The energy industry assumed that it would have guaranteed access to these hydrocarbons due to geographical proximity, commercial integration, and the political influence that the United States exercised on the continent. Additionally, it obtained them at very low prices as they promoted the narrative that these were not oil. In Venezuela, they called it bitumen.
Written by: La Tabla/Data Journalism Platform 29 JAN 2026
Since the seventies, U.S. energy companies decided to build refineries capable of processing heavy and extra-heavy crude oils that were not available in their territory.
They did so, believing they could secure, for decades, access to these resources in Canada, Mexico, and Venezuela.
This technical and strategic decision explains today’s pressure to regain influence over the immediate oil environment and the insistence on securing the supply of a type of crude oil that their own subsurface does not offer.
Starting from the energy crisis of the 1970s, U.S. companies assumed that domestic production of light crude would enter a permanent decline.
In light of this scenario, they opted for a strategy that would shape the refining system for half a century: investing in facilities designed to process heavy, extra-heavy crudes, and bituminous sands.
This type of petroleum was not found in the United States but was available in large volumes in the Western Hemisphere, especially in Canada, Mexico, and Venezuela. The industry believed that access to these reserves was secured by geographical proximity, commercial integration, and the political influence that Washington had in the region.
The Gulf of Mexico and Midwest refineries were adapted with coking and deep hydroprocessing units, expensive technologies that only become profitable with dense and low-cost crudes.
The rationale was simple: if the United States could guarantee the flow of these heavy barrels, it would gain a lasting competitive advantage in the production of fuels and derivatives. This infrastructure, built to last for decades, solidified a structural dependency on oil that is not part of the U.S. natural wealth.
Today, this historic decision conditions the country’s energy and foreign policy. While 80% of the crude it produces is light, over 60% of the heavy crude it needs must be imported.
In this context, securing access to the large reservoirs of the continent becomes a strategic objective. Government initiatives aimed at reinforcing influence over the region respond to this same need: to guarantee, for the coming decades, the supply of the type of crude oil that keeps the refining infrastructure operational and supports key sectors of the U.S. economy.