Guillaume Long served as a minister in Rafael Correa’s government from 2013 to 2017. Currently, he is a senior researcher at the Center for Economic and Policy Research.
Guacamaya, November 16, 2025. Guillaume Long is a senior researcher at the Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR) and a professor at Sciences Po. Additionally, he acts as a diplomatic advisor to the The Hague Group, a coalition of countries taking action to address genocide in Gaza.
Long’s governmental involvement began in 2011 when he was called to serve in Correa’s administration. During his tenure, he held several positions, including Coordinating Minister of Knowledge and Human Talent (2013-2015), Minister of Culture and Heritage (2015-2016), and eventually Minister of Foreign Affairs (2016-2017). After Correa, Lenin Moreno appointed him as ambassador to the United Nations, but Long quickly distanced himself from the new president’s policies.
We have many questions for him regarding Julian Assange’s case, his split with Lenin Moreno, his views on Venezuela, his opinion of President Daniel Noboa, and his insights about U.S. military presence in Latin America and the Caribbean. Lastly, we ask him to elaborate on the role of The Hague Group.
Q: How does someone born in France become a minister in Ecuador for four years? Also, what is the story behind your relationship with then-President Rafael Correa?
A: Well, I am also Ecuadorian! Sure, I was born in France, but I lived in Ecuador for about 20 years and became a naturalized citizen. So today, I’m probably more Ecuadorian than French.
My relationship with President Correa began when I was an academic at FLACSO (Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences) and taught at various universities. I was completing my doctorate in London when colleagues introduced us. The Correa government welcomed many academics, which made it a unique time filled with aspirational goals for social, political, and economic change aimed at creating a “society of good living.”
Some friends convinced me to join their political project, and I eventually agreed. It turned out to be a profound life experience, albeit also a challenging political campaign during the decade of Correa’s rule from 2007 to 2017, which sadly ended with what felt like Shakespearean betrayal from Moreno.
This is how I gradually entered the government, starting as an advisor in the Ministry of Planning, then leading a university regulation council, and culminating in various ministerial roles under Correa.
“Ecuador granted asylum to Julian Assange because there was a real risk he would be extradited to the U.S. for his journalistic work and as the head of WikiLeaks. Everything else was solvable.”
Q: I wanted to ask you specifically about Julian Assange while you were foreign minister. He was in the Ecuadorian embassy in London from 2012 until 2019. What motivated the Ecuadorian government to protect him, and why did he choose that embassy?
A: That’s a pivotal question. You’ll need to ask him directly because the Ecuadorian state ultimately let him down. When Lenin Moreno took charge, Ecuador’s treatment of Assange drastically changed, culminating in the invitation to British security forces to enter our embassy on April 11, 2019, and arrest him—leading to more years of nightmares and the threat of extradition. So, Ecuador’s role became quite unclear.
Initially, we safeguarded his life, but as the new government transitioned, it betrayed the principle of asylum, even violating the Ecuadorian Constitution and the international legal principle of “non-refoulement.” Assange chose Ecuador, likely drawn by the political vision we offered and had even met President Correa. At that time, Ecuador was seen as a beacon of progress and innovation.
Complications arose concerning foreign policy ties with the U.S., the UK, and Sweden, especially when it came to the legal situation surrounding Assange. The Swedish authorities eventually recognized their role in violating human rights regarding Assange’s arbitrary detention, leading to conditions where he could be interviewed, but any opportunity for him to leave freely was thwarted by the UK’s retaliatory positioning and refusal to guarantee he wouldn’t be extradited to the U.S.
After a long saga, a compromise was reached sometime later with the Biden administration that eventually allowed Assange’s release, responding to global public pressure that elevated his case from mere legal controversy to one touching on journalism and freedom of speech.
Ultimately, Ecuador granted him asylum because extradition to the U.S. posed a substantial risk to his freedoms as a journalist and whistleblower. Meanwhile, Ecuador had agreed on Assange’s willingness to answer questions in Sweden, but that opportunity collapsed when it became evident the Swedish charges were unfounded.
The world’s major media outlets that had initially distanced themselves grew concerned and many began calling for his release. As it stands, Ecuador’s role was a mixed bag—significant in protecting him initially, but also marred by the profound betrayal he faced from Moreno, culminating in the expulsion from our embassy.
“As an international actor, we emphasized identifying the illegalities and arbitrariness of this situation, primarily the U.S. sanctions imposed.”
Q: As foreign minister, you faced criticism for your stance on Venezuela, especially during the 2017 protests. Why didn’t you take a more critical position against Maduro? How should democratic left-wing forces in Latin America address Maduro after the accusations of electoral impropriety on July 28?
A: Ecuador aimed to support ongoing negotiation processes in Venezuela. There were efforts from several past regional presidents, including Leonel Fernández and Martín Torrijos, to mediate. We always leaned towards political dialogue rather than violence, standing at odds with those who sought to polarize the Venezuelan political landscape.
We consistently opposed sanctions, recognizing how the U.S.’s sanctions had severely contributed to Venezuela’s economic crisis. There is a clear link between declines in oil exports, exacerbated by sanctions, and the spiraling economic situation, which includes ongoing mass migrations despite the sovereign right of Venezuelan actors to navigate their political disputes.
We recognized that the polarization resulting from U.S. foreign policy has worsened conditions, even leading to an unprecedented recognition of a parallel government by the OAS under Juan Guaidó, which had not even occurred under military regimes in Latin America.
It’s disheartening to see the current situation, marked by insufficient international consensus for peaceful resolution, undermining South America’s legacy of non-intervention and respecting sovereignty.
“Trump seems intent on regime change in Venezuela, but his instinct may be against military intervention.”
Long at the General Assembly of the Organization of American States in June 2016, with the then Salvadoran foreign minister, Hugo Martínez. Photo: Ecuadorian Foreign Ministry.
Q: Considering the U.S. military deployment in the Caribbean, what do you discern as Trump’s main objectives? Is there a real danger of military action to oust Maduro?
A: Trump seems focused on regime change in Venezuela, though his instinct appears to resist overt military intervention. His strategy likely hinges on instigating a rebellion among Venezuelan military officers.
This would mark an unprecedented military threat within Latin America and a historical first direct military assault by the U.S. on a South American nation. Such military actions illuminate the drastic escalation currently taking place in the Caribbean and reflect Trump’s belief that a more aggressive posture may yield results.
However, the loyalty of the Venezuelan military seems quite fortified against these attempts. Past coup failures have only strengthened government control over the military, making rebellion less likely.
Actors within Trump’s administration, like Marco Rubio, push for more aggressive actions, often linking Venezuelan and Cuban issues. There’s an ongoing internal debate surrounding the appropriate response to the Venezuelan situation, with some advocating for military action while others stress keeping hostilities at bay.
Should military conflict arise, the potential humanitarian fallout would be catastrophic, likely triggering a refugee crisis affecting neighboring nations and beyond. Such a policy approach seems deeply unwise.
Q: Multiple attacks have been reported in the Caribbean against vessels allegedly transporting drugs to the U.S., affecting nationals from not just Venezuela but Ecuador, Colombia, Mexico, and Trinidad. Do you think regional governments are being too passive? What precedents does this set?
A: Yes, it appears that Latin America has generally been too compliant. While some nations have voiced their concerns regarding this military escalation, the overall regional response is lacking.
Countries like Brazil, Mexico, and Colombia have been vocal against these threats, but others have aligned themselves with Trump’s government. This disturbing situation comes at a time when consensus on maintaining regional peace is crucial. Not too long ago, both left and right sought peaceful resolutions to conflicts.
It’s unfortunate to witness a shift towards radicalization among Latin American right-wing governments, deviating from the historical non-intervention ethos. Accepting a potential military confrontation appears unpatriotic and undermines the principle of sovereignty, which is essential for upholding the self-determination of nations.
Moreover, risking a humanitarian crisis in Venezuela and its spillover effect on neighboring countries would be catastrophic, raising ethical and moral concerns about new military adventurism.
Finally, as evident from the recent aggressions targeting Latin American individuals, it’s critical to demand accountability for citizens’ lives. While those accused of drug trafficking should face justice, extrajudicial killings violate basic human rights.
“Trump’s initial goal was to create a domestic impact, which has now shifted into a tactic of intimidation aimed at regime change, largely driven by Marco Rubio.”
Q: Brazil and Qatar have proposed to mediate between Trump and Maduro. How can these initiatives be effectively organized to prevent further escalation? What paths should be taken to resolve the Venezuelan political conflict?
A: It’s vital that Brazil, Qatar, or any other suitable nations, including Latin American states, convene as mediators between the U.S. and Venezuela.
We’ve seen successful precedent in the 1980s with the Contadora Group, which managed to mediate and stabilize situations during the Central American crises involving several nations. This kind of diplomatic engagement could significantly aid in resolving the complexities surrounding Venezuela.
There are mechanisms in place focused on controlling drug trafficking that could potentially form the basis for discussions, aiming for agreements that benefit all parties. So, pursuing diplomatic avenues may unveil solutions to drive forward to a peaceful resolution.
While the Trump administration has trickier motives, it’s possible to veer towards more diplomatic solutions that could be palatable to both the U.S. electorate and Venezuela, ultimately preventing unnecessary conflict.
Q: Reflecting on Lenin Moreno’s transition from Correa’s vice president to a staunch opponent, how did this radical change happen?
A: That’s indeed an enigma. Moreno’s behavior towards Correa can truly be characterized as a Shakespearean betrayal. It was not just a political shift; it involved widespread policy changes across social, economic, and foreign policy realms, bringing the IMF back into Ecuador and enacting austerity measures.
The hostility directed towards those associated with Correa’s administration was particularly alarming, with many former colleagues facing legal repercussions. Moreno’s actions indicated a calculated effort to dismantle Correa’s achievements and stifle dissent.
The long-term effects of Moreno’s strategy continue to resonate as we observe an increasingly imbalanced political landscape in Ecuador where threats silence many voices, including Correa’s political party, which remains active but hampered by regulatory restrictions. The media is rife with biases, leaving little room for genuine investigative journalism.
Even now, Ecuador stands at a crossroads where authoritarian governance threatens basic democratic ingredients, stymieing peaceful dialogues and destabilizing political credibility.
“There is no real investigative journalism in Ecuador at the moment; media outlets seem to be subdued by political forces and are fearful. Noboa’s administration has demonstrated authoritarian tendencies.”
Q: Given the U.S. fight against drug trafficking in the region, you have accused Daniel Noboa’s family businesses of involvement in drug trade. What bases exist for such serious allegations, and how is it tied to the security crisis in Ecuador?
A: Ecuador is currently in a state of crisis, having undergone the most drastic decline in security in recent history. From being a safe haven under Correa’s governance to witnessing a startling rise in homicide rates, we are now struggling with the highest figures in Latin America.
This alarming trend correlates significantly with drug trafficking as gangs vie for control over crucial Pacific ports. Given the Noboa family’s role as the leading banana producers, numerous incidents involving drug finds within Noboa’s shipments have come to light, corroborated by media reports.
Noboa’s initial denials regarding ownership have been contradicted by documents revealing his substantial stake in Noboa Trading, hinting at deeper connections to ongoing drug issues affecting our country. This raises serious concerns that merit exhaustive investigative efforts, particularly in a landscape where journalism often lacks the courage to confront power.
If there’s evidence linking Noboa’s businesses to trafficking, thorough investigations are essential for public accountability. As it stands, the state of investigative journalism in Ecuador appears diminished, as many people express fear over potential reprisals from the government.
Q: The Venezuelan economy is largely dollarized. Ecuador itself is officially dollarized. Do you think dollarization could stabilize Venezuela’s economy and foster sustainable growth long-term?
A: I prefer not to comment on whether Venezuela should or shouldn’t embrace dollarization. Right now, there’s definitely an informal dollarization process ongoing in Venezuela, which does help to contain inflation.
Different forms of dollarization exist—temporary, definitive, etc. Ultimately, the decision lies with the Venezuelan people, and since I’m not an economist, it’s outside my realm of expertise.
In July 2025, Bogotá hosted a conference to outline the next steps for the Hague Group, with over 30 nations uniting to align on an agenda addressing the genocide in Gaza. In the image, Guillaume Long can be seen at the Bogotá Conference. Photo: Instagram / @guillaume.long.
Q: You are a diplomatic advisor for the Hague Group. Many in our audience may not know about it. Can you explain its purpose and your role?
A: The Hague Group is a diplomatic coalition of states formed to ensure adherence to international law, specifically focusing on stopping crimes occurring in Gaza and across Palestine. By establishing an alliance of like-minded countries, we aim to advocate for Palestinian human rights and adherence to international legal standards.
Founded in January of this year, the group began with nine nations calling for the respect of international law. Numerous legal resolutions already exist, yet violations continue unabated, with countries failing to fulfill their obligations under international norms.
Inspired by past anti-apartheid campaigns, we came together not to act in isolation but rather to coordinate efforts, increasing the strength of collective action to draw attention to and hold violators accountable.
Our early measures included enforcing International Criminal Court arrest warrants and restricting arms sales to those involved in genocidal actions. We expanded our actions during the Bogotá conference to more specific initiatives, such as prohibiting ports from servicing vessels carrying military supplies used against civilians.
The Hague Group’s evolution is remarkable; in recent dialogue, participation grew from nine to 35 nations, encompassing countries from four continents. This development emphasizes the international community’s widespread commitment to uphold human rights and collective accountability.
It’s crucial to enforce international law through actionable steps rather than rhetorical persuasion. After all, the effectiveness of multilateralism hinges on the practical application of these standards.
In conclusion, the group represents a dual purpose: advocating for Palestinian rights while also reinforcing the broader principles of international law and the need to push back against unilateralism that threatens collective efforts.