There are no chances that the weakened Venezuelan military can defend the Cartel of the Suns and Nicolás Maduro’s criminal enterprise. The FANB lacks the preparation and military technology to confront the operations the United States has deployed in the Caribbean near the coasts of Venezuela.
This is a detailed analysis of the capabilities, doctrine, and current status of the Bolivarian National Armed Forces (FANB) conducted by José Humberto García for Venezuela Política y Sin Filtros. It reveals a hollow entity, incapable of providing significant defense against a modern military force.
The security and defense expert stated that the FANB lacks operational capability and modern weaponry to withstand the phases of degradation, dismantlement, and elimination outlined by the U.S. State Department to combat the Cartel of the Suns and other narco-terrorist organizations.
Assessment of Venezuelan Military Capability
In his analysis, José Humberto García emphasized the incapacity of the Venezuelan Armed Forces to confront a high-tech external threat due to their almost total operational inadequacy.
He mentioned that the U.S. strategy in the Caribbean is articulated in three phases:
- Degrade
- Dismantle
- Eliminate
Vulnerability to Air and Naval Attack (Phases 1 and 2)
García asserts that Venezuela’s ability to defend its air and maritime space is practically nonexistent.
Air defense (CODAI): Russian-made systems (such as the Buk and S-300) are largely inoperable due to corruption, parts cannibalization, and total lack of maintenance and training. The war in Ukraine prevents Russia from providing technical support or spare parts.
Air Force: out of the F-16 fleet, only three are operational for flight, but their weapon systems and radar are dysfunctional. The pilots, although experienced, are between 50 and 60 years old. The capability of the Sukhoi fighters is equally precarious.
U.S. intelligence and mapping: aircraft such as B-52s and high-altitude drones like the Global Hawk thoroughly map all positions of Venezuelan radars and air defense batteries. These assets were “deliberately painted” by Venezuelan radars to triangulate their exact location.
Navy: the naval fleet is minimal and in a disgraceful state, as evidenced by the sinking of an amphibious landing ship due to overloading near the coasts of Falcón.
José Humberto García explained that in a degradation and dismantlement phase, the United States would use MQ-9 drones, Tomahawk missiles, and electromagnetic warfare capabilities to destroy all these positions without risking personnel.
Analysis of Propaganda: the “Circus” of Coastal Defense
A video showing a defense exercise in Carmen de Uria, La Guaira, featuring a ZU-23 anti-aircraft artillery piece, highlights a profound lack of military professionalism.
Severe doctrinal errors:
- Absurd exposure: the artillery piece was positioned in plain sight on a beach, violating the fundamental principle of concealment.
- Lack of depth defense: the position lacked necessary security layers, such as machine gun nests or mine perimeters.
- Incorrect mixing of doctrines: anti-air defense tactics were inappropriately combined with infantry tactics, resulting in useless and theatrical displays.
- Inappropriate command presence: the presence on the ground of a Major General, supposedly the head of CEOFANB, was a propaganda act that contravenes command structure in a real operation.
García described this type of deployment as an “irresponsible show” that, under the Uniform Code of Military Justice of the U.S., could lead to charges carrying the death penalty for putting the nation and its troops at risk.
The Igla Missile Arsenal: Real Threat versus Narrative
Next, José Humberto García referred to the regime’s narrative regarding the possession of 5,000 portable surface-to-air missiles (MANPADS) Igla, which must be nuanced.
• Technical capability: the Igla are effective against low-flying and slow-speed targets (helicopters, slow planes) up to an altitude of about 2,000 meters. They are completely useless against modern jets or drones operating at high altitudes.
• Operational state: they are complex systems that require constant maintenance of their infrared sensors and engines. It is estimated that up to 50% of the arsenal could be inoperable.
• Operator training: effective use requires complex training to “lead” the shot to the target’s path, something very few operators have practiced.
• U.S. countermeasures: U.S. military aircraft are equipped with countermeasures such as flares that divert heat-seeking missiles.
The main concern regarding the Igla is not their impact in a direct conflict with the U.S., but their potential use by remnants of the Cartel of the Suns against civil aviation in a phase following the regime’s collapse.