In your diplomatic career, haven’t you witnessed numerous ocassions that “money is a powerful gentleman” saying?
Question: In ethnic conflicts, religion often plays a significant role. From an anthropological perspective, don’t you see hardcore chavismo as a kind of sect of fanatics, who don’t care who they hurt, as the general four-star Henry Rangel Silva recently stated? Do you agree that incitement to hatred, war, and the absolute negation and elimination of the other by Hugo Chavez is the closest Venezuela has gotten to Jose Tomas Boves in contemporary times?
Question: Referring to the extreme polarization in Venezuela and its possible resolution, do you believe the opposition political actors are equipped for such a monumental task? And what about the chavistas?
Question: What role do you think the armed forces will play in the event of the official government’s denial of electoral results, as recently announced by Henry Rangel Silva?
Question: You have said the cost of Hugo Chavez’s exit from power is very high. Considering who supports the strongman, not only at the institutional level in Venezuela but also organized crime, international terrorism, Muslim fanaticism, Russian mafias, the Castro dictatorship, etc., don’t you find it more appropriate and realistic to state that the possibility of a “transition to democracy” in Venezuela will happen Russian-style, only when those in power decide it’s time?
Question: Looking back at our contemporary history, do you see yourself: 1) as a transitional president, 2) as one who will complete their term, or 3) as one who will be overthrown?
Question: What do you offer that other political actors do not have, or as marketing specialists say, what is your “Unique Selling Point,” or your unique contribution to restore democracy and coexist peacefully in Venezuela?