U.S. President Donald Trump, along with members of his cabinet, including Vice President JD Vance, Energy Secretary Chris Wright, and State Secretary Marco Rubio, met with 17 oil executives. Photo: The White House.
Guacamaya, January 15, 2025. On January 9, U.S. President Donald Trump extended an invitation to seventeen energy executives to the White House, urging them to invest “$100 billion” in Venezuela, noted for its substantial oil and gas reserves. But are they responding to his appeal?
Many business leaders took the chance to express their willingness to enter or re-enter the South American market, while also complimenting Trump. Conversely, some, including ExxonMobil CEO Darren Woods, voiced skepticism, labeling Venezuela as “uninvestable” in the current climate. Prior to the meeting, an unnamed executive shared with the Financial Times: “No one wants to go in there when a random freaking tweet can change the entire foreign policy of the country.”
Just a week earlier, Trump ordered a military operation that resulted in the abduction of Nicolás Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores, who now face drug trafficking charges in New York. Interim Vice President Delcy Rodríguez has indicated her willingness to collaborate with the U.S., despite her earlier public calls for the release of Maduro and Flores. She has had several phone conversations with Trump and his administration officials, including Secretary of State Marco Rubio.
Trump has overtly proclaimed his primary aim in Venezuela is accessing its vast oil reserves, but he requires American businesses—and certain tolerated allies—to deploy their billions. Yet, a clear plan remains elusive, which contributes to most executives’ hesitation.
Will the U.S. Treasury’s Office for Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) revoke sanctions on Venezuela’s oil and financial sectors, or possibly introduce limited exceptions, such as special licenses? Will American firms gain preferential treatment? Will investments have safeguards? And how will physical security be ensured in a volatile country? The situation is particularly precarious, given the recent kidnapping of its head of state. The Trump administration is already exploring the possibility of involving private security firms in securing oil fields.
Last week, Delcy Rodríguez’s Interim Government of Venezuela announced extensive economic reforms, including modifications to laws on mining, foreign trade, industrial property, and the national electrical grid. However, regulations impacting oil, notably the Hydrocarbons Law of 2006, were not mentioned. In recent years, Caracas has been preparing contracts more favorable for investors than the conventional “joint venture” or empresa mixta model established under the Anti-Blockade Law of 2020. If sanctions were lifted, would that law still stand?
New plans are emerging daily, likely due to ongoing adjustments, as multiple sources in Washington, DC have informed Guacamaya.
Who were the executives and companies at Trump’s meeting? What is their current stance on Venezuelan oil? And who was missing?
It’s possible that Trump aimed for a politically impressive display, with oil executives publicly thanking him for his recent initiatives to unlock Venezuela’s natural resource wealth. Numerous companies present have also been notable contributors to his campaigns. However, if that was the goal, it appears unfulfilled, as many still showcase significant reservations.
The event at the White House illustrates the vastly diverging paths taken by descendants of Standard Oil. For instance, ExxonMobil has shifted its focus towards Guyana, positioning it as a competitor to Venezuela; ConocoPhillips has acted as an aggressive creditor trying to recover $12 billion; and Chevron has worked to not only safeguard its assets but also expand its presence.
The exiled giants, reluctant to return: ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips
When Trump envisioned Big Oil investing in Venezuela, he likely had ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips in mind alongside Chevron. Both companies have experienced tumultuous relationships with the regimes of Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro, originating from nationalizations they viewed as wrongful confiscations. They’re hesitant to return without clear signals about industry rule reforms in Caracas.
ExxonMobil, the largest oil company in the U.S.—with China and Saudi Arabia competing globally—has been vocal about not putting money into Venezuela under current laws. CEO Darren Woods informed Trump that Venezuela must alter its regulations, or it will remain “uninvestable.” This led Trump to consider excluding Exxon from his anticipated “$100 billion” oil deal with Venezuela.
The $530 billion corporation would likely not reclaim its pre-existing assets in the country but would need to invest in new ones instead. The Cerro Negro field is currently the largest joint venture between PDVSA and a Russian state-owned company, producing 95,000 barrels per day as of late 2025.
ExxonMobil has continued to maintain a strained relationship with Caracas due to its significant role in the Stabroek offshore oil block. Located in waters claimed by Venezuela as its own, this block is off the coast of the Essequibo territory. Rex Tillerson, a past Exxon CEO (2006-2016) also served as U.S. Secretary of State from 2017 to 2018, during the initial stages of the Trump administration’s sectoral sanctions on Venezuela.
ConocoPhillips has arguably emerged as the most recognized creditor of Venezuela. It holds two arbitration awards against the country for $8.7 billion and £2 billion, which, with accrued interest, positions the company as the largest non-sovereign creditor. Together with miner Crystallex, they are at the forefront to be compensated should PDV Holding, Citgo’s parent company, be sold off to settle claims.
During the meeting with the 17 oil executives, CEO Ryan Lance discussed the recovery of its $12 billion debt, although Trump remarked, “We’re not going to look at what people lost in the past, because that was their fault.” The considerable debt could end up being labeled a “good write-off,” a term used for companies recognizing losses to reduce taxable income. “It’s already been written off,” responded Lance.
Until 2007, ConocoPhillips operated in the Hamaca and Zuata regions of the Orinoco Oil Belt, which included heavy crude upgraders. The Hamaca field is now part of a PDVSA joint venture with Chevron, known as Petropiar, while Zuata has a new partner, A&B Investments, supported by Venezuelan and Brazilian investors, under the Petrororaima joint venture. ConocoPhillips also produced oil in the Corocoro offshore field, which PDVSA now operates along with Italy’s Eni.
In 2018, ConocoPhillips negotiated with the Maduro government to have certain debts repaid following the seizure of Venezuelan assets in the Caribbean. However, in 2019, payments became unfeasible due to sanctions and the U.S.’s recognition of a so-called “interim government” led by Juan Guaidó, which subsequently assumed responsibility for Caracas’s debts.
Sunk costs: Chevron, Repsol, Eni
Three executives represented companies that have decades of presence in Venezuela, investing such significant sums that they now most keen to capitalize on any political shift: Chevron, Repsol, and Eni. They are well-acquainted with PDVSA’s operations and the politics in Caracas, realizing Trump’s need for compliments.
Chevron stands as the largest U.S. firm in Venezuela, having sustained operations for over a century. When Trump revoked most sanctions waivers in 2025, he created a new special license for this massive corporation. It’s simply too critical to overlook. Chevron’s joint ventures with PDVSA are currently producing 243,000 barrels per day, constituting 21% of the country’s total, according to figures from October 2025. Now, Chevron is anticipated to obtain an expanded OFAC license for Venezuela soon.
Even during the peak tensions between Trump and Maduro, Chevron-chartered vessels continued to transport Venezuelan crude across the Caribbean to refineries on the East Coast. For context, in October 2025, the U.S. energy firm shipped 135,000 barrels daily, which amounted to 56% of its total production from the four joint ventures.
In the meeting with Trump, Vice Chairman Mark Nelson asserted that Chevron could significantly boost its production. “We have a path forward here very shortly to be able to increase our liftings from those joint ventures 100% essentially effective immediately. We are also able to increase our production within our own disciplined investment schemes by about 50% just in the next 18 to 24 months.”
The CEO of Spain’s Repsol, Josu Jon Imaz, grasped the assignment. He first highlighted the $21 billion the corporation invested in the U.S., then asserted that it could swift boost output in Venezuela. “Today, we are producing 45,000 barrels of oil a day, gross, and we’re ready to triple this figure in the next two to three years, putting on hard investments in the country, if you give us the chance, of course.”
Together, Eni and Repsol produce about a third of Venezuela’s natural gas consumption, utilizing the Perla field. The Italian energy firm has benefited from Trump’s favorable relations with Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, remaining the sole European company with a special sanctions waiver.
Vitol, Trafigura: non-U.S. traders allowed to sell to Asian buyers
John Addison, a senior executive from Vitol, a European commodity trading firm, and Richard Holtum from Singapore-based Trafigura were also present. Both have previously engaged in shipping Venezuelan oil before the 2019 sanctions, as well as during other periods using OFAC licenses.
According to Reuters, the two traders are already in negotiations with refineries in India and China for March deliveries, suggesting they possess some authorization from the U.S. Treasury for this new endeavor. Possible buyers include Refiners Indian Oil Corp, Hindustan Petroleum Corp, Reliance Industries, and PetroChina.
In this scenario, the two leading trading houses would be selling the Venezuelan oil that filled storage tanks due to Trump’s recent naval blockade, which led to the seizure of five tankers. Sales proceeds, estimated at $500 million, are being deposited in bank accounts in Qatar, to be managed by Trump. In a social media post, he claimed these funds will be utilized in a manner that “benefits the people of Venezuela and of the United States.” The U.S. OFAC has allowed these revenues to reach the Central Bank of Venezuela enabling it to allocate this capital for purchasing food products.
Sanctions aren’t the only hurdles here. In March last year, Trump introduced “secondary tariffs” of 25% on all trade with any nation buying Venezuelan oil and gas, resulting in companies either cancelling or rerouting shipments. However, if India and China—excluding so-called “teapot refiners”—are confident enough to purchase Venezuelan oil, perhaps they have been assured that the path is clear.
Don’t forget about the gas
Shell, a UK-based energy giant, was also part of the meeting. Previously, it participated in joint ventures for oil production in Venezuela, but now seems to focus on just one project: the offshore gas fields that cross the maritime border with Trinidad and Tobago.
While Shell and its local partner, the National Gas Company of Trinidad and Tobago, possess a U.S. license to proceed, they may face additional political challenges. Prime Minister Kamla Persad-Bissessar has previously made hostile comments towards the Venezuelan government and offered Trinidad as a base for recent U.S. military actions. As Maduro’s allies take charge, they could still harbor resentment.
BP was absent from the White House, but it follows a similar trail as Shell. It’s also interested in developing a cross-border offshore natural gas field. Trinidad and Tobago has created an extensive infrastructure network to process and export this fossil fuel, along with dependent sectors like petrochemicals and steel. Without access to its neighbor’s reserves, a large portion of its economy could become obsolete, with former Prime Minister Stuart Young stating this could occur in as little as 10 years.
Oilfield services also present
Significant U.S. oilfield services companies, Halliburton and Schlumberger, were also part of the meeting. They have a long-standing history in Venezuela and previously held sanctions waivers linked to Chevron’s licenses, allowing them to maintain limited operations tied to its joint ventures. The same General License 8 also applied to Baker Hughes and Weatherford International, although they were absent from the meeting.
These firms, alongside local or non-U.S. counterparts, are often more essential than typically acknowledged. Generally, large corporations like Chevron and ExxonMobil outsource significant portions—or all—of their oilfield operations to companies like Halliburton and Schlumberger.
During the White House meeting, Halliburton CEO Jeff Miller remarked that he personally lived in Venezuela for four years and that his company is “very much interested in returning.” Trump questioned him on why they had exited, forcing Miller to awkwardly remind him of the 2019 sanctions during his first term that led to the shutdown of U.S. oil firms.
The Gulf Coast refiners
The narrative of Venezuelan oil has primarily revolved around a mutually beneficial relationship between the oil fields surrounding Lake Maracaibo and the Faja, and the refineries located along the U.S. Coast, especially in the recently renamed “Gulf of America.” These facilities were designed to process heavy crude, specifically the type delivered from Venezuela over many decades.
It’s thus no surprise that Trump included two “downstream” executives: Maryann Mannen representing Marathon, and Lane Riggs from Valero. The latter has emerged as the largest recipient of Venezuelan oil in the U.S., acquiring 46% of the total from January 2023 to June 2025. Virtually all shipments were supplied by Chevron under General License 41.
Notably, during that time, ExxonMobil refineries occasionally purchased Venezuelan crude from Chevron, and recent reports suggest it may be looking to increase imports, independent of whether it will engage in upstream operations within the South American nation.
Oil magnates: “We’re going to Venezuela”
Trump also invited a selection of oil magnates to the meeting. Although they may lack direct experience in Venezuela, many are recognized as donors to Trump and the Republican Party. This group includesContinental Resources’ Harold Hamm, Hilcorp’s Jeff Hildebrand, Aspect Holdings’ Alex Cranberg, Tallgrass’s Matt Sheehy, Armstrong Oil & Gas’s Bill Armstrong, and HKN’s Ross Perot.
Many appear concentrated within the U.S. market, and some represent the face of the Shale Revolution. They might be in for a surprise as they begin to understand the local regulations. However, Ross Perot may bring some relevant expertise, considering HKN operates two blocks in Iraqi Kurdistan.
Are we missing someone?
Not all were represented. Harry Sargeant III, based in Florida, was absent. His businesses have engaged at different points in producing, trading, and refining Venezuelan oil, and he allegedly facilitated high-level communications between Washington, DC, and Caracas.
Sargeant’s Global Oil Management Group has been a significant trader of asphalt from Venezuela, permitted by OFAC licenses from late 2023 to early 2025. He is also connected with North American Blue Energy Partners, which produces around 140,000 barrels daily. Additionally, Global Oil invested in Curaçao’s Isla refinery, originally designed to process Venezuelan oil—it was previously a PDVSA asset. In January 2024, Sargeant led a group of American “wildcat investors” to Caracas to assess oil and gas prospects.
LNG Energy Group, established by Texas billionaire Rod Lewis, signed a contract with Venezuela to produce oil in 2024, but production never commenced as General License 44 lapsed that year. No representatives from this company attended the meeting at the White House on January 9 either.
Awide range of companies from France, India, Argentina, China, Russia, Brazil, and elsewhere have a footprint in Venezuela’s oil industry, and none were at the meeting. Their future under a potential Trump deal appears uncertain.
Will there be an initiative to favor American businesses? By extending invitations to firms like Repsol, Eni, and Vitol, the U.S. president has indicated he is minimally willing to entertain collaboration with friendly Western nations. Yet “ad hoc” encapsulates the current approach, and Trump’s personal relationships may play a crucial role. He currently enjoys good rapport with President Lula da Silva, despite earlier tensions; does that mean Brazilian investors are in the clear? Will countries under sanctions, such as Iran and Russia, be excluded?