Santa Cruz, May 2, 2008 | I shared a flight from Miami to La Paz with former President of Bolivia Jorge Quiroga. After introducing myself at the start of the flight, I was left with a bitter taste from not being able to discuss in-depth the current situation in Bolivia, where I was heading to observe the referendum process regarding the autonomous statute. Nevertheless, luck was on my side. While we were supposed to land in La Paz and then continue on to Santa Cruz de la Sierra, due to unfavorable weather conditions and fog, the flight continued directly to Santa Cruz, my final destination.
I took the opportunity to sit next to Quiroga and ask him all kinds of questions. I noticed the books he was reading: one about Obama and another on Chávez by Bart Jones. Regarding Chávez, he mentioned, “I’ve talked a lot with Chávez, but you need to know your enemy well.” Clearly, the former president is not among the many fans Chávez seems to have in Latin America. I got the impression he has a clear understanding of the Venezuelan political crisis and what Chávez represents, having been a direct victim of Chávez’s petro-diplomacy.
Our conversation mainly focused on the autonomous statute and the constitution that Morales is promoting. The Bolivian process closely resembles what occurred in Venezuela with Chávez’s rise to power in ‘98. However, Morales has never held the majorities required to ensure the uninterrupted advancement of his political project: neither in Congress, nor in the Senate, nor even in the constitutional assembly, which moves from place to place to prevent assembly members aligned with Quiroga from blocking the constitution’s approval. When I mentioned I was surprised that the approved text contained 408 articles while the version presented to Morales had 411, Quiroga replied, “That’s the least of the problems. There are three different versions of the constitution; the ones produced on November 23, 2007 at the Military Lyceum, December 8, 2007 in Oruro, and between those dates and January 2008 at the Lottery building. In the first two cases, shock groups and police prevented opposition assembly members from accessing the venue where the text was about to be approved. In fact, a handful of people at the Lottery building, lacking the necessary credentials, modified 254 of the 411 articles to be approved.” He then pulled out a copy of a presentation titled “Bolivia 2008: Wasted Bonanza, Struck Democracy… Frustrated Hope,” and proceeded to explain in detail the numerous violations of agreed procedures by Morales, which nullifies his new political constitution and, consequently, his attempt to rebuild the state.
It’s clear Morales faces significant challenges. He hasn’t been able to dissolve established powers as easily as the Chávez process; he hasn’t introduced Chávez’s electronic electoral machinery (Smartmatic); he doesn’t have all the military’s support; in fact, there appears to be a struggle between troop managers and higher-ranking officials, who are those who have personally benefited from the handouts coming from Caracas, payable in checks at the Venezuelan embassy; he doesn’t have the required majority in any chambers; and finally, he has the prefects of 6 out of the 9 departments of the country, elected through voting and holding substantial political and economic capital, against him.
There are already talks here in Santa Cruz about Venezuelan and Cuban military presence, indigenous mobilizations, militarization, etc. Nevertheless, Hugo Chávez’s continental project has encountered a strong opposition movement in Bolivia, and it seems that neither his petrodollars, nor his OAS—as Quiroga defines it—nor his imperialist army, nor the media will be able to prevent the federalist and decentralizing, not secessionist, desires of the regions.