The violation of sanctions against Venezuela continues to bring individuals who contributed to these infringements before U.S. courts. In this instance, Taskin Torlak, a Turkish citizen, is accused of conspiring to violate the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) and profiting over USD 32 million.
Specifically, Torlak is alleged to have designed—along with his associates—a complex scheme operating between 2020 and 2023 to move and sell unlicensed Venezuelan oil products for the benefit of the sanctioned state-owned company Petróleos de Venezuela S.A. (PDVSA).
The evidence in the case reveals that the conspirators utilized the U.S. financial system to process payments in dollars while engaging in intentional evasion tactics to hide their activities. Their strategy involved using “clean fleets” to transfer funds, altering ship flags, and deliberately disabling maritime identification and tracking systems (AIS/LRIT) before loading crude oil.
Case Timeline
Since the filing of the sealed criminal complaint against Taskin Torlak on November 1, 2024, followed by his arrest the next day in Miami, Florida, while trying to flee back to Turkey, the case has gone through several stages, including the issuance of the first formal indictment detailing ten charges and a confiscation request on November 13 of that year.
On November 19, 2024, the seal was lifted, and an initial appearance occurred, during which Torlak pleaded not guilty and a temporary detention order was issued against him.
Between December 2024 and January 2025, the case faced multiple postponements for detention hearings until a waiver of deportation was finally accepted, and he was held without bail.
Throughout 2025, several status conferences were held with delays; a protective order was approved for sensitive material under CIPA proceedings due to potentially classified information related to intelligence and sanctions.
Torlak’s detention was maintained until July 2025, when he was granted conditional release.
In September 2025, a replacement indictment was filed with 18 charges, increasing the seriousness of the case, and a new arraignment was held, where Torlak reiterated his not guilty plea.
As of November 2025, the case is still ongoing, with a jury trial scheduled for February 2, 2026, and the possibility of a trial only before a judge. Pending issues include the exclusion of time for a speedy trial, as well as the disclosure of classified and privileged material.
The case against Taskin Torlak encompasses a strong security component and fits within the maximum pressure policy of the U.S. against Nicolás Maduro’s regime and networks that aid him in evading sanctions on Venezuelan oil. This is not a classic espionage case but rather an evasion of economic sanctions using “dark fleet” methods.
Affidavit of the Criminal Complaint
The affidavit by U.S. Special Agent of Homeland Security Investigations, Alan R. Poorman, dated November 1, 2024, supports the criminal complaint against Turkish shipping businessman Taskin Torlak in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.
The evidence reveals a multifaceted criminal conspiracy that operated at least from November 2020 to June 2023, under the leadership of Torlak, aimed at transporting and selling Venezuelan petrochemical products for the benefit of Petróleos de Venezuela S.A. (PDVSA), an entity sanctioned by the U.S. government. The criminal network deliberately exploited the U.S. financial system to process transactions in U.S. dollars, thereby facilitating their illegal operations.
To evade detection, the conspirators implemented a sophisticated set of evasion tactics, including the systematic disabling of ship identification and tracking systems (AIS and LRIT), frequent name and flag changes of vessels to jurisdictions with lax oversight, falsifying cargo documents to hide the Venezuelan origin of the oil, and using non-Western insurers—Russian and Chinese—that do not comply with international sanctions.
The investigation identified specific operations involving several oil tankers, including M/T Mirame, M/T Melissa Amy, and M/T Gracy. Authorities have in possession emails, financial records, and confirmations from confidential sources that detail the planning and execution of these illicit voyages.
Correspondence also revealed direct business relationships and multimillion-dollar payments in U.S. dollars from PDVSA to a company controlled by Torlak. This accumulated evidence supports a criminal complaint against Taskin Torlak for conspiring to violate the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA).
Key Players and Entities in the Conspiracy
The criminal network was composed of several individuals and shell companies that played specific roles in the sanction evasion scheme.
Actor/Entity Description Taskin Torlak Turkish citizen. Main operator of various companies involved in shipping sanctioned oil. COCONSPIRATOR 1 Ukrainian citizen. Operator of numerous companies involved in oil smuggling. COCONSPIRATOR 2 Employee of a China-based shipping company that owned the M/T Melissa Amy during the relevant period. COCONSPIRATOR 3 Captain of a tanker, allegedly based in Turkey. General manager of COCONSPIRATOR 4. COCONSPIRATOR 4 Ship management company controlled by Torlak and incorporated in the Marshall Islands. COCONSPIRATOR 5 Another company operated by Torlak used for ship management. COCONSPIRATOR 6 Company managed by COCONSPIRATOR 1, used for the sale and payment of illegal oil. PDVSA State-owned oil company of Venezuela. Designated as SDN by OFAC and beneficiary of the conspiracy.
Modus Operandi: Sanction Evasion Tactics
The conspirators employed a series of coordinated and deliberate methods to conceal their illegal activities and evade U.S. sanctions.
Use of the U.S. Financial System:
Despite the sanctioned nature of their operations, the network repeatedly utilized U.S. financial institutions to process payments in U.S. dollars for operational expenses, including insurance, marine services, and flag changes of vessels.
Concealment of Vessel Identities:
Renaming: vessels were periodically renamed to complicate tracking. For instance, the M/T Mirame was previously named M/T Trident Symphony, and the M/T Melissa Amy was later renamed M/T Lisa.
Flag Changes: vessels were registered in countries with lax maritime regulations and less oversight. Communications explicitly mentioned Djibouti as a preferred flag because authorities “turn a blind eye and ask no questions.”
Physical Concealment: instructions were given to physically cover the vessel’s name and IMO number with blankets, sailcloth, or paint before arriving at loading ports.
Deactivation of Tracking Systems: they turned off ship identification systems, such as the Automatic Identification System (AIS) and the Long-Range Identification and Tracking system (LRIT), to avoid detection while loading in Venezuela. Coconspirator 1 indicated that, unlike Iran, in Venezuela it is necessary to turn off both systems for a prolonged period (more than 40 days) to “not be seen and not appear on the U.S. OFAC list.”
Document Forgery: they altered Bills of Lading to falsely state that the cargo originated from West Africa or Malaysia instead of Venezuela, thereby deceiving port authorities and financial institutions.
Use of Non-Western Insurers: they utilized Russian or Chinese insurers for Protection and Indemnity (P&I) coverage since International Group insurers track vessels and would have suspended coverage if tracking systems were turned off in violation of U.S., EU, or UN sanctions.
Creating a “clean fleet”: Torlak proposed the idea of establishing a fleet of “clean” vessels, with no public history of sanctioned trade, to channel funds for spare parts and maintenance of the illicit fleet, to “prevent the money from getting stuck somewhere.”
Detailed Evidence by Vessel Operation
In November 2020, the vessel M/T Mirame was managed by Taskin Torlak and Coconspirator 1, and the evidence shows it loaded oil from PDVSA at the Jose Terminal, Venezuela, in late December 2020 with its AIS system turned off.
In a communication dated January 3, 2021, Torlak wrote to Coconspirator 1: “We really need that clean fleet under management (…) to cover the fund transfers for V[enezuela], meaning for the spare parts of the Mirame, we could use one of the clean names to prevent the money from getting stuck somewhere.”
After an online article on January 18, 2021, exposed the vessel’s trip to Venezuela, Torlak expressed concern about information leaks from the PDVSA terminal and suggested stricter operational security measures.
In November 2020, several companies associated with Torlak made U.S. dollar transfers through U.S. Financial Institutions 1 and 2 to cover expenses of the M/T Mirame, including payment for the vessel’s flag change to the Marshall Islands.
Communications in February and March 2021 revealed negotiations to charter the M/T Melissa Amy for a trip to Venezuela. On February 23, 2021, Coconspirator 3, a manager of Torlak, sent an email outlining the terms required by the charterer, which included:
Change the vessel’s flag to Djibouti.
Obtain P&I insurance from a Russian or Chinese insurer.
Instructions to turn off electronic devices like AIS and LRIT.
Agree to state a different ship name at the loading port.
Physically cover the vessel’s name with blankets or paint.
Strictly follow the charterer’s instructions to change documents, such as the Bill of Lading, to reflect a false cargo origin (West Africa/Malaysia).
On February 25, 2021, Coconspirator 1 bluntly stated to the ship owner: “It looks like this will be their first cargo from V[enezuela], and if they are not ready to closely follow the charterers’ instructions, I don’t think we can close the deal.”
A confidential source confirmed through satellite imagery that the M/T Melissa Amy loaded oil on July 7, 2021, at the Jose Terminal in Venezuela.
Payments in U.S. dollars were made through U.S. Financial Institutions 1 and 3 in April, June, and September 2021 related to the M/T Melissa Amy, with its IMO number included in the transfer reference.
Meanwhile, the M/T Gracy, owned by Vietnam, was chartered in mid and late 2021 to transport PDVSA oil from Venezuela.
In a chat message on December 6, 2021, Torlak complained about operational challenges: “We always face sanction issues; it isn’t easy to source supplies at good prices for sanctioned vessels.”
Records show that the M/T Gracy completed its loading in Amuay Bay, Venezuela, on October 9, 2021.
Between September 2021 and January 2022, a Vietnamese company made multiple payments in U.S. dollars through U.S. Financial Institution 4 to a Russian insurer. The references for the transfers explicitly identified “GRACY IMO 9326720.”
Direct Financial Links to PDVSA
The most compelling evidence linking the conspiracy directly to the sanctioned entity comes from a series of letters dated June and July 2023 between one of Torlak’s companies (Coconspirator 5) and PDVSA.
A letter dated June 29, 2023, from Torlak’s company to PDVSA states: “We would like to emphasize our satisfaction in operating our fleet under commercial interest in servitude of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and PDVSA Petróleo S.A. for almost 2.5 years.”
The correspondence details a dispute over payments. Torlak’s company claimed that out of a total of USD 57,797,325.88 owed, it had only received approximately USD 32.5 million, leaving a balance of nearly USD 25 million.
In a response letter dated July 3, 2023, PDVSA explicitly acknowledged the payments, stating: “[COCONSPIRATOR 5] has acknowledged receiving USD 32,878,939 in payments from PDVSA in their letter.”
This correspondence establishes direct proof that Torlak’s network not only conducted transactions for the benefit of PDVSA but also received tens of millions of U.S. dollars from the sanctioned entity in exchange for its illicit services.