Political scientist Michael Paarlberg was a Latin America advisor for Bernie Sanders’ 2020 campaign.
Guacamaya, August 26, 2025. Michael Paarlberg is a Political Science professor at Virginia Commonwealth University. As a progressive and an expert in foreign policy, he served in 2020 as the Latin America advisor to Senator Bernie Sanders’ campaign. He is also a Senior Fellow at the Center for International Policy and an Associate Fellow at the Institute for Policy Studies.
We spoke with him about U.S. policy toward Venezuela, particularly from his progressive viewpoint. Paarlberg has expressed his disagreement with the strategies of both the Trump and Biden administrations, arguing that they are based on flawed assumptions. He believes sanctions should be lifted, but warns against being naïve about Nicolás Maduro.
Q: In an interview with eldiario.es, you stated that “Venezuela is a very strange country. I tell my students that it’s not really a Latin American country, but rather a Middle Eastern petrostate located in Latin America.” Could you elaborate on that?
A: It frustrates me that U.S. foreign policy towards Latin America is often viewed through the lens of countries that don’t truly represent the region. For most of the Cold War, it was Cuba, but for the last 25 years, it has been Venezuela. Venezuela differs from the rest of Latin America; it is a petrostate and a founding member of OPEC. While other countries in the region do produce oil and gas, none have economies as reliant on oil—and thus vulnerable to global price fluctuations—as Venezuela’s.
This resource curse creates economic bubbles and subsequent collapses, as seen in other petro-states around the world. It promotes corruption, patronage, and autocratic rule. This oil-based economy leads to government subsidies and institutions unlike those found in other nations, like Mercal. No other country in the region appoints generals to distribute basic necessities like diapers. Yet, Washington tends to view Venezuela as representative of Latin America or the Latin American left, shaping its foreign policy accordingly while overlooking larger, more significant players like Brazil. In reality, Venezuela shares more similarities politically and economically with Iran than with Colombia or Cuba.
“In reality, politically and economically, Venezuela has more in common with Iran than with Colombia or even Cuba.”
Q: The administrations of Donald Trump and Nicolás Maduro engaged in an exchange of migrants detained at the CECOT in El Salvador and Americans jailed in Venezuela. Could this set a precedent for Washington-Caracas relations, and what’s your take on it?
A: Many people in the U.S. fail to realize that it cannot simply deport people to another nation unilaterally. It requires a deportation agreement. If tensions exist with a nation that produces many migrants, like Venezuela, it complicates the situation: migrants gain stronger asylum claims, making deportation harder. This dynamic grants leverage to the migrant-origin country to secure certain concessions from the U.S.
Maduro astutely understands that the migrant crisis he partly caused—and which worsened due to U.S. sanctions—has turned into a political asset for him. It clears out potential dissidents, boosts the economy through remittances, and pressures the U.S. to negotiate. He also knows he doesn’t have to follow through on negotiation terms, as seen with the fraudulent election. Still, Maduro remains economically fragile, and Trump’s administration won’t allow him to dictate terms unilaterally. Thus, the approach from the Trump administration combines public military threats with private concessions benefiting U.S. corporate interests. This sets a tone for future diplomatic relations: consistently antagonistic but still open for negotiation.
The Trump and Maduro governments have made agreements for resuming deportations and have engaged in multiple prisoner exchanges. In the photo, an ICE-chartered airplane lands at Maiquetia International Airport, loaded with deported Venezuelan migrants. Photo: Ministry of the Interior, Justice and Peace.
“Most corruption looks more like Odebrecht than Tren de Aragua.”
Q: A group led by Joseph Humire listed alleged crimes by the “Tren de Aragua” in the U.S. InsightCrime has found various inaccuracies. Several intelligence agencies have refuted claims from the Trump administration about this criminal group, including its connection to Maduro. Do you think a false narrative about Tren de Aragua has been constructed? Is it designed to undermine the rights of Venezuelan migrants?
A: It’s not just private intelligence analysts contradicting the Trump administration’s claims about Tren de Aragua (TdA); it was Trump’s own Director of National Intelligence, Tulsi Gabbard, who was pressured to retract her statements later.
The relationship between the gang and the Maduro regime remains unclear, and there have certainly been deals made between TdA and officials such as Tareck El Aissami. However, there’s no evidence that the gang’s actions are orchestrated from Miraflores, the presidential palace in Venezuela. This ambiguity allows the Trump administration to inflate these connections to pressure the Maduro government and facilitate deportations, tying migrants to illicit activities and “terrorism.” It also allows Maduro to scapegoat and make arrests of figures like El Aissami, diverting attention from widespread governmental corruption, most of which isn’t grandiose; it’s more about procurement fraud and money laundering. Most corruption looks more like Odebrecht than Tren de Aragua.
Q: Within the Trump administration, there seems to be a split in approaches to Venezuela. One side advocates for “maximum pressure” for regime change, while the other favors a more pragmatic, negotiation-focused method. What do you think drives their disagreements and public contradictions?
A: Trump’s foreign policy is essentially split between two factions: the neocons and the nationalists. This divide mirrors the broader rifts within Trump’s support base: traditional Republicans, many of whom have roots in the Bush administration and lean toward interventionism, versus those loyal only to Trump who think the Iraq War was a mistake and believe foreign policy should drive business deals.
Marco Rubio is a key figure in the neocon camp. Although he professes allegiance to Trump, he represents a hawkish stance favoring maximum pressure and regime change. Yet, his ability to shape foreign policy is often undermined by Trump’s statements that contradict him regularly. On the flip side are names like Ric Grenell and Steve Witkoff—special envoys with ambiguous powers—who have pushed for negotiations with Maduro, likely to enrich themselves and the corporations they represent.
This schism can be advantageous for Maduro, as he is capable of pitting the two factions against each other, illustrated when both Rubio and Grenell negotiated with Jorge Rodriguez simultaneously, oblivious to each other, while offering different agreements. The recent renewal of Chevron’s license signals that despite the Trump administration’s military threats, the dealmakers currently hold the power.
“The unfortunate conclusion is that to convince someone to give up power, you have to offer them something more attractive than a prison cell.”
Q: What approach would be more effective and just for political change in Venezuela? Negotiating incentives or forcing Maduro out through maximum pressure?
A: The results of the economic embargo on Cuba illustrate that sanctions do not effectively lead to regime change. The same can be observed in other nations, like Iran, Russia, and North Korea, where regimes have remained intact despite heavy sanctioning.
If nothing else, these sanctions provide autocratic regimes a scapegoat for their problems and an opportunity to intensify crackdowns on dissent. They inflict suffering primarily on ordinary citizens, many of whom are likely to oppose the regime. If the aim is to encourage an autocrat’s removal, maximum pressure has the opposite effect. Moreover, threats of prosecution or assassination rarely compel dictators to step down. Maduro is aware of the fate met by Muammar Qaddafi and has drawn his conclusions.
Extensive academic studies exist on what helped promote democratic transitions in the 80s and 90s in Latin America, conducted by political scientists like Guillermo O’Donnell. Those who managed to step down did so only when offered promises of amnesty or through manipulated elections (e.g., Pinochet), or by reforming their parties to allow successors to contest elections again (rare examples like Mexico’s PRI and Mongolia’s People’s Party).
These exits were negotiated with amnesty deals and guarantees for military powers. While this frustrated victims of oppressive regimes, it is crucial to recognize that some dictators were eventually prosecuted later, and in cases like Chile and Argentina, there were moments when amnesty was later revoked. The hard truth remains: to persuade someone to relinquish power, you must offer something more enticing than a prison cell.
Q: A study in The Lancet asserts that unilateral economic sanctions impact mortality similar to war. How do you view “sectoral” or “economic” sanctions? What role should they play in a progressive U.S. foreign policy?
A: It’s essential to clarify the implications of terms like “sectoral sanctions.” If a country has only one sector, like Venezuela, these sanctions amount to penalizing the entire economy, impacting common citizens struggling to survive. The embargo on Cuba has many loopholes, as most nations don’t recognize it and there are numerous exceptions.
It’s likely that U.S. sanctions on Venezuela have resulted in higher mortality rates than those of Cuba. Even if they were a politically effective tool—which they are not, given Maduro’s continued governance—they would still be morally indefensible. They should be unilaterally lifted, not as a concession to Maduro—who would just lose a useful scapegoat—but as a gesture of solidarity with the Venezuelan people, whose suffering the U.S. claims to be concerned about. Other methods, like targeted personal sanctions, could more effectively hold specific leaders accountable, similar to the investigations that toppled Juan Orlando Hernández.
The continuation of maximum pressure sanctions and embargoes, despite the lack of regime change, raises another crucial question: are these measures genuinely aimed at regime change, or do they serve another purpose, like providing leverage for negotiations or politically maintaining a foreign adversary for the U.S.?
“There was a general naivety by Biden and his foreign policy team. The genocide in Gaza stems from Biden’s all carrot, no stick approach.”
Juan González (right) directed the Biden administration’s negotiations with Maduro while at the National Security Council. Photo: David Lienemann / White House.
Q: Juan González, former senior director for the Western Hemisphere at the National Security Council under Biden, said in an interview with Guacamaya that: “When we took office, it was already clear to the region that policy toward Venezuela was being determined by the political dynamics of South Florida, not by a serious plan to restore democracy.”
Do you think the interests of Venezuelan and Cuban exiles in Florida align with U.S. foreign policy interests? How have they exercised such influence?
A: The Cuban American lobby in South Florida has been one of the most effective in U.S. history. While I disagree with their policy objectives, I admire their effectiveness and discipline. Few issue areas allow a small, organized group to dominate policies that many Americans oppose. I also sympathize with individuals who have fled their homes due to dictatorial regimes and wish for change, even if those policies counteract their goals.
The Venezuelan American diaspora may be smaller today, but it has aligned its efforts with the Cuban American lobby to promote strict policies. However, as Venezuela becomes a more prominent concern over Cuba in U.S. politics, two unfavorable trends are diminishing the power of so-called Magazolanos. First, Florida has shifted from being a swing state crucial for elections to a firmly Republican state that Democrats no longer see as vital to win. Biden’s victory in 2020 illustrates this shift. Second, U.S. foreign policy has transitioned from a focus on dictatorships to one motivated primarily by migration fears. Consequently, states like Arizona and Texas are becoming more central to U.S. policy discussions. We can expect to see more incentives crafted for negotiations with dictators, reflected in Venezuela’s shifting policy and the declining clout of hawkish figures like Rubio.
Regarding Juan, it’s commendable that he pushed for a new approach, correctly identifying the changing political dynamics that presented Biden with an opportunity. Yet, the Biden administration’s approach to Venezuela has proven naivety, as evidenced by the collapse of the Barbados Agreement. They recognized Maduro’s demand for sanctions relief but overlooked that his own political survival takes precedence over the Venezuelan economy or its citizens’ wellbeing.
This indicates a general naivety among Biden and his foreign policy team. The issue transcends Maduro. The administration essentially supported Bukele while he eroded Salvadoran democracy. Tragically, in Israel, they provided unlimited support to Netanyahu, assuming he acted in good faith. Like Maduro, he is driven by corrupt motives prioritizing his political survival, needing to sustain conflict to remain in power and avoid prison. Understanding the domestic political motivations and incentives of foreign leaders is crucial. Both carrots and sticks need to be utilized. The current humanitarian crisis in Gaza is a direct result of Biden’s overly optimistic, carrot-heavy approach.
“Sectoral sanctions should be lifted unilaterally, not as a bargaining chip, simply to alleviate human suffering.”
Q: You were an advisor to Bernie Sanders on Latin America during his 2020 campaign. What key strategies did you recommend regarding Venezuela at that time? Which of those would still be beneficial?
A: I can’t speak for Senator Sanders, but I can share my perspective and the advice I provided to him during the campaign and since. Throughout the race, Senator Sanders faced attacks from other Democratic candidates who perceived his popularity as a threat, branding him as a radical sympathizer of dictators, which was inaccurate. During his campaign, he labeled Maduro a “vicious tyrant.” Both he and I understand who Maduro is, unlike many Democrats who believe reasoning can reform an untrustworthy actor, or Republicans who think threats can yield results. Unfortunately, media coverage focused heavily on the term “socialist,” which in the U.S. mainly means supporting universal healthcare but carries different connotations in Venezuela, Chile, or France.
My guiding principle has always been solidarity with the Venezuelan people rather than promoting regime change. Even those advocating for regime change must realize that elections alone won’t achieve that goal, as Maduro is likely to rig them. Nevertheless, it’s also evident that maximum pressure and sectoral sanctions don’t lead to regime change and are inhumane. They need to be lifted unconditionally, not as a bargaining tactic, purely to relieve human suffering. If free elections are to be possible in the future, groundwork for effective monitoring and campaigning must be established.
Q: What multilateral efforts could the U.S. support?
A: I also acknowledge that the U.S. lacks credibility as a neutral mediator, and other countries should take the lead. While Brazil, Mexico, and Colombia’s efforts haven’t been taken seriously, the U.S. can still play a role in making those proposals more feasible through selective pressure and by offering Maduro a plausible exit strategy.
Q: With this year’s parliamentary and local elections, the opposition has divided into two factions: one seeking confrontation with Trump’s support and the other aiming to negotiate and participate in elections, even as they remain the minority. How can progressive forces in the U.S. assist Venezuela’s democratic effort? Should they propose an alternate strategy to “maximum pressure”?
A: I believe that no U.S. administration or progressives should harbor illusions about Maduro. Given his deep unpopularity and his perception of holding power as a life-or-death situation, it’s highly unlikely any election under his watch will be free or fair. Therefore, I think it’s misguided to focus hyper-specifically on elections as the ultimate goal, as reflected by the failures of the Biden administration’s approach.
It’s also crucial for the U.S. to refrain from taking sides in internal political conflicts, especially with an opposition historically marked by division like Venezuela’s. Various civil society actors beyond opposition leaders merit support. Some of these groups have engaged with the regime, while others haven’t, yet some have made gradual advancements improving state services and reducing oppression. It’s not my position to direct the Venezuelan opposition or its people. However, it seems evident that democratic change will be incremental, and a longer-term strategy tends to be more effective than chasing promises of quick results through maximum pressure and similar tactics. These quick fix fantasies are often pitched by U.S. politicians like Trump for electoral gain, rather than serious plans to genuinely assist Venezuelans.