The different treatment between yachts and fast boats doesn’t represent preference, but the coexistence of two protocols: the historic effective interdiction model from Southern Command and Trump’s naval deployment, focused on bombings without structural results.
Written by: La Tabla/Data Journalism Platform December 9, 2025
The apparent differential treatment between a yacht intercepted near Miami Beach and the fast boats destroyed by missiles offshore does not indicate a change in the operational policy of U.S. security forces against maritime drug trafficking. Instead, it showcases the coexistence of two distinct protocols to manage the threat.
In the case of the yacht, the historical paradigm, which has been in place since the 1990s under Southern Command, was applied. This involves a joint task force integrating the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard, alongside federal agencies like the DEA, DIA, CIA, CBP, FBI, ICE, and the State Department, as well as representatives from allied countries (Argentina, Ecuador, France, Peru, the UK, Holland, El Salvador, Spain, among others). Its jurisdiction spans the Caribbean and Pacific, and up until mid-2025, it demonstrated effectiveness with high rates of seizures and precise interdictions, even in waters close to Venezuela without clashes with their authorities.
The naval deployment initiated in August altered that framework. It incorporated exclusively military forces—navy, marine infantry, aircraft carriers, amphibious ships, and air support—with resources far beyond what is necessary for interdiction operations. However, instead of enhancing seizures and arrests, it has been limited to bombings against fast boats, resulting in deaths but lacking clear records of seized cargo, identified or captured individuals. The contribution to structural control of illegal trafficking has been practically zero.
In contrast, the Coast Guard force and allies under Southern Command continue to show valuable quantitative results. Officially, the inter-agency structure has not been dismantled, but from the presidency and the Pentagon, no new operations are announced under that format. This operational divergence prompted the demand for Admiral Alvin Halsey’s removal, who is set to hand over command on December 12, before the end of his scheduled term.
Conclusion
It’s not that yachts have a “preference” for not being bombed. No vessel should be subjected to bombing, according to the usual security and anti-drug combat protocols. What this situation reflects is the incoherence of federal authority, arbitrarily altering proven procedures and sidelining effective structures. The current government under Donald Trump appears to be instrumentalizing the narrative of the “war on drugs” for geopolitical purposes, rather than for real objectives of controlling illicit trafficking.