Guacamaya, August 28, 2025. James B. Story served as the United States ambassador to Venezuela from July 2018 to May 2023. In 2019, due to the closure of the embassy in Caracas by the first Trump administration, he transitioned to Bogotá. He is currently retired.
We spoke with him regarding the events of 2019, including Nicolás Maduro’s 72-hour ultimatum to the US diplomatic corps, the “Interim Government” period, and the “maximum pressure” campaign. He offered his thoughts on the sanctions and the moments when Venezuela was closest to political change.
Q: You were in the U.S. Embassy in Caracas during some of the most perilous times, including when Nicolás Maduro ordered American personnel to leave within 72 hours. How do you recall those days?
A: Those were incredibly challenging days. We decided that since we no longer recognized Maduro as a legitimate leader but rather Juan Guaidó as interim president, we didn’t have to obey his orders. Secretary of State Pompeo concurred, allowing some of us to stay behind.
While most families left within the 72-hour deadline, 28 of us remained to uphold the American flag at the embassy.
“[In 2019] I strenuously advocated for the Embassy to stay.”
Q: During that time, there was division within the Trump administration about whether to bring remaining personnel home or keep you in Venezuela. Do you think the White House made the right call? Did the lack of a presence in the country hinder your intelligence-gathering?
I believe most analysts now agree, even those who initially wanted us to close the embassy, that it was a mistake. Staying on the ground allowed us to symbolize freedom and engage directly with the democratic opposition, as well as, where possible, with the regime.
Decisions like these are tough. Hindsight is always clear, right? I firmly advocated for remaining in place, as we were attempting to support the democratic opposition and the Venezuelan populace.
However, the situation worsened when the Maduro regime implied that there were threats against my life, aimed at provoking tensions between the United States and Venezuela.
We all remember Ambassador Stevens’ tragic death in Libya. Secretary Pompeo, having been a congressman during that incident, had strong opinions about our safety. While I doubted the Maduro regime’s claims, when they indicated it was time to leave, we had no choice but to comply.
Did we lose our chance to fully understand the situation? Yes. Ideally, you want to be on the ground. Nevertheless, even after closing the embassy and relocating to Colombia, we retained valuable insights from the vast network we had established.
Q: On January 2019, the U.S. recognized Juan Guaidó and his Interim Government. What were your expectations from day one?
A: Naturally, we anticipated a negative reaction from the regime. Although constitutionally Guaidó was recognized as interim president, I didn’t think he would go so far as to close the entire U.S. mission. I expected to be declared persona non grata, along with a few others, but the complete embassy shutdown was a surprise.
Q: To frame this further, what was your perspective as a U.S. representative in supporting Juan Guaidó?
A: We were endorsing a constitutional action from the legitimate government of the country. Our support for the opposition was crucial as they sought to restore democracy.
Now, how it would work in reality? If that’s your question, we believed that enough Venezuelans, including those within the regime, would recognize the Maduro regime’s abuses and back Guaidó and the 2015 National Assembly in their efforts for change.
Q: Let’s discuss the events of February 23, 2019, when there was an incident at the border bridge in Cúcuta. There were hopes that segments of the Venezuelan military would turn against Maduro. A few soldiers crossed the border. Was there a deal with the military? If so, what went wrong?
A: I wasn’t aware of any deal involving the military to support Guaidó, though some members of the military may certainly have known.
In April 2019, Leopoldo López left house arrest with help from SEBIN officials, responsible for his protection. There were indeed individuals within the regime acknowledging the issue.
I won’t delve into specifics of our internal conversations, but I found it notable when Iris Varela armed ex-convicts to intimidate people in Cúcuta. Her actions were significant and quite detrimental.
Photographs showed desperate individuals seeking humanitarian aid in Venezuela, with the regime proving they’d control their populace through the CLAP program and rejecting outside help.
If you’ve been in a hospital, you’d understand what I mean. Things haven’t improved. Those with money can access assistance; others are left to suffer.
“I think the Cuban intelligence service has been quite helpful to Maduro.”
Q: On April 30, 2019, as you mentioned, there was another attempt against Maduro. Leopoldo López claimed that Maikel Moreno, the Supreme Court official, and Defense Minister Vladimir Patrino were part of the plan. Was that accurate? Did the opposition mislead everyone?
A: I can’t speak to that specific situation, as I wasn’t on the ground.
However, there’s documentary evidence suggesting Maikel Moreno may have been involved with opposition figures at one point, indicating there were many around Maduro who felt his time was limited.
I can’t give details about what happened around April 30, though.
Soldiers positioned on an overpass near La Carlota air base in Caracas, Venezuela, April 30, 2019. Photograph: Ariana Cubillos / AP.
Q: You’ve noted that many within the military and the civilian government believed Maduro’s time was up. What do you think prevented them from acting against him?
A: The Cuban intelligence service has certainly played a significant role in supporting Maduro. Furthermore, fear plays a vital role when confronting the head of a criminal organization.
Fear remains a strong motivator. Just look at General Raúl Isaías Baduel’s years in prison; his death served as a stark warning. This instills terror in others.
Q: How much do you attribute this situation to Russia and other allied nations beyond Cuba?
A: Cuba has been the primary actor because for them, Venezuela is crucial. The ongoing issues in their power grid mean they rely heavily on free Venezuelan oil. Without it, the Cuban revolution is under threat. Cuba’s involvement has been extensive, including teaching methods for torturing dissenters.
While Russia, China, and Iran are also players in this context, Cuba remains the most actively involved. I often chuckle when Maduro talks about colonialism because, if sending exports for free to the colonizer constitutes a colony, then Venezuela clearly fits that definition.
“I doubt there’s ever been a strong desire for military intervention within the U.S. government.”
Q: In 2019, there was a negotiation process in Barbados after the discussions we’ve outlined. Maduro appeared open to sharing power. We have interviewed Stalin González, who claimed that the government and opposition were closest to a deal at that moment. He also noted that maximum pressure and sanctions thwarted that. Do you agree with his perspective?
One must acknowledge that for the regime, losing total control is a threat to their existence. In 2015, when the opposition achieved a super majority in the National Assembly, the regime expelled three indigenous representatives from Amazonas state to prevent that majority and subsequently formed the Constituent Assembly.
This clearly displayed their unwillingness to share power. They controlled the Supreme Court, the CNE, the military, and the executive branch, and were not prepared to allow any opposition influence in the legislature.
No one studying Venezuela believes the Maduro regime or Chavismo is willing to share power. Evidence lies in the stolen elections in July last year. Saying they were near an agreement overlooks historical context.
While recent negotiations have led to certain primary conditions being set for eventual elections, it has exposed the electoral theft by Maduro, complicating his defenders’ claims of legitimacy. There are ongoing questions about the election’s legitimacy. So, no, I don’t think we were ever close to an agreement.
People often reference Barbados and the Dominican Republic, but this regime has consistently revealed its true colors.
Q: Numerous books have emerged from the first Trump administration’s cabinet discussing how military intervention in Venezuela was on the table, though it ultimately didn’t happen. Was this a request from the opposition or a product of “national security hawks”?
A: I don’t think there’s ever been a significant inclination for military intervention within the U.S. government.
Certain opposition factions understand they’ve staged protests, conducted recall referendums, and won elections, yet Maduro remains entrenched. They wonder what else can be done. I get that sentiment, but there’s never been much enthusiasm for military action.
Q: What do you perceive as the goal of the current U.S. Navy deployment in the Caribbean? When the first Trump administration indicted Maduro in 2020, a similar deployment occurred. Are these deployments merely symbolic, or do they represent a credible military threat?
This significant deployment poses minimal risk to Maduro. It lacks the capacity for actual military intervention apart from long-range missile assaults. It serves as a show of strength and may offer some modest counter-narcotics assistance.
Q: The CEPR recently published a study in The Lancet claiming that economic sanctions result in death rates comparable to wars, damaging the economy without triggering political change. Do you believe the sectoral sanctions from the first Trump administration are still relevant today?
A: The notion that sanctions equate to a blockade is flawed. There are no prohibitions on importing humanitarian goods. I vividly recall Rafael Lacava struggling to explain how he brought U.S. school buses into Venezuela if a blockade existed. His response was lacking. It’s impossible to assert a blockade if individuals receive food deliveries from Costco.
Explain to me how a blockade is occurring when sanctions explicitly state they don’t apply to food or medicine. I challenge the idea that sectoral sanctions increased suffering within Venezuela.
Regarding migration, some believe fixing the economy would keep more Venezuelans at home. Perhaps, but the deeper issue remains political: the absence of liberty in the country. A people seeking freedom will pursue it, regardless of economic conditions.
Thus, I fundamentally oppose The Lancet’s perspective. Even the Office of Management and Budget shares my view.
The Venezuelan regime possesses the power to decide what to import. In 2019, they chose to burn humanitarian aid at the border rather than allow it in. Ultimately, who is to blame for that?
“[Sanctions] were intended to damage the economy, sure. They were designed to urge negotiations.”
Q: The Maduro government shoulders plenty of blame. Yes, sanctions aren’t a complete blockade, but they specifically target revenue sources, like oil and government debt issuance. Wouldn’t you argue they harm the economy?
A: They indeed injure the economy, and their design aims to compel negotiations. However, the Maduro government opt not to negotiate, and our initiatives didn’t yield the desired outcomes. Despite sanctions, companies like Chevron still produce oil that ends up on the black market.
An intriguing scenario is Tareck El Aissami’s fate. I believe that the license granted to Chevron under the Biden administration, carried over into Trump’s second term, brought transparency to the oil sector, enabling Maduro to see how much El Aissami was pilfering through black market oil sales to China via Malaysia, which may explain his disappearance. No one ever mentions him now, although he was part of Maduro’s inner circle. Where is Tareck El Aissami? Who knows?
Q: I’m curious if these sectoral sanctions still hold value today. After all this time, what’s the purpose of maintaining them?
A: I believe sanctions serve best as a tool to foster negotiations. If they’re solely punitive, they lose effectiveness. Some suggest that minor adjustments to Cuba’s sanctions after 60 years will finally lead to change, but we have experience with sanctions.
Sanctions have functioned effectively in certain scenarios, like in Sudan, South Africa, and other nations.
In general, sanctions should be targeted, finite in duration, and not indefinite. Broad sanctions are understandable, but they must include conditions for relief. Without a clear path to easing sanctions in exchange for specific actions, they become exclusively punitive, which, historically, fails to bring about change.
At present, the Russians find ways to bypass the SWIFT system, and the Venezuelans have circumvented oil sanctions through various means, such as ghost ships from convenient flag nations. If sanctions exist for their own sake, then no, they won’t succeed. If they’re part of a coherent strategy, they can effectively stimulate dialogue.
Q: John Bolton’s book quotes Trump as saying efforts to oust Maduro faltered because “he’s too smart and too tough.” Do you feel the U.S. is underestimating his capability to maintain power in Venezuela? If he’s too clever and strong, what can be done?
A: I view Maduro as clever, not necessarily smart. He’s a survivor, well-coached by Cuba. They were arguably the happiest when Chávez selected him to lead the country.
What’s the path forward? That’s an intriguing question. I think the democratic opposition, led by María Corina Machado, should articulate a vision of Venezuela’s future once Maduro departs.
Because if there’s a fracture within the regime, who fills the power void when Maduro, Jorge, Delcy, and others are gone? Understanding that Maduro effectively governs a criminal network makes it crucial to anticipate potential chaos if the structure collapses.
If I were María Corina, I’d assert, “If Maduro, Padrino Lopez, Tarek William Saab, the Rodríguez siblings, and so on, are no longer here, this is how we would establish an interim government, conduct elections, and every political viewpoint would be represented.”
It’s also essential to reassure those within the regime, who haven’t committed crimes against humanity, that they won’t face immediate retribution. They need to know there’s life after Maduro. This fear, both of Maduro himself and the aftermath of his exit, creates a kind of stickiness around him that’s tough to dislodge.
The then National Security Adviser John Bolton speaks to the press about the events of April 30, 2019, in Venezuela, next to a White House entrance. Photograph: Tia Dufour / White House Press.
Q: In a past interview with Guacamaya, Juan González suggested that the prospects for a transition in 2024, coinciding with the presidential election, were slim. He believed in a gradual change approach. Do you think he was correct?
A: This perspective assumes the Maduro regime is open to sharing power, which I’ve indicated they are not. That’s how I’ll address that.
Q: There’s ongoing speculation in Caracas about whether a closed embassy could still provide asylum protection without diplomats inside.
I don’t think that’s feasible.
There are those who believe the U.S. embassy is harboring different opposition figures, perhaps that’s what you’re hinting at?
Q: Yes.
A: I can assure you that the U.S. embassy in Venezuela is under constant surveillance by the Maduro regime. Achieving something like that would be quite difficult.
Q: Do you remain updated on events in Venezuela? What news sources do you rely on?
I tend to follow a variety of sources. I must mention La Guacamaya, since you’re here. I also check out El Pitazo, NTN24, and others. Additionally, I receive much information from individuals who contact me to share updates. I maintain regular conversations with various people. I’m particularly proud of what Leopoldo López is doing with the World Liberty Congress, assisting others striving for freedom. He’s doing an excellent job. Plus, there are many others, whose identities I’ll keep private, informing me of developments in Venezuela. I still feel well-informed about the situation there.
Q: Do you ever consider returning to Caracas?
A: It’s unlikely I’d ever receive a visa, and it’s a “Level 4: Do not travel country.” I advise against any American citizen traveling to Venezuela due to Maduro’s established pattern of kidnapping.
In 2022, we negotiated the release of all unlawfully detained American citizens, and in 2025, another batch was released. So, there’s no telling if more will be kidnapped in the future, and Maduro might look to do just that.
My advice to any American or passport holder contemplating a trip to Venezuela is simple: don’t.