The aerial and maritime surveillance by the U.S. over Venezuela is increasing, highlighting internal failures, military discontent, and the fragility of the Cartel of the Suns’ control model.
In recent months, within the Bolivarian National Armed Force (FANB), a perception has emerged that few are trying to hide: U.S. aerial and maritime operations in the Caribbean are part of a sustained strategic pattern. These actions are not occasional but rather a calculated presence aimed at keeping Venezuela under constant surveillance and placing its military systems on a continuous state of alert, where each reaction causes operational and psychological weariness.
A presence designed to be detected
U.S. flights—airplanes, helicopters, drones—approach Venezuelan shores with transponders intentionally turned on. For internal analysts, this technical gesture serves multiple purposes:
- Forces the FANB to activate human and material resources.
- Measures response times on land, sea, and air.
- Allows for the study of entry and exit routes.
- Evaluates Venezuela’s capacity to detect, engage, and react to a potential threat.
The pattern repeats day after day: approach, detection, alert, withdrawal. Although the aircraft do not carry out overtly offensive maneuvers, the message is clear. The FANB is being watched, measured, and subjected to constant pressure.
An internal weariness that deepens
The most visible consequence is exhaustion. The continual maintenance of the alert level is combined with what military personnel describe as a growing internal overload:
- Extensive and repetitive Militia duties every Saturday.
- Mandatory participation of generals and officers in activities unrelated to their strategic functions.
- Increasing logistical deficiencies.
- Complaints shared by generals, senior officers, subordinates, and militia members.
- General discontent stemming from the additional burdens imposed by leaders linked to the Cartel of the Suns.
Many describe these sessions as a “mandatory show,” where videos, formations, and activities are required that not only interrupt operational functions but also deteriorate morale. Militia members with civilian jobs, officers working tirelessly, and commanders forced into improper tasks form an institution that is exhausted and pressured from multiple fronts.
Additionally, the actions of the DGCIM are noted internally for abuses that increase the atmosphere of fear and resentment. The result is a weakened FANB faced with dual pressures: external stress and internal imposition.
Areas under observation: operational routine or strategic tactics?
Recent U.S. aerial activity is notably concentrated in Falcón state, particularly around Tocópero. Among pro-government military circles, this pattern has sparked evaluations of possible tactical scenarios, including:
- Playa Maracara, between Puerto Cumarebo and Morrocoy:
A stretch of 2 to 3 kilometers that the Venezuelan Navy has used for landing practice. - Machurucuto, in the east:
An area of historical significance due to attempted incursions linked to Cuba.
Other analysts prefer to interpret these flights as part of the systematic monitoring of drug trafficking, given the importance of these routes for the structures of the Cartel of the Suns.
U.S. logistics: a key factor
Any projected U.S. military operation requires nearby support bases. Thus, the FANB evaluates with concern:
- Aruba and Curacao, territories of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and NATO members:
A Venezuelan military movement against these islands would activate automatic defensive obligations. - La Orchila or Margarita, with useful ports and airports but limited defenses.
- Trinidad and Tobago, due to its strategic proximity for support operations.
The FANB also acknowledges U.S. overflights over internal maritime areas around La Orchila, Blanquilla, and La Tortuga, indicating a systematic update of Venezuela’s strategic map.
Western region: the epicenter of pressure on the Cartel of the Suns
A significant percentage of flights concentrate in the western part of the country, a key region for the Cartel of the Suns’ operations. For many within the institution, these overflights represent daily harassment, a psychological pressure that, while not involving direct fire, is equally effective in terms of weariness and surveillance.
Between external surveillance and internal fracture
Today, the FANB faces a dual scenario:
- External pressure, marked by flights seeking to reveal weaknesses, measure reaction times, and keep defense systems on constant tension.
- Internal pressure, where fatigue, discontent, and the actions of the DGCIM undermine institutional cohesion.
In this context, U.S. operations seem more aimed at generating weariness, collecting information, and conditioning the Venezuelan response than announcing an immediate intervention.
The true question is no longer just about what Washington will do, but how long the FANB can sustain internal weariness and growing fractures, especially when its role within the Cartel of the Suns is what keeps Maduro’s power structure intact.
The FANB, caught between power and social rejection
Within the institution itself, it is assumed that the U.S. maintains advanced communicational control over the capabilities of the FANB: nothing that happens inside the barracks goes unnoticed by a power with cutting-edge technology.
The FANB continues to be the main support for the Cartel of the Suns and the regime, even after having endorsed—by action or omission—the electoral fraud. However, civil society, increasingly organized, keeps a constant watch on military behavior.
If a confrontation with the U.S. were to occur, many military personnel recognize they would be facing not only an external power but also a significant internal rejection.
Maduro, aware of the growing unrest in the barracks, seeks at all costs a negotiated exit or an intervention that allows him to justify an internal closure. He knows that his margin for containment is shrinking.
Meanwhile, the opposition is trying to influence the military body at a time when institutional loyalty is more eroded than in previous years.
The U.S. is increasing pressure in the Caribbean. The FANB faces weariness, deep discontent, and internal fracture. Is it a psychological war or a precursor to a real operation?