Written by: La Tabla/Data Journalism Platform 18 DEC 2025
The warlike rhetoric from U.S. President Donald Trump, accusing Venezuela of “stealing” oil and American assets, is not something new. His immediate goal is to justify the current naval blockade and military deployment, but his argument traces back to a specific trade conflict largely resolved: the restructuring of the oil industry by Hugo Chávez in 2007.
That year, the Venezuelan government shifted from the Oil Opening policy of the 1990s, decreeing that projects with foreign capital had to migrate to a mixed company model, with a majority stake and operational control by the state-owned PDVSA.
While companies like Chevron negotiated to remain as minority partners, ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips refused the new terms. The state took control of their assets, which both companies labeled an expropriation.
The mechanism for resolving these disputes, international arbitration, had already been utilized. The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) ruled in favor of the oil companies, ordering Venezuela to pay compensations amounting to $1.6 billion to ExxonMobil and around $8.7 billion to ConocoPhillips.
Nearly two decades later, the Trump administration revives this episode, yet omits its concluded legal dimension. By framing it as “theft” warranting a military response, it shifts the conflict from international arbitration courts to the field of geopolitical confrontation, where the objectives—regime change or strategic resource control—are entirely different.
How Trump Tried to Turn a Business Model Into a Cause for War
Between 2007 and 2008, President Hugo Chávez’s government implemented a comprehensive modification of the legal and contractual framework governing private capital participation in the Venezuelan oil industry, particularly in the Orinoco Belt.
This change, shifting from “strategic partnerships” of the 1990s to a “mixed company” model with majority state control, generated divergent reactions among international companies. Some, like ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips, opted not to accept the new terms and submitted the conflict to international arbitration courts, which ruled in their favor with monetary compensations. Others, like Chevron, chose to remain under the new scheme.
This report describes, in five sections, the evolution of this process, from its background to its resurgence in the political discourse of former U.S. President Donald Trump’s administration.
1. The Oil Opening Model (1990s)
In a context of low oil prices and the need for capital and investment, Venezuela propelled, starting in 1995, a process known as the “Oil Opening.” Its main goal was to develop the heavy crude reserves of the Orinoco Belt, which required technology and financing that the state lacked at that time. The model was based on signing “strategic partnership” and “shared-risk” contracts between the state-owned PDVSA and international consortia. Under this arrangement, private companies assumed the initial investment and operational control of the projects, maintaining a majority stake in the capital (between 50% and 70%), while PDVSA held a minority share. This scheme attracted billions of dollars in investment and significantly increased the country’s production capacity.
2. The Transition to the Mixed Company Model (2007-2008)
As part of a state policy aimed at increasing control and oil tax revenue, the Venezuelan government, through the Hydrocarbons Law of 2001 and subsequent decrees, established that all strategic projects should migrate to a mixed company model.
The new conditions required PDVSA to have a shareholding of no less than 60% (in practice, it averaged around 78%) and operational control of the projects.
A strict deadline (until June 2007) was set for international companies to accept this new condition and sign the corresponding contracts as minority partners, or alternatively, withdraw.
The government offered compensation for the transferred assets, which amounts were subject to dispute with some companies.
3. Responses from U.S. Companies: Two Different Strategies
The reaction from major U.S. oil companies was not uniform, revealing different risk assessments and long-term strategies.
· Exit of ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips: Both companies, which were operators and had majority stakes in projects like Cerro Negro (Exxon) and Petrozuata/Hamaca (ConocoPhillips), decided not to accept the new terms. Their arguments centered on considering the offered compensation to be inadequate and claiming the loss of operational and majority control made their continuity under the new rules unviable. Both announced they would pursue international arbitration to resolve the dispute.
· Continuity of Chevron: In contrast, Chevron, along with other European companies (Total, ENI, Statoil), chose to negotiate and accept the new role as a minority partner. Their decision was based on a strategic assessment that prioritized long-term access to the vast crude reserves of the Orinoco Belt, even under a scheme of reduced operational control. This decision has allowed them to maintain a continuous presence in the country to this day.
4. The International Arbitration Process and Its Results
The mechanism for resolving disputes established in bilateral investment treaties was activated. ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips sued the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela before the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). After years of proceedings, the arbitration courts issued their rulings:
· They determined that Venezuela had incurred indirect expropriation by substantially modifying investment conditions without offering compensation deemed fair and effective according to the treaties.
· Ordered the Venezuelan state to pay compensation: approximately $1.6 billion to ExxonMobil (after a process of partial annulment) and about $8.7 billion to ConocoPhillips, plus interest.
· These rulings are legally binding. Venezuela has partially recognized these debts and made some payments, but the main amounts remain pending total cancellation.
5. The Resurgence of the Conflict in Trump’s Political Rhetoric
Almost two decades after the events, former President Donald Trump and figures from his administration have incorporated this historical episode into their political discourse against Venezuela. They have used the narrative of “stolen oil” to refer to the expropriations, omitting in their account the existence and outcome of international arbitration processes that already quantified the compensation obligation. Analysts point out that this instrumentalization of the conflict seeks to:
1. Build a justification for foreign policy before public opinion.
2. Apply maximum pressure in the context of economic sanctions.
3. Possibly establish a position of strength for future negotiations regarding the Venezuelan energy industry, beyond just the specifics of the arbitration awards.