Following the parliamentary elections in December 2005, Venezuela’s National Electoral Council took over 42 days to announce the results. At that time, the CNE, led by Jorge Rodríguez (who was later appointed vice president under Chávez), faced issues manipulating abstention figures, which are believed to have exceeded 85% even today. The current crop of public representatives was elected in 2005 by, at best, 15% of Venezuela’s electorate. Eventually, Rodríguez produced more manageable figures for the leader, reducing the abstention rate to about 75%.
Regardless, this percentage was extraordinarily strange in a country where participation levels hover around 70%. The cause was a little-publicized event that took place in Caracas on November 23, 2005.
In the presence of electoral observers from Venezuela, Europe, and the Organization of American States (OAS), an opposition representative managed to approach a Smartmatic voting machine, for the first and only time since then. The technician plugged his laptop into the voting machine, ran a program, and began to announce aloud how different participants had voted: “Mr. Black, you voted A; Mr. Green, you voted B; Mr. White, you vo…”
Before the third call was made, Jorge Rodríguez abruptly halted the exercise, ordered the meeting to end, and dismissed everyone present. Opposition parties claimed at the time that the secrecy of the vote was compromised, leading them to withdraw en masse from the contest. This provided Chávez with the current ineffective congress.
Over the past five years, representatives from a minority of Venezuelans have been endorsing Chávez’s whims. The opposition candidates received 52% of the votes in the last parliamentary elections held on September 26. However, due to poor distribution, manipulation, and favorable electoral legislation, Chávez’s representatives managed to secure a simple majority in the new congress, which practically means he can no longer push through legislation.
The principles of democracy, or being subject to the will of the majority, are not something that troubles Chávez. Anticipating issues with the opposition bloc, Chávez prepared for the upcoming presidential elections in 2012. He demanded powers from his loyalists in Congress to rule by decree, which were granted without much difficulty for the next 18 months. The new congress will meet for the first time on January 5, 2011. However, Chávez will be able to circumvent congressional obstacles and, more importantly, has created a parallel state structure that was quickly approved in congress, through which massive power and budgets will be redirected to communal organizations under his control.
It’s ironic to mention the debate on democratic deficit in relation to a country that has held numerous elections over the last 11 years. However, contrary to what Chávez’s apologists argue, many elections do not necessarily equate to an abundance of democracy.
Perhaps the individual who best exemplifies Chávez’s democratic deficit in Venezuela is opposition politician Antonio Ledezma, elected mayor of Caracas in 2008. Unwilling to accept defeat in the nation’s capital, Chávez created a new role above that of mayor in the institutional hierarchy of the city, stripping the mayor of his budget and all powers, rendering the electoral results and local democracy meaningless. Chávez proposed the power to create such roles and appoint fully subordinate individuals in a constitutional amendment put to vote in 2007. It was resoundingly rejected by the public in the 2007 referendum, but since then, the ineffective congress has ensured Chávez has enough power to push through undemocratic reforms without consultation, violating electoral outcomes.
In its final days, the Chávez congress has rushed to legislate to:
· criminalize freedom of expression and dissent in congress;
· control the Internet and silence the media;
· block NGO funding;
· assault the independence of universities—where Chávez has yet to win his first election;
· transfer mayoralties, governorships, congress, the judiciary, economic planning powers, and budgets to Chávez’s communes.
It is important to note that this is being done after the election of a new, more representative congress, in addition to the authority to govern by decree for the next 18 months. In conclusion, Venezuela can no longer be called a democracy for one simple reason: the actions of the current dictator demonstrate the contrary.