The Creation of the Joint Task Force in the Caribbean Marks a Strategic Shift Centralizing Power in SOUTHCOM While Marginalizing Traditional Naval Structures
By: La Tabla/Data Journalism Platform, October 17, 2025
The unexpected resignation of Admiral Alvin Holsey as the commander of U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) comes amid strategic tensions regarding the establishment of a Joint Task Force in the Caribbean aimed at drug control, revealing deep divisions in the U.S. government’s national security approach.
The official announcement of the new joint force was made on October 10 by Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, who stated, “If you traffik drugs to our shores, we will stop you cold.” However, by October 15, Holsey—the main advocate for the initiative—submitted his resignation, interpreted by experts as a clear sign of irreconcilable disagreements over the restructuring of anti-drug efforts.
From Quick Hunter to Institutional Elephant
The proposal for the Joint Task Force in the Caribbean represents a radical change in the U.S. operational architecture. Analyst Jesús D. Romero explains in an article published on Infobae on October 15 that this indicates “a reorientation of the current operation with the Iwo Jima Amphibious Group,” which has until now led naval operations in the region.
The difference is doctrinally significant:
· The Iwo Jima Amphibious Group: an agile naval structure, rapid response, with direct command and mainly maritime capabilities. It is the “quick lance” of U.S. naval power.
· The Joint Task Force in the Caribbean: a permanent, multi-service structure with bureaucratic command under Lieutenant General Calvert Worth, reporting directly to SOUTHCOM.
Strategic Escalation
According to the military doctrinal analysis consulted, this change represents three fundamental transformations:
1. From Tactical to Strategic: Transitioning from isolated interdiction operations to a sustained and broad-spectrum campaign.
2. From Naval to Joint: The Navy loses prominence to a multi-service integration including Marines, Air Force, and Army.
3. From Agile to Institutional: The expeditionary structure gives way to a permanent bureaucratic apparatus.
“Transnational organized crime poses a direct threat to the security, prosperity, and health of our hemisphere,” Admiral Holsey stated in the original article on Defensa.com dated October 14, justifying the need for the new force.
Institutional Power Tensions
The establishment of this joint force generates profound frictions within the defense establishment:
· Loss of Presidential Control: The current structure allows for greater direct oversight from the White House, while the new force grants SOUTHCOM more autonomy.
· Bureaucratic Military Empowerment: Combatant Commands gain operational and budgetary autonomy.
· Resistance from Traditional Naval Forces: The Navy sees its role diminished in a historically naval mission.
Lieutenant General Calvert Worth, appointed to lead the new force, embodies precisely this bureaucratization of anti-drug efforts, distancing it from the expeditionary character previously advocated by naval sectors.
Reading a Symptomatic Resignation
The temporal coincidence between the announcement of the joint force and Holsey’s resignation does not seem coincidental. Experts suggest that the Admiral, while initially a proponent of the initiative, encountered insurmountable resistance within the defense establishment, particularly from sectors defending traditional structures.
Holsey’s departure represents more than a personnel change: it is a symptom of an institutional battle for control of U.S. anti-drug strategy. While the government announces an escalation in the fight against drug trafficking, internal tensions unveil deep disagreements about how this war should be executed.
The creation of the Joint Task Force in the Caribbean moves forward, but it does so without its primary supporter, highlighting the strategic fractures that divide U.S. Armed Forces in their fight against drug trafficking.