“Everyone knows that the dice are loaded.” Leonard Cohen
This week’s note is written before the appearance of Secretary of State Marco Rubio in the U.S. Senate and his subsequent meeting with María Corina Machado.
I borrow a phrase from Mark Carney, Canada’s prime minister, who interpreted the current moment in Davos as a break and demise of the international order based on rules, agreements, and commitments.
In using this phrase, I point out that Trump’s decision to put the same power machinery that has led the country for more than twenty years, now headed by Delcy Rodríguez, in charge of the “transition,” not only marginalizes MCM, who is undeniably the leader of the democratic opposition, but also excludes the Venezuelan people and the decision they made on July 28, 2024.
Trump, who is not particularly fond of democracy, prefers to prioritize force, as seen in his disproportionate handling of immigrants in his country. He chose to leave a regime that was imposed through “state terrorism, persecution, censorship, and the closure of civic space,” while also ruining the country and causing the fracture of families, with the exodus of over 8 million people, amounting to almost a third of the total population.
This all assumes that the opposition led by MCM was not in a position to manage the transition to democracy since Chavismo maintained control and monopoly over violence and authoritarian power structures (armed forces, police, and other security bodies of the state, courts), establishing authoritarian enclaves within civil society (the so-called armed collectives, “cooperating patriots,” and the narrative of politics as war with the rhetoric of friend versus enemy, etc.).
This created a narrative that became hegemonic, accepted by almost all sectors.
The result has not been a displacement of the dominant “Historical Block” (as Gramsci would call it), formed by the alliance between the government and the criminal drug trafficking structure, foreign irregular groups in the country, and widespread corruption that took control of state power. What has occurred is a process of “transformism” within itself, where Maduro was replaced by the Rodríguez brothers, who are not free from the suspicion of having betrayed him and handed him over to the Americans, or at least failing to prevent it.
In reality, the State, far from expanding and providing greater coverage to civil society and democratic demands, meaning a “return to politics” and much more, a return to democracy, has shrunk even further, leaving the repressive apparatus as the internal support for Chavismo, accompanied this time by a slight economic loosening (especially in the oil sector) under the pressure, oversight, and punishment of the U.S. government, should they fail to comply with its directives.
The imposition by the Trump administration has maintained the predominance of a restricted state that has conferred some “internal irresistibility” (given the weight of the repressive apparatus in establishing order), at least for now, but increased its vulnerability from outside, signaling the death of the Venezuelan nation-state. This (the state) is merely a segment of a larger whole, the decision-making center of which lies in the hands of the Trump administration.
What is crucial is that those of us who are “outside the table” risk being consumed, devoured, and digested by the “Chavista transition,” which aims to construct its own temporal horizon that surpasses the constitutional timeframe of 180 days, a long time if we consider that the Chavista logic continues to be articulated around what Elías Pino Iturrieta calls “the evil (Chavista) dominating society” while respecting “the clock of civilized transitions.”
Thus, Venezuelans, both “inside” and “outside,” must organize to demand the right to be the subjects in the construction of this present and consolidate the future, and not be mere objects of the Trump-Rubio plan for a transition that could be “an infinite transition” if the Rodríguez brothers decide to continue being useful to the Trump administration.
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Analyses of the “current moment” seem to overlook that the opposition’s electoral victory on July 28, 2024, was the first sign of a real political-cultural transformation. This was manifested electorally in favor of the opposition when a large sector of the Armed Forces voted for Edmundo Gonzales Urrutia in a contesting action (this gives an idea of the extent of control over FAN), though electoral fraud committed by the regime prevented its access to state power.
We have not analyzed that electoral event in its proper dimension, which produced a “transformation of common sense and the political culture of previous years.” This has been the virtue of MCM’s leadership, who must now invite the “other opposition” to join a political project to govern.
For clarity, I shouldn’t speak of the “other opposition,” but it truly exists, not just one, but several, as it would be absurd to claim that MCM is alone as an opponent; it’s just that this “other opposition” is undergoing a deep crisis of representation, and its current efforts should aim to restore the value of “their words,” regaining the lost affections.
To do justice, it has been MCM who, under adverse circumstances, has revalued the opposing word. She has enunciated a genealogy of the country, recreated new forms of interpellation, and made a fundamental contribution to pull the opposition out of marginalization. Of course, until today, this has not been recognized by that “other opposition.”
I acknowledge the complexity and uncertainty of this “current moment” (that expression brings me back to a Leninist category, which, despite everything, can sometimes be useful, but those who do not even concede a theoretical nod to Marxism might use the term “juncture”) and I fear that the Trump administration (which has not set a clear and recognizable timeline for when this interim will end) has not considered the revaluation of institutional procedures.
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There’s an effort by Marco Rubio to establish a timeline, who has set the ongoing process into phases that need to be started and concluded, but that doesn’t guarantee a transition to democracy due to the weight Trump has placed on recovering the debt Venezuela owes to the U.S. On the other hand, those phases and timelines (still open) could merely serve to assuage the demands for “transition now” made by citizens, as survey results show, but they would be far from realization if the unpredictable Trump chooses to prolong Delcy Rodríguez’s tutelary administration.
Furthermore, I suspect Rubio won’t take long to submit to whatever decision Trump ultimately makes to avoid alienating his affections, as his aspirations are not to be “governor” of Venezuela or “Captain General” of Cuba, but to compete with JD Vance for the U.S. presidency.
Therefore, I assume that Rubio’s position, in this regard, is not a reference for Trump.
In Venezuela at this hour, uncertainty and insecurity reign. Although people say they have lost their fear, some demonstrators are already returning to the streets demanding freedom for political prisoners and public sector employees are calling for a substantial increase in salaries.
This seems like a “twist” that could untie knots and obstacles, leading to a faster path toward democratic transition.
Of course, someone will say, “I know! I know!” because I’ve talked to friends still in Venezuela, and they, a bit disillusioned, mention that while there are indeed protests, a large part of the population is preparing for carnival.
In any case, the transition, unless a sudden phenomenon prompts a massive outcry that gets people to the streets, will continue depending on the indefinable Donald Trump, who we all know is guided in life by the scent of profit, and here he is led by the strong scent of oil.