The Trump administration is debating whether to exile the dictator and how to lift sanctions on his devastated country.
The Venezuelan dictator Nicolás Maduro and his closest allies should take notice of Turkey. Some Trump administration officials are discussing possibly exiling them there, unless they prefer Russia, Azerbaijan, or maybe Cuba.
One idea being considered by President Donald Trump’s advisers, regarding what to do with Venezuela if they manage to oust the dictator, is to offer Maduro and his confidants a safe passage to another country, according to a U.S. official and two others familiar with the discussions.
Others suggest arresting Maduro and trying him in the United States, according to a third source familiar with the talks. After all, the military operation Trump is conducting in the Caribbean does not officially seek a regime change in Venezuela. The administration claims to be combating drug-trafficking terror cartels in the region, and Maduro is already indicted in the U.S. on drug-trafficking charges (which he denies). Some Trump advisers hope that mere threats of U.S. military action will cause chaos in Maduro’s regime, leading him to lose power.
Trump’s team—whether rightly or wrongly—is not known for its long-term vision, so it is significant that advisers are considering scenarios for a post-Maduro era. This indicates that Trump has no intention of abandoning his campaign in the region (as evidenced by the recent deployment of a massive aircraft carrier in the area). The aspects of these plans the U.S. decides to implement could offer clues about the role it will play in Venezuela and the region for years to come.
As part of its post-Maduro strategy, Trump’s advisers are discussing which sanctions to lift against Venezuela and when. Some are considering the potential role the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund could play in helping Venezuela rebuild its devastated economy. Clearly, how to leverage Venezuela’s oil wealth would also be a crucial factor.
There is even talk of incentivizing private security firms, possibly from other countries, to provide initial protection to the government succeeding Maduro, as long as it is aligned with Washington, according to the U.S. official and one source. I granted them and others anonymity to discuss sensitive diplomatic matters.
From what I’ve gathered, the post-Maduro discussions within the administration are neither solid nor well-coordinated. Instead, a handful of individuals are examining the issue across various departments (State, Energy, Treasury, Justice, Defense, the White House, among others). Some are reaching out to former U.S. officials and external analysts.
The Venezuelan opposition has stated that it has its own plans for what to do in Venezuela in the hours and days following Maduro’s fall. However, while Trump advisers are in contact with the opposition, a U.S. official and two sources informed me that the government is not meaningfully integrating the opposition into its current planning.
But we are still not talking about a comprehensive and revised Trump plan for Venezuela for the day after his presidency.
When I pressed the U.S. official on the extent of the preparations, he referenced a famous Trump statement: “We have the outlines of a plan.” (I wouldn’t dismiss the possibility that someone at the Pentagon or CIA has a sophisticated, secret plan tucked away in a drawer, and I hope they call me).
Some former U.S. officials and analysts who study Venezuela fear that the administration is lagging in post-Maduro planning, that the various U.S. departments and agencies are not effectively communicating with each other, and that not enough experienced public officials have been consulted.
After all, it’s possible that Maduro could fall and be replaced by someone more anti-American or corrupt, even one of his advisors who might betray him. Cartels, other criminal gangs, and armed military units in the country could also sow chaos.
“If a power vacuum occurs and no one holds authority over the country, drug trafficking and corruption could worsen, deeply undermining President Trump’s anti-drug objectives and endangering the lives of more Americans,” said Carrie Filipetti, a former State Department official who dealt with Venezuela during Trump’s first term.
The focus on drug trafficking is one of the reasons why it’s difficult to get people on Trump’s team, or close to him, to speak candidly about initial plans.
Some of these individuals refuse to admit that U.S. actions have any purpose other than fighting drug trafficking. They don’t even want to suggest that regime change is a goal, or that it could be a side effect of the operation against the cartel. One person reprimanded me for using the term “day after,” as it would imply a regime change instead of a police action against an alleged drug trafficker.
In fact, when I requested comments from the administration, State Department spokesman Tommy Pigott sent the following: “The United States is involved in an operation against drug cartels, and any claim that we are focusing on anything other than this specific effort is completely false.”
Nevertheless, the government could argue that it is justified in thinking about a post-Maduro Venezuela since the U.S. doesn’t even recognize Maduro as the legitimate leader of the country. It believes he has manipulated multiple elections since coming to power in 2013. Washington considers the true winner of the last presidential elections to be Edmundo González, a former diplomat who works with the main Venezuelan opposition leader, María Corina Machado. Machado won the Nobel Peace Prize this year and dedicated it to Trump.
Machado and her associates would do well to prepare for when the U.S. reaches out to them, according to a source close to the discussions. This implies having names available to appoint personnel in key positions, even within the Venezuelan armed forces. (David Smolansky, a representative of the Venezuelan opposition, assured me they would be ready).
Some individuals I spoke with are so eager for Maduro’s departure that I worry they’re overinterpreting the actions of the government, believing that there is more advanced planning than there actually is. Some of the most interested parties in how the U.S. manages Maduro’s departure have ties to oil and gas companies.
In my conversations with various stakeholders, some indicated that increasing humanitarian aid to Venezuela should play a more significant role in post-Maduro planning than it has so far.
Some lamented the dismantling of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) by the Trump team, which could have played a stabilizing role. (This is despite the fact that the State Department has taken on some of USAID’s work and recently helped provide humanitarian aid following the hurricane in the Caribbean).
Several people I spoke with remarked that most of the State Department has been sidelined in conversations regarding Venezuela. Pigott, the State Department spokesperson, replied: “Those who are leaking information about their supposed sidelining aren’t participating, nor should they, in delicate diplomatic discussions.”
Trump has long sought to oust Maduro, a man he despises partly because he has ruined the economy of a nation that was once prosperous.
During his first term, Trump withdrew U.S. diplomatic recognition from Maduro’s government and pressured the Venezuelan leader through sanctions. His first administration even urged the Venezuelan people to overthrow him. Trump’s subordinates during his first term then drafted plans for the post-Maduro era, and some hope his current team will consider the consequences of their management.
This time, Trump has approved attacking alleged drug-trafficking boats off the coasts of Venezuela and has authorized the CIA to conduct covert operations inside the country. His military deployment in the region now includes the massive aircraft carrier and about 15,000 soldiers. Several individuals have told me it’s hard to believe he won’t use the aircraft carrier in some way against Venezuela.
However, Trump continues to be reluctant to send U.S. troops to Venezuela.
There is also a possibility that Trump, given his volatility, might ultimately abandon this whole project. Some key members of his MAGA base—who are wary of U.S. military interventions abroad—are already dissatisfied with his actions against Venezuela.
U.S. officials—including those at the Pentagon—do not necessarily expect that U.S. attacks on Venezuelan soil will be the breaking point for Maduro.
There are more than one way to pressure the strongman.
The U.S. is in contact with people inside Venezuela, beyond the opposition, a fourth source familiar with the discussions told me, preferring not to disclose further details.
It’s not outlandish to think that one of Maduro’s main advisers could be suddenly assassinated. Or that a Venezuelan military leader could turn against the autocrat.
Or Maduro could wake up one day and find out that a close confidant is in exile and the rest of his people are contemplating where they might flee.
I’ve heard that Turkey has very nice beaches.
Nahal Toosi is the chief foreign affairs correspondent for POLITICO