——- Summary ——-
¶1. (C) The efforts of Hugo Chavez to expand his influence in the Southern Cone were the topic of ref A. This communication, the second part of a series of joint cables from embassies in the Southern Cone, explores various ways the U.S. can counter Chavez and reaffirm its leadership in the region. From our perspective, there are six areas of action through which the U.S. government can limit Chavez’s influence: –know the enemy: we need to better understand how Chavez thinks and what he aims to achieve; –direct involvement: we must reaffirm our presence in the region and expand our relationships in sectors traditionally marginalized by elites; –change the political landscape: we should offer a vision of hope and bolster it with adequately funded programs; –improve military relations: we need to continue strengthening ties with military leaders in the region who share our concerns about Chavez; –highlight our strengths: we must emphasize that democracy and a free market, which encourages companies to act socially responsibly, provide sustainable solutions; –communicate the message: diplomacy is key, as this is a battle of ideas and visions. Septel has made detailed suggestions. 2. (C) We must neither underestimate Chavez nor lose sight of his vulnerabilities. Many leaders and analysts in the region appreciate the importance of maintaining relations with the U.S., and in general would like to see us more involved, while rejecting the notion that Chavez is the best representative of the region’s interests.
We need to convince not only government leaders but also civil society—the everyday people—that we are committed to a progressive and democratic vision for the Americas, and to helping our neighbors overcome their challenges. If we demonstrate this, we can quickly diminish Chavez’s influence, strengthen democracy, and reaffirm our leadership in the region. End of summary.
————– Know Your Enemy ————–
¶3. (S/NF) Despite his rants and bluster, it would be a mistake to dismiss Chavez as a clown or an old-guard caudillo. He has a vision, albeit a distorted one, and is taking calculated steps to achieve it. To effectively counteract the threat he poses, we must better understand his objectives and how he attempts to achieve them. This requires improved intelligence reporting across our countries. The embassy in Asunción, for example, is gathering information about Chavez’s communication protocols, which it shares with policymakers in Washington, helping to inform and coordinate our response. 4 (S/NF) When we have concrete information about matters of concern to our allies in the region—such as Venezuela’s relationship with Iran—we should share this information to the best of our abilities. And when Chavez’s programs fuel local elite corruption, or fail to deliver on his promises, we must make this known.
————— Direct Involvement —————
¶5. (SBU) We must rebut the erroneous notion that the U.S. is absent and disconnected from the region. President Bush’s visit to five countries in March, followed by his meeting with President Lula at Camp David, had a tremendously positive impact. The visit of Assistant Secretary Shannon to Chile and Paraguay was similarly praised by local leaders and press. We must capitalize on these positive feelings with regular visits from high-ranking officials, including cabinet members, to advance our positive agenda for the region and generate concrete programs and agreements that address problems. 6 (SBU) To maximize the benefits of these visits, we encourage Washington to explore multi-country travel itineraries.
When we make these visits, it’s important that we are not seen only with government officials and elites, but also with those who have traditionally been marginalized or who stand on the fringes of society. We should not only visit the countries whose leaders appreciate us, but especially those that have distanced themselves from us. In these places, we must directly explain our democratic and progressive vision to the populace, which can change distorted or outdated perceptions about us.
————– Change the Political Landscape —————
¶7. (C) Chavez’s agenda is to expand his influence and power using his “Bolivarian revolution” as a vehicle. This greatly annoys government and non-government leaders in the region, particularly those who do not want to be associated with his methods or who perceive Chavez as a growing threat to their leadership. We must leverage that resentment to strengthen our ties with these leaders, praising their governance and fostering a broad public respect for progressive models they seek to implement in their countries.
Fortunately, countries led by leftist governments but with proven democratic credentials and adherence to responsible fiscal policies offer arguments that counter Chavez’s regressive agenda. Due to its size and economic weight, Brazil wields significant influence over the rest of the continent. This can serve as an important counterbalance to Chavez’s project. We must help Brazil stay the course—emphasizing the need to pursue fiscal responsibility and institutional strength, be open to the global community, and establish responsible relationships with neighboring countries and the U.S.—all as a progressive model to follow in the region. Chile offers another excellent alternative to Chavez. Foreign Minister Foxley is working to integrate Chile into the global economy. Chile has not only made its position clear, but has also demonstrated it—such as the letter sent by President Bachelet to Congress leader Nancy Pelosi, expressing support for Congress ratifying the free trade agreement with Peru, Colombia, and Panama—and its desire to help other Latin American countries integrate into the global economy. We should seek other ways to grant Chile leadership in important initiatives, but without giving the impression that it is our puppet, or that its actions are subordinate to our policies.
The situation in Argentina is more complex, still it represents unique features that could contribute to our effort to counter Chavez in that country. Argentina has a substantial middle class and a vibrant civil society, open to our democratic ideas and market vision, and skeptical of Chavez’s revolution. Venezuela does not appear to have provided significant subsidies or funds to Argentina, yet Chavez has managed to exploit Buenos Aires’ inability to access international markets and foreign investments. Local and foreign investors do not provide an adequate level of capital for long-term investments needed to develop required infrastructure. On the other hand, the issue of external debt default to the Paris Club and bondholders after the crisis restricts Argentina’s access to international capital markets and the volume of credit needed to develop infrastructure projects. The obvious measure to counteract the influence that Chavez has gained in Argentina is to help the Argentine government gain access to international markets and work with it to create a favorable climate for foreign investment, which will foster the levels of domestic and international investment needed for infrastructure development. This policy should be complemented by establishing ties with civil society and other actors who share our concerns in certain areas (crime, terrorism, peacekeeping forces, etc.). Our growing relationship with Uruguay’s pragmatic leftist administration undermines the argument that increased U.S. trade and investments are detrimental to the people. This point is very important because poor countries, like Uruguay, are not as vulnerable to Chavez’s ideology as they are to his petro-bolivars. We must bring attention to these cases where relations with the U.S. have resulted in successful solutions, as an alternative to Chavez’s vision of a region disconnected from the U.S. Even the leftist priest Fernando Lugo, now a presidential candidate in Paraguay, has expressed being closer to Bachelet or Lula than to Chavez.
¶8. (C) It goes without saying that we must expose the reality of Chavez—his empty vision, his broken promises, and his dangerous international relations (starting with Iran)—carefully judging where and when we confront Chavez directly and publicly. While it is preferable that we maintain our higher moral ground, focusing on our vision of hope and prosperity in the region, there will be occasions when we will have to discuss his authoritarian tendencies. Nevertheless, we should neither face this task alone, nor lead these efforts. The NGO community, civil society groups, regional leaders, and international organizations—particularly the UN and OAS—must take a larger role in denouncing these issues and putting Chavez on the defensive—without exaggerating the threat but mentioning the facts. The recent closure of RCTV is a topic where international organizations, local media, and civil rights groups could have been more vocal.
9. ( C) Regarding Mercosur, we should not be intimidated to say that Venezuela’s entry will obstruct U.S. interests in even considering direct negotiations with the group, and questioning when and how Mercosur plans to apply the democratic clause to Chavez’s regime. Without expressing hostility towards Mercosur per se, we can continue free trade negotiations with interested countries, such as Chile’s “Pacific Arc” initiative.
— Use Our Military Relationships with Regional Armed Forces —
¶10. (C) The armed forces of Southern Cone countries remain key institutions in their countries and important allies of the U.S. These armed forces are generally organized and technically competent. Their desire to maintain interoperability, access to technology, and training in the U.S. is something we can use to our advantage. In seeking to modernize, professionalize, and transform, they pursue closer ties with the U.S. for assistance in these processes. In recent years we have seen a decrease in funding for key programs like International Military Education and Training (IMET), Commander’s Traditional Activities (TCA), and the elimination of other important programs like Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and Excess Defense Articles (EDA), due to sanctions imposed by ASPA. To maintain our government-to-government relationships and guide political-military events in the region in support of our interests, we must change tactics. Now is the right time to enhance our political-military ties and programs rather than reduce and limit them. We should also review our old and frankly rigid positions on SOFA agreements and insistence on certain privileges and immunities with an eye toward gaining flexibility to negotiate new cooperation agreements with regional armed forces.
¶11. (C) A topic that increasingly excludes Chavez altogether and isolates Venezuela among regional armed forces is participation in regional and international peacekeeping exercises. The Southern Cone is doing very well in this area, as all countries contribute troops to peacekeeping missions worldwide. Argentina and Chile have even formed a combined peacekeeping brigade, expected to be ready for deployment in 2008. Uruguay is the largest per capita contributor of troops for peacekeeping forces. We should increase funding availability for Southern Cone countries to enhance and strengthen the capacity and cooperation of their peacekeeping forces. Additionally, we should explore utilizing the mechanism that contributing countries to MINUSTAH (Haiti) have established to discuss ways to increase peacekeeping cooperation across a broader spectrum.
————— Highlight Our Strengths ————-
¶12. (C) Chavez has significantly penetrated, particularly among local populations, by providing programs for the less privileged and portraying the U.S. as elitist, only interested in promoting free trade for the benefit of large corporations. The slogans are easy: neoliberalism makes the rich richer and the poor poorer; the Bolivarian revolution guarantees the sovereignty and dignity of our region. These slogans resonate with the populace and make people feel better about their lack of progress.
¶13. (C) Transforming our image does not mean separating ourselves from our commitment to free trade and the promise that it benefits impoverished peoples. However, it means that we must improve the promotion of free trade, pointing out successful cases at local and global levels, making it easier to negotiate free trade agreements, and expanding access to the U.S. market while promoting investment. Concluding the Doha Round negotiations is key to revitalizing more local negotiations and strengthening our credibility. In the interim, we must support programs that promote exports from the region, particularly favoring small and medium enterprises, emphasizing healthy corporate behavior.
¶14. (C) Likewise, we must emphasize social responsibility among businesses and investors as a priority for the U.S. government. President Bush’s speech on social justice on March 5 resonated in the region. We must be seen alongside the local population, promoting projects that directly address their social and economic needs, particularly in healthcare and education. This is vital, not only in poor countries but also in places like Chile and Argentina, where our actions in small communities and with youth are welcomed and have received excellent media attention and coverage.
¶15. (C) Projects that promote transparency and democracy are important, as they empower citizens at the local level, strengthen democratic institutions, and contribute to growth. When it comes to these programs, we cannot overlook the fact that we must support our policies with more resources to counteract the easy money that Chavez is distributing, which is having a huge impact in countries like Uruguay. Chavez is not merely conducting his campaign through rhetoric. He is investing millions to win over people. We can use greater discretion and deploy our funds more strategically and objectively; the truth is, we won’t change the perception that we are not seriously committed to the region by carrying out cheap campaigns.
——————– Communicate the Message ———————–
¶16. (U) Public diplomacy will be absolutely vital for our success. We cannot win in the marketplace of ideas if the scope of our message is not active and effective, particularly with young people and those involved in addressing social issues and educational needs. The embassy in Santiago has identified many areas where we can be more active. Personal contact at the grassroots level with local leaders, NGOs, youth groups, community activists, and cooperatives is key.
——- Comment ——-
¶17. (C) Chavez starts with intrinsic advantages in seeking to become this generation’s Castro, one of which is a lot of money. If we add his anti-imperialist bravado, anti-U.S. rhetoric, and a certain charisma, these factors continue to find a receptive audience in much of Latin America, making him a formidable enemy. But we can definitely confront him. Policymakers in Washington have already found a foolproof tactic: do not respond to his provocations, especially when it’s clear that Chavez’s mouth opens before his brain engages. His recent spats with the senates of Chile and Brazil over the closure of RCTV are examples of how his tirades have cost him points with ostensible friends without us lifting a finger.
¶18. (C) But we cannot expect Chavez’s blunders to derail him in the Southern Cone by themselves. Hence the set of measures we propose: a more muscular U.S. government presence in the region supported by high-level visits, highlighting the strength of viable and successful alternatives (such as Brazil and Chile) over Chavez’s brand of socialism, channeling more resources to regions and populations overlooked by elites, and using public diplomacy to clearly communicate our message of democracy, freer trade and investment, alongside effective programs addressing social problems and the needs of the region’s youth. That’s all. End of comment. KELLY