This piece is the third article in a series examining the ‘Cartel de los Soles’ political narrative. We encourage you to check out the first and the second articles.
Guacamaya, September 15, 2025. Crafting and disseminating a false narrative can have serious consequences. In this article, we expose the damaging effects of labeling Venezuela as a ‘narco-state’, particularly through the narrative that it is governed by the so-called ‘Cartel de los Soles.’
In our first investigative piece, we showed that there is no substantiated evidence for this claim: The scale of cocaine trafficking through Venezuela is insignificant compared to other routes, and there is no proof linking Nicolás Maduro to its control. The term ‘Cartel de los Soles’ has instead been utilized as a political weapon by certain actors in the U.S. to justify intervention aimed at regime change, as we discussed in our second article. Consequently, the deployment of the U.S. Navy in the Caribbean is not aimed at tackling crime—a narrative that resonates well with the American public—but rather at utilizing American forces to intervene in a foreign nation, a far less palatable proposition.
The assertion that Venezuela is a narco-state is already having tangible repercussions. Just last week, the U.S. military fired at a suspected drug boat, resulting in 11 fatalities. This action has raised serious questions regarding its legality and effectiveness. A New York Times article revealed that the boat had turned around prior to being struck, further undermining what experts criticized as an already flimsy self-defense claim.
This article aims to demonstrate that the narrative surrounding the Cartel de los Soles is damaging U.S. strategic interests in Latin America. It is further alienating Venezuela from the West, driving it closer to Beijing. Military interventions would also fuel instability in the region, with consequences that could rebound to the United States. One direct effect would be the termination of repatriation agreements with Caracas, leading to an increased Venezuelan exodus, and disrupting oil supplies to the U.S. Gulf Coast. Finally, it negatively affects trust and collaboration with regional partners. Several key governments have publicly rejected the ‘Cartel de los Soles’ narrative, undermining efforts to coordinate effective counter-narcotics actions and escalating geopolitical tensions.
Venezuela’s oil reserves shifting to China
The isolationist rhetoric fostered by sanctions and pressure for regime change has already made Caracas more reliant on China, Russia, and Iran, solidifying energy and military alliances that erode U.S. strategic influence in its own hemisphere. This is critical: Venezuela has the world’s largest proven oil reserves and ranks seventh in natural gas—and if we only consider Latin America and the Caribbean, the country holds 80% of this resource.
The consequences of sectoral sanctions are clear. For many years, the primary trading partner of the South American nation was the United States, benefiting from geographical proximity and synergies between Venezuelan heavy crude and Gulf Coast refineries. However, sanctions necessitated a severe pivot toward Eastern partners. In 2016, prior to the imposition of sanctions by the Treasury Department, Americans imported 800,000 barrels per day (bpd). By 2019, this figure plummeted to zero due to sanctions, only recovering to a mere 230,000 bpd in 2024 through special licenses granted to Chevron and other companies. Energy experts believe that the same refineries could efficiently absorb 750,000 bpd of Venezuelan heavy crude, which would be more cost-effective than alternative options due to shorter distances and steeper discounts.
China has capitalized on this scenario, benefiting from discounts of up to $35 per barrel. This August, the Asian powerhouse accounted for 85% of Venezuela’s oil exports, or 820,000 bpd. Additionally, China has become the main source of imports for Venezuelans, supplanting the United States in 2019. Simultaneously, Russia and Iran have become critical intermediaries in oil trade; these three nations have fostered interdependencies with Caracas. Furthermore, Maduro increasingly relies on their arms sales and military advisors as the last links between the Bolivarian National Armed Forces (FANB) and Western counterparts fade away.
Chinese companies have also begun upstream production and refinery work under opaque contracts signed under the ‘Anti-Blockade Law’—a legislation aimed at mitigating sanctions impacts. This includes China Concord Petroleum, Anhui Guangda Mining Investment, and Kerui Petroleum. Meanwhile, American firms are barred from operating in Venezuela by the Treasury Department, despite interest in investing.
Practically, sanctions and political pressure have driven Venezuela away from Western dependence and towards Asia. This situation mirrors Russia’s response to the Ukraine invasion: redirecting energy exports towards India and China at discounted prices. The result is paradoxical: the U.S. ends up indirectly subsidizing affordable oil that benefits its strategic adversaries.
Military actions that do not lead to a political transition—keep in mind that the main option discussed is ‘kinetic strikes’—could provoke an even more radicalized Nicolás Maduro, who has already asserted that ‘if Venezuela is attacked, we will immediately enter a period of armed struggle.’ Such a scenario would escalate the Venezuelan crisis into a new phase of conflict, with widespread internal and regional ramifications.
If these punitive measures fail, as they have in the past, Maduro would seize the chance to portray a political-military victory. Externally, he would drift closer to China, Russia, and Iran. Domestically, he would feel compelled to intensify his closure of the democratic system, diminishing the influence of moderate opposition members in the National Assembly, including former presidential contenders Antonio Ecarri and Henrique Capriles, who advocate for a strategy of internal negotiation and gradual reforms.
How reckless regime change efforts in Venezuela undermine U.S. security
The primary issue with intervening in Venezuela is the lack of sound strategy behind it. Officials in Washington, DC are considering an astonishingly broad range of tactics, including drone strikes on Maduro; airstrikes on suspected cocaine production sites or even a Russian-built munitions factory; or even deploying ground troops reminiscent of the 1989 invasion of Panama, with one suggesting, ‘This could be Noriega part 2.’
In contemporary times, overseas interventions rarely bear fruit. Since 1990, nearly every U.S.-led intervention has left behind war-torn or devastated nations, as evidenced by Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Syria, Somalia, and Haiti. Experts warn that such a reckless initiative in Venezuela could trigger destabilization across the region, allowing more room for non-state armed actors and exacerbating the wave of emigration from Venezuela, initially to Colombia and Brazil, and subsequently to other nations, including the United States.
To enforce a government change, Washington would need to deploy a significant ground force, something not accounted for in the current mission, which consists of just 2,200 Marines. Various opposition factions lack an armed wing, including María Corina Machado and her party. So far, there is no evidence that the FANB, which is accused of drug trafficking and crimes against humanity, would turn against Nicolás Maduro in her favor.
In a 2018 column, Shannon K. O’Neil from the Council on Foreign Relations stated, ‘Venezuela is not Grenada or Panama, the two Latin American countries invaded by the United States towards the end of the Cold War. Instead, it is twice the size of Iraq, with a slightly smaller population, and on the verge of chaos. Any invasion would require preparations on a similar scale, meaning a force of over 100,000 troops.’ Herein lies another challenge. From the interventions she cited, only the very small countries produced successes from the perspective of U.S. foreign policy; larger ones were disastrous for the locals.
Some neoconservative factions in Washington claim that selective airstrikes within Venezuela could pressure the FANB to spark an internal rift. However, in a hypothetical scenario where a military faction decided to side with Machado, a likely outcome is civil strife or intensified political violence, without necessarily leading to a political transition.
Phil Gunson, a senior analyst for the Andes region at the International Crisis Group, pointed out, ‘If the U.S. continues on this path, several outcomes are conceivable, but very few are positive. No one has assessed what comes next. It’s quite naïve to believe that you can topple the regime, introduce Edmundo González and María Corina Machado, and voilà, democracy will flourish.’
He added, ‘What is more probable is some form of internal conflict.’ Gunson, speaking from Caracas, noted, ‘Maintaining order internally will be extremely difficult. We might see a split in the armed forces, amidst numerous non-state groups across the nation who have no incentive to disarm simply because they’ve heard the government has changed.’
If a military conflict erupts, the U.S. would need to prepare for a long-term presence, dealing with a scenario of regional instability. Policymakers must acknowledge the active presence of Colombian guerrillas and other organized crime groups, both local and transnational, within Venezuela. Chavismo has also armed loyal civilians through entities like the Bolivarian Militia and the ‘Colectivos,’ which function as paramilitary organizations. The burden of nation-building would then fall on American taxpayers and soldiers, with unpredictable costs and scant chances for success—a scenario reminiscent of painful experiences in Iraq or Afghanistan.
Clear repercussions on U.S. borders
This also raises the issue of migration fallout following a failed intervention in Venezuela. The collapse of Venezuela’s economy has already led to one of the largest exoduses in recent history, second only to Syria, according to the UNHCR. A war would worsen this situation, leading to social challenges in host countries. It’s notable that the initial wave of emigration from Venezuela impacted South America primarily; however, many have since sought refuge in third countries such as the U.S. and Spain. In fiscal year 2023, over 266,000 Venezuelans crossed illegally into the U.S., according to Customs and Border Protection (CBP), marking a historical high that strained immigration authorities’ capacities.
Once again, a scenario of ungovernability in Venezuela poses a threat to President Trump’s immigration strategy. He would face both a renewed influx of migrants eager to cross the southern border, overwhelming authorities, and complications in executing deportation flights to Venezuela.
This January, one of the initial moves by the new Trump administration was to negotiate repatriation flights with Caracas, despite a lack of official recognition of Maduro. Flights carrying deportees have been arriving in Venezuela twice a week, a practice maintained amid tensions between the two governments. While some of these flights are chartered by ICE, many are financed and operated by the Venezuelan state, making it unique in that the receiving country bears the cost. A military conflict would disrupt this agreement, a key component of Trump’s immigration agenda.
False narratives jeopardize genuine efforts to combat drug trafficking
Drug trafficking remains a significant issue in the Western Hemisphere. Given the Navy’s mission to combat such crimes, it warrants examination from this angle as well. To what extent does the narrative that Maduro leads a narco-state, alongside deploying warships to the Caribbean, aid counter-narcotics efforts? Currently, it appears more like an expensive display of power yielding numerous negative consequences and few if any positive results.
Instead of fostering consensus, the State Department’s push for the region to adopt the ‘Cartel de los Soles’ narrative is causing frictions throughout Latin America. Notably, three crucial governments in the fight against drug trafficking—Colombia, Mexico, and Brazil—have clearly rejected the accusations against Maduro.
Colombia, traditionally a U.S. ally in the battle against narcotics, publicly contradicted the State Department’s stance. President Gustavo Petro unequivocally stated in a post on X that ‘the Cartel de los Soles does not exist; it is a fictitious excuse from the far right to overthrow governments that don’t obey.’
Petro, who presides over the nation producing most of the world’s cocaine, stressed that ‘the transit of Colombian cocaine through Venezuela is regulated by the “Drug-trafficking Junta,” whose leaders are located in Europe and the Middle East.’ He referred to the collusion of Colombian criminal factions such as the Clan del Golfo and FARC dissidents managing routes, suggesting that responsibility for narcos trafficking lies largely with transnational criminal organizations distant from the Venezuelan state.
He also highlighted that Venezuela’s political crisis should be resolved internally ‘with more democracy,’ without foreign intervention. These statements reflect a strong division between Bogotá and Washington, DC regarding the Cartel de los Soles narrative, aligning with Petro’s continuous opposition to interventionism in the region.
Similarly, Mexico has discredited the claims coming from the U.S. State and Justice Departments. President Claudia Sheinbaum expressed disbelief when U.S. Attorney General Pam Bondi alleged that Maduro is cooperating with the Sinaloa Cartel. ‘This is the first time we have heard about this. There is no investigation in Mexico regarding that. Absolutely nothing,’ said the Mexican president during a press conference.
These open contradictions pose a significant challenge. The U.S. must work in tandem with Colombia, and particularly with Mexico, to intercept drug shipments before reaching the border. Mexico is a central entry point for cocaine and other narcotics like fentanyl. Law enforcement efforts could suffer greatly if both governments cast doubt on the validity of Washington, DC’s narrative surrounding narcotics linked to Venezuela.
Brazil, the leading nation in South America, has refrained from directly commenting on the existence of the ‘Cartel of the Suns,’ yet has clearly expressed its opposition to the U.S. Navy’s deployment in the Caribbean and any potential military actions against Venezuela. At the BRICS summit, President Luis Ignácio ‘Lula’ da Silva remarked that ‘The presence of armed forces from the largest power in the Caribbean Sea is a source of tension incompatible with the peaceful nature of this region.’ In sum, insisting on a supposed Venezuelan ‘narco-state’ is counterproductive.
The militarization of counter-narcotics: Costly and ineffective
Utilizing the Navy in this narrative entails numerous issues. It diverts resources and focus from the actual epicenters of global drug trafficking while militarized tactics have proven inefficient, incurring substantial direct and opportunity costs.
International evidence indicates that effective combat against drug trafficking relies on police intelligence, judicial cooperation, and collaborative security pacts—not naval deployments suited for conventional warfare. The Navy, designed for territorial defense and maritime oversight, lacks the criminal investigation capacity, network infiltration abilities, and transnational coordination needed for effective anti-drug law enforcement.
The operational cost of the U.S. military deployment in the Caribbean is estimated at around $10 million, according to specialized sources consulted for this investigation. This includes an Amphibious Ready Group, a Marine Expeditionary Unit, a nuclear submarine, and other warships. The anti-narcotics operation was authorized by President Donald Trump on August 8, which could imply a total cost exceeding $300 million for American taxpayers by the end of the month.
There is also the opportunity cost involved, as these resources could have been directed towards genuine military threats and piracy, or invested in training, as noted by Mark Cancian, retired Marine Colonel and senior advisor on defense and security at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Meanwhile, no information has emerged regarding the quantity of drugs seized, or the number of shipments interdicted, raising doubts about the justifications for such an outlay.
In Spring 2020, the Pentagon conducted a similar maritime operation to thwart drug smugglers, without achieving significant law enforcement progress, while these same actions were linked to efforts towards regime change, following immediately with the landing of mercenaries on Venezuela’s shores—a scenario known as Operation Gideon. Bryan Clark, a naval operations specialist and senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, remarked at the time that deploying warships in the Caribbean ‘is sort of overkill. They are military-grade, escalating costs. While they’re more durable, drug traffickers typically don’t use torpedoes.’
It’s not controversial to claim that stationing naval units around the coasts of Venezuela is absurd. The DEA itself acknowledged that the major maritime routes for cocaine transport are the Eastern Pacific (74%) and the Western Caribbean (16%). In contrast, the Caribbean corridor that includes Venezuela represents a mere 8%. The notion that this route is the most significant is outdated, originating from the initial cocaine boom of the 1970s and 1980s.
The militarized crackdown on narcotics is, therefore, misdirected towards a relatively minor cocaine route, which loses relevance when considering fentanyl and opioids, which are responsible for the majority of overdose-related fatalities.
The targeted strike on an alleged drug boat from Venezuela also lacks strategic sensibility, raising a slew of questions regarding the validity of the administration’s claims or legality—the attack has been labeled by some as an ‘extrajudicial killing.’ While the precise location of the incident remains undisclosed, reports indicate a route connecting Venezuela’s Sucre state with the nearby island of Trinidad, likely associated with European trafficking, as explained in our first piece.
Open heart surgery with a hammer
It would be easy if life were that straightforward—simply airstrike problems away or send warships to coerce weaker nations. But reality is far more complicated. When discussing the prospects of altering Venezuela’s political landscape through U.S. Navy deployment, Gunson aptly commented, ‘it’s akin to performing open heart surgery with a hammer.’
Two critical matters are at stake: the illegal drug crisis in the United States and Venezuela’s political future. Both require comprehensive solutions grounded in clear, long-term strategies. They cannot depend on a singular military initiative lacking defined aims. Cooperation with regional governments is essential. While the Navy shows off its might, or limited airstrikes attract attention, this is not the avenue for shaping history.
Currently, the ongoing campaign to label Venezuela as a narco-state is damaging the United States’ credibility in Latin America, especially when it needs collaboration in fighting illegal drug trafficking and countering China’s expanding influence. Meanwhile, a strategically crucial nation is being alienated by the West, which pushes it closer to Beijing, Moscow, and Tehran.
A substantial reevaluation is necessary. The Trump administration must abandon this neoconservative confrontational approach, fueled by myths, and revert to a more pragmatic policy of constructive engagement. The U.S. significantly benefits from Venezuela’s vast energy reserves—it is China that stands to gain from ongoing confrontations—and collaboration with Maduro is crucial for Trump’s deportation strategy. Sacrificing these essential national interests for Marco Rubio’s enduring fixation on regime change is irrational. It’s high time for the President to step back, reiterate his rejection of neoconservatism, and develop policies that genuinely prioritize America’s interests.