Alberto Maresca is a PhD Fellow at UNU-CRIS and Ghent University.
Guacamaya, February 4, 2026. Operation Absolute Resolve has important implications for global oil supplies. While Venezuela has been a key source of crude-heavy oil worldwide, its ability to increase oil exports has diminished in recent years, primarily due to US sanctions. The OFAC license 41B granted to Chevron represented the only avenue for Venezuela’s PDVSA to generate oil revenues from US companies. At present, most of the Venezuelan oil is being sold at a $25 discount to the Brent benchmark. To attract buyers, Venezuela has been heavily discounting its oil sales, while Brent prices recently fluctuated around $60 per barrel.
A key aspect of Trump’s strategy regarding Venezuelan oil is the amount of barrels that Caracas can produce. It’s important to remember that Venezuela and the US, via PDVSA, are currently exploring a specific trade agreement to establish oil exports for the coming years. Trump has already claimed that he could extract 30-50 million oil barrels from the nation. As of 2024, the Venezuelan government reported a production of 841,000 oil barrels per day (bpd), while OPEC’s estimates hover around 796,000 bpd. If we take a median between Venezuela’s and OPEC’s calculations, it seems that Venezuela can produce approximately 818,500 bpd. Thus, Venezuela could produce 24,555,000 barrels monthly, which would sum to an annual total of about 8,962,575,000 barrels. These figures are considerably lower than Trump’s projections.
Historically, during the 1970s, without US sanctions, Venezuela was capable of shipping 1.7 million bpd solely to the US before the nationalization in 1976. Therefore, with adequate support, the Venezuelan oil industry could, over time, reach Trump’s proposed export levels. According to S&P Global, experts caution that revitalizing Venezuelan production to even 1.5 million bpd would necessitate investments estimated between $5 billion and $30 billion. Following the US’s removal of Nicolás Maduro, Venezuela has reportedly shipped 800,000 bpd, a figure that could potentially rise with new licenses from the Treasury in Washington.
Trump’s ambitions shouldn’t foster unrealistic expectations concerning Venezuelan oil. Structural issues need to be thoroughly accounted for. As of 2023, the EIA reports that Venezuela’s exporting capacity doesn’t even rank within the top 10 globally. The US alone has nearly 22 million bpd capacity. The influencing element here is undoubtedly global oil prices. Over the past five years, Brent oil prices have generally decreased to their current level, approximately $60 per barrel according to Trading Economics. Overall, the oil market is currently characterized by a situation where supply exceeds demand, especially fueled by Saudi Arabia’s push for increased production. Analysts note that, as US companies like Exxon, ConocoPhillips, and Chevron face the economic impacts of low oil prices, there’s little incentive to enter the Venezuelan market due to its instability, low production output (1% of the global market), and high costs associated with modernizing the oil industry. On the other hand, US oil firms might find the opportunity to diversify their investment portfolios in Venezuela appealing, especially if secured by Trump’s pledge to halt Venezuelan oil exports to China. Additionally, it’s critical to take into account that low-carbon technologies, such as solar panels and electric vehicleshave been progressively reducing fossil fuel demand, thereby hindering the growth of oil and gas demand.
To sum up, it appears that Trump’s assertions about Venezuela and its oil implications are not backed up by data. Instead, he seems to lean on persuading oil companies to spearhead the reconstruction in Venezuela, which involves substantial costs. The idea that the Venezuelan operation relates to domestic politics seems to be more convincing. As Will Freeman noted in Foreign Affairs, Trump is losing support in Florida, where Miami elected a Democratic mayor for the first time in nearly three decades. Coupled with the backlash from Trump’s removal of temporary migration status for Cubans, Venezuelans, and Nicaraguans, even facing opposition from some Republicans in Florida, the reasoning for foreign policy toward Venezuela may find oil as merely a secondary motive, with the primary focus being the Floridian support for removing Maduro.
Trump’s focus on Venezuelan oil is intricately linked to electoral strategies, especially in swing states like Florida. The Venezuelan diaspora residing in the US, particularly in Florida, holds substantial political sway, and foreign policies targeting Maduro resonate within this electorate. Thus, oil-related strategies may have a dual role: projecting a tough stance against socialism while also securing political loyalty domestically, rather than realizing immediate strategic gains in global energy markets. In this context, Operation Absolute Resolve seems to serve as a symbolic policy tool, harnessing the promise of oil riches to fulfill broader political aims instead of driving tangible increases in Washington’s energy supplies.