Hugo has worked tirelessly. As the saying goes, “he’s put in a truckload of effort.” While most people involved in Venezuelan politics treat their roles as unmonitored jobs with flexible hours that never include weekends or holidays, Hugo has spent many years solidifying his grip on power. If we are to believe what Alberto Garrido has written, Hugo has been at it since he entered the military academy in the early 70s, meaning it’s been around 40 years. His impact is visible to the world, unavoidable. Today, December 18, 2010, Hugo stands as emperor, and his dominion is Venezuela. There isn’t a single institution willing to oppose his orders, nor a public figure who can, even verbally, put him in his place. Not to mention the competition with his economic, judicial, military, and criminal power.
Hugo has taken to confiscating private estates, particularly those that are well-maintained and fully operational. The Venezuelan state, under Hugo’s absolute control, remains the largest landowner. However, it’s not the thousands of acres of barren land that Hugo wishes to redistribute. No. These communists only like to expropriate established farms with good houses, livestock, and productive land. Take for instance Hato Piñero, El Charcote, Hato El Frio, or La Carolina farm. A few days ago, the chavistas decided, in “deliberations” which excluded the rightful landowners, that over 40 farms located in the South of Lake Maracaibo—one of the most productive beef and milk-producing regions in Venezuela—were of “social interest or public utility,” thus justifying their expropriation, a “rescue” in the truest Orwellian style:
As in all the previously mentioned cases, once the chavistas execute the “rescue,” destruction follows. It’s like cancer; just placing a few chavistas in charge of something is enough to ruin it. Venezuela exemplifies this well.
Now, what happens when it is the Venezuelans, mostly and publicly, who decide that Venezuela must be “rescued” from Hugo, his projects, or his cronies? Let’s remember: 1) the constitutional amendment of 2007; 2) the elections of 2008; and 3) the legislative elections on September 26, 2010. In all three instances, the majority voted clearly against Hugo, his proposals, and his lackeys. And what has been his reaction? Many proposals contained in the constitutional amendment, despite being rejected, have been imposed through laws or decrees by Hugo, disregarding the popular vote. In 2008, Antonio Ledezma was elected Mayor of Caracas. What did Hugo do? He created a higher authority than the Caracas mayoralty, which had been rejected in the 2007 constitutional amendment referendum, and illegally appointed a functionary who would revoke all powers and budgets allocated to the Mayor of Caracas. They didn’t even leave Antonio Ledezma an office. On September 26 of this year, Venezuela voted overwhelmingly against the legal minions, appointed by Hugo Chavez, for the National Assembly. The opposition garnered 52% of the votes, although through illegal electoral measures, the chavistas secured a simple majority in the Assembly. What has Hugo done? He ordered the current Assembly, whose 165 representatives were elected by only 11% of the voting population in 2005, to grant him special powers to govern by decree for 18 months, until June 2012, thereby eliminating any possibility for the representatives of 52% of Venezuelans to block his wishes in the new Assembly to be formed on January 5, 2011.
I am left with just one question: with what moral authority can Hugo Chavez demand anyone in Venezuela respect his laws and decisions when he is the first to ignore the choices of the majority of Venezuelans?