The U.S. Department of the Treasury, through the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), issued General License 48 (GL 48) on February 10, 2026, under the Venezuela sanctions regulations. This measure authorizes certain activities in the Venezuelan energy sector, marking a new shift in sanctions policy and Washington’s strategy towards the country’s oil industry.
The license allows the involvement of U.S. goods, technology, and services in oil and gas exploration and production projects in Venezuela, with strict limits to prevent sanction evasion and maintain financial and legal control from the United States.
The issuance of GL 48 is part of a broader selective easing of energy sanctions, initiated weeks earlier with licenses for crude oil exports, diluents, and oil trade.
This measure coincides with a growing interest from international energy companies in reviving projects in Venezuela and the Caribbean. Companies like BP and Shell have sought licenses to advance gas and oil developments, conditioned by U.S. sanctions regulations.
Washington aims to facilitate energy production while maintaining oversight over capital flows and commercial relations with the Venezuelan state and PDVSA.
GL 48 allows for “ordinary and incidental” transactions necessary for the operation of the Venezuelan energy sector, including:
Authorized Activities
Provision of goods, technology, software, and services for oil and gas exploration, development, and production.
Operations involving:
- Government of Venezuela
- Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA)
- Companies where PDVSA owns ≥50%
Logistical and operational services:
- Insurance
- Maintenance and repair of equipment
- Port services and operational support
These authorizations aim to reactivate the oil infrastructure without fully lifting the sanctions framework.
The license imposes strict restrictions to prevent opaque schemes or sensitive geopolitical alliances:
Not Authorized
- Non-commercial payments (e.g., debt swaps, state gold, cryptocurrencies).
- Transactions involving sanctioned actors or strategic opponents.
- Unblocking of frozen assets.
- Operations with sanctioned vessels.
- Creation of new joint ventures in Venezuela.
- Certain sensitive exports linked to the oil system.
The aim is to allow controlled energy activity without dismantling the financial pressure structure on the Venezuelan state.
One of the most significant elements is the legal framework in the United States:
- Contracts must be governed by U.S. law.
- Dispute resolution mechanisms in U.S. courts or forums.
- Mandatory reporting of operations:
- within the first 10 days of activity
- then every 90 days while the operation continues
These conditions reinforce Washington’s financial and regulatory control over any associated commercial flow.
Energy analysts believe the license could:
- Increase Venezuelan oil production in the short term;
- Facilitate foreign investment;
- Revive projects stalled by sanctions;
- Reconfigure the relationship between PDVSA and international companies.
The U.S. Energy Information Administration estimates that oil production could rise up to 20% if the new licenses are fully implemented.
General License 48 does not signal the end of sanctions but rather a calibrated easing strategy:
- It permits controlled economic activity;
- Maintains structural financial blockades;
- Preserves the ability to exert political pressure on Caracas.
Strategically, Washington aims to:
- Prevent the total collapse of the Venezuelan oil industry;
- Block any advances from Russia, China, or Iran in the energy sector;
- Maintain regulatory influence over the reconstruction of the sector.
GL 48 is part of a larger redesign of U.S. policy towards Venezuela:
- Selective sanctions instead of total blockade;
- Conditional opening to the energy sector;
- Strict financial oversight;
- Use of oil as a tool for regional stability and energy security.
In summary, the license sets up a hybrid model: limited economic opening with political and legal control from Washington.
This does not imply normalization or lifting of the embargo, but rather a regulatory engineering to allow oil activity under U.S. supervision, partially reinserting the country into the global energy market and maintaining strategic pressure on the state apparatus and financial system linked to Chavism.
The real impact will depend on three factors:
- The response of international oil companies,
- The political stability in Venezuela,
- And the continuity of the U.S.’s flexible sanctions approach.