I received a document titled “Venezuelan Armed Forces: 200 Years Later,” supposedly produced by the COMACATES (Commanders, Majors, Captains, and Lieutenants of the Venezuelan Armed Forces). It concludes with the following questions and warnings:
I. Considering the real situation within the FANB, what communication messages should political leaders convey to counter the idea propagated by HCh that a change in Commander in Chief in 2012 will lead to the destruction (in HCh’s terms) of the FANB? How can political leaders establish communication bridges (both direct and indirect) to facilitate a transition with minimal trauma in 2012, fostering a relationship of mutual trust? What can the collaborative effort between a new generation of young leaders in both the FANB and civil society look like for the future of Venezuela? Given the discontent of active officers with the current state of the country, what reciprocal proposals can be made to encourage a controlled transition?
II. What institutional mechanisms will allow the FANB to purify those officers who have drastically harmed the institution due to collusion with drug trafficking, surrendering the institution to Cuba, or using weaponry against civilians in demonstrations, thus violating Human Rights? How will investigations be conducted into the acquisitions of weaponry without proper oversight, which harm the national treasury?
III. What role will all active officers from the four components of the FANB play in ensuring peace in Venezuela instead of defending HCh’s outdated and personalist project? What real possibility do these active officers have to uphold compliance with the National Constitution at all levels of the organization through discipline, obedience, and subordination, and to prevent various types of disturbances? How can these officers take responsibility for all those indoctrinated seeds that seek to use the Republic’s arms against the country again?
IV. To what extent can the institution be reorganized to reassign existing human resources for the appropriate protection of national territory and professional training with quality trainings? What is the real operational readiness to combat drug trafficking, illegal mining, armed irregular groups that kidnap Venezuelans, or protect Venezuelan territory such as the Gulf of Venezuela or the Esequibo State?
V. In the face of rebuilding Venezuela after HCh, what military organization does Venezuela need in the 21st century? What should be the purpose, scope, and roles of the military organization to assist the civil power embodied by the President of the Republic and the state institutions in managing the government? How is military power guaranteed to be subordinate to civil authority for Venezuela’s development without the threat of new coups? What is Venezuela’s military strategy?
This document was prepared by a group of COMACATES from various generations because we understand the crucial moment our beloved Armed Force is facing. The destruction that Hugo Chávez has inflicted on our institution displays all the traits necessary for charges of treason against the homeland. We are in a state of maximum weakness against external enemies violating our sovereignty.
We cannot continue to be subjected to a personalist, anachronistic project that contradicts the 1999 Constitution. The destruction of the Armed Forces (and the country) will end democratically in 2012, with a true Venezuelan civic-military union. That, we SWEAR!
The entry Is There Noise of Swords in Venezuela? was first published on El Faro del Morro.