The project was approved in first discussion on Thursday, February 5, 2026. The pardon cannot be decreed.
The Amnesty, Reconciliation, and National Reunion Law proposal presented in January 2026 emerges during one of the most fragile moments of Venezuelan political cycle. Under the argument of closing decades of confrontation, the project aims to pardon crimes related to political events from 1999 until the norm comes into effect. The declared goal is to release prisoners, facilitate the return of exiles, and rebuild institutional trust. However, the context in which it arises necessitates a more critical reading.
The text is built on the narrative of a country trapped in a prolonged conflict leading to persecution, politically motivated judicial processes, and mass migration. From this premise, amnesty is presented as an exceptional, almost humanitarian instrument, to deactivate accumulated tensions and open spaces for dialogue. The law prioritizes the release of detainees for political reasons, eliminates judicial records, and restores civil and labor rights.
The framework of the project is extensive. It includes offenses linked to protests, demonstrations, political opinions, and expressions on social media; it contemplates the dismissal of cases, the return of seized assets, and the removal of administrative disqualifications. Simultaneously, it excludes grave crimes such as crimes against humanity, torture, intentional homicide, large-scale drug trafficking, and corruption with illicit enrichment, aligning with international human rights standards.
However, the scope of the pardon raises concerns. The inclusion of crimes such as rebellion, incitement to hatred, resistance to authority, or property damage, when occurring in political contexts, reopens the debate about the boundaries between justice and impunity. In a country marked by violent episodes and victims of state terrorism, widespread forgiveness may be perceived more as a political shortcut than a genuine reconciliation process.
The Venezuelan experience adds an additional layer of skepticism. In 2016, a similar law was blocked by the Supreme Court controlled by Chavismo on the grounds that it promoted impunity. Today, the fact that power sectors are pushing such an initiative fuels suspicions about strategic, rather than humanitarian, motivations. Amid sanctions, international isolation, and political pressure, the amnesty can also be interpreted as a gesture to reshape the regime’s external narrative.
The project also does not address the core of the institutional problem. It does not propose structural reforms to the judicial system or the state security apparatus, nor does it establish robust mechanisms for truth, reparation, or guarantees of non-repetition. In practice, it could release victims without dismantling the conditions that allowed their persecution.
Another critical element is the extension of amnesty to administrative and disciplinary infractions within the public apparatus. This point opens the door for controversial decisions to remain unreviewed, weakening accountability and the fight against corruption. Reconciliation in this design seems to prioritize political stability over historical clarification.
The underlying debate is not legal but part of the political crisis existing in Venezuela. The law attempts to close 27 years of conflict, abuse, persecution, and state terrorism without a real agreement on the causes, responsibilities, and consequences of that confrontation. In the absence of an independent truth commission or real justice processes, forgiveness could become a tool for social demobilization rather than a step towards national reconciliation.
Can a country rebuild itself without fully facing its past? The recent history of Latin America shows that amnesties not accompanied by truth and reparation end up being fragile, temporary, or functional for those holding power.
The legal proposal may relieve immediate tensions and open space for political negotiation. But it can also operate as a mechanism of rearrangement within the system, without altering its foundations. The risk is that the country achieves a truce, not a solution.
Reconciliation is not decreed by law. It is built with justice, memory, and profound institutional reforms. Without these elements, any amnesty runs the risk of being interpreted not as an act of peace but as a strategy to manage the conflict and prolong it in new forms.